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ABSTRACT 
As a result of high economic inequality, widespread discontent with excessive 
chief executive officer (CEO) compensation levels is acute in South Africa (SA). 
Some commentators argue that instead of high levels of CEO pay causing 
inequality, it may be part of the solution if higher levels of CEO compensation 
translate into better company performance, so reducing unemployment.  
International studies investigating the relationship between CEO short-term cash 
compensation and current company performance generally report a weak or no 
relationship where accounting based measures of performance are used. 
Developments in the international literature reflect a stronger relationship when 
long-term incentive compensation (LIC) is included and total shareholder return 
(TSR) used to measure company performance. However, a concerning negative 
association between the highest paid CEOs in terms of excess LIC and future 
abnormal TSR is reported. 
In contrast, SA pay-performance research is largely not reflective of the 
developments in the international literature, with local studies mostly finding no 
pay-performance relationship, except where size-related accounting measures are 
used. As a result of the strong correlation between CEO pay and company size 
reported in the international literature, and local studies not adequately controlling 
for company size, the accuracy of the conclusions drawn in prior studies on the 
pay-performance sensitivity relationship in SA are brought into question. 
This study addresses the gaps in the SA literature by investigating the relationship 
between the size-adjusted excess CEO compensation and future abnormal TSR for 
the top 100 SA companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for the 
period 2011 to 2013. A positive relationship is found between future abnormal 
TSR and short-term cash compensation, but not LIC. The levels and structure of 
CEO compensation in SA is also described. 
KEYWORDS: Pay-performance sensitivity; Optimal contracting; Agency theory; 
Executive remuneration; Company performance; South Africa 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERIEW 
This study investigates the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) 
compensation and company performance for the top 100 South African (SA) 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the period 2011 
to 2013. The need for such a study arises from two acute shortcomings inherent in 
the SA literature. Firstly, where a relationship between CEO pay and company 
performance is found and reported in the SA literature accounting measures, 
which are strongly influenced by company size, have largely been used as a proxy 
for company performance. As a strong positive relationship between company 
size and CEO pay is reported in the international literature, with international 
studies on pay-performance sensitivity consequently controlling for size, it is 
questionable whether the positive pay-performance relationships reported in the 
SA literature are in fact a reflection of a relationship between pay and company 
performance or pay and company size. 
Further, SA studies largely ignore long-term incentive compensation (LIC) 
despite the fact that the international literature indicates that LIC is a significant 
component of CEO compensation and generally report a stronger relationship 
between company performance and LIC, than short-term cash compensation 
(SCC). 
Thus a South African study that controls for company size, measures company 
performance more appropriately and includes both SCC and LIC is sorely needed. 
This study investigates the relationship between excess compensation calculated 
against peer groups based on company size and future abnormal total shareholder 
returns (TSR), which this study argues is the most appropriate  measure of 
company performance. 
Shareholders pay CEOs substantial packages for the purposes of attracting and 
retaining talented senior executives and motivating them towards improved 
company performance in order to increase shareholder value, in turn contributing 
to the economy through increased taxes and job creation. The justifiability of high 
CEO pay levels is a contentious issue in SA. Consequently studies on pay-
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performance sensitivity are important to inform this debate. This study 
commences by setting out the background to the debate. 
 
1.1.Background to the executive compensation debate 
1.1.1. High pay of executive management 
The level of compensation earned by executive managers of companies in the 
private sector is a contentious issue worldwide. Fuelling this debate is the 
increasing disparity in compensation between executives and the average worker. 
In the United States (U.S.) the average ratio of CEO-to-worker pay increased from 
42:1 in 1980 to 373:1 in 2014 (AFL-CIO, 2015a) and in 2014 the top paid CEO 
earned 4 429 times the average wage of non-supervisory workers. The question 
arises whether this increase is justified in terms of increased company 
performance and returns to shareholders. Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2014) found 
that  the companies that pay their CEOs in the top ten percent of excess pay earn 
negative abnormal returns of nearly -8% in the subsequent three years. This casts 
doubt over the economic justification for ever increasing executive compensation. 
If the labour market for good leaders is a competitive environment, as suggested 
by Chalmers, Koh and Stapleton (2006), then companies need to compensate 
CEOs adequately in order to retain quality talent (Bizjak, Lemmon & Naveen, 
2008). Agency theory argues that once the appropriate talent has been secured, 
management needs to be incentivised to act in the best interest of the shareholders 
of the company. It is further argued that if companies perform well, they 
contribute to the economy and more jobs are created. 
Due to the injustice of Apartheid the South African (SA) landscape is arguably 
more sensitive to pay inequalities. The ruling political party (African National 
Congress) and its ally, the largest trade union, openly and strongly condemn the 
levels of CEO compensation in South Africa (COSATU, 2014). It would therefore 
be concerning if similar results to that of Cooper et al. (2014), where relatively 
higher paid CEOs performed worse in a subsequent period, were found locally. 
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Consequently a study that investigates whether higher compensation for CEOs 
does in fact translate into better company performance in the South African 
context is needed. 
 
1.1.2. Pay-performance sensitivity 
Pay-performance sensitivity studies investigate the relationship between CEO pay 
and company performance. The majority of research on the topic of executive 
compensation and agency theory focusses on the relationship between company 
performance and CEO compensation. The methodology adopted by these studies 
can be characterised according to three main aspects, namely: the direction of the 
study, measurement of compensation and measurement of company performance. 
Table 1 highlights the main aspects present in pay-performance sensitivity studies, 
indicating the initial focus of the literature and subsequent developments. There is 
a trend towards including long-term incentive compensation and measuring 
company performance using market-related shareholder returns. 
Table 1: Differences in aspects of studies on pay-performance sensitivity 
 Earlier (initial) research Developments 
Measure of 
company 
performance 
 
Accounting measures of 
company performance 
Market related measures of 
shareholder returns 
Measure of CEO 
compensation 
Cash compensation Total compensation 
(including long-term 
incentives) 
 
Direction of study Correlation between CEO 
compensation and company 
performance 
 
CEO compensation for 
future company 
performance 
 
International studies that find only a weak relationship between company 
performance and CEO pay either exclude long-term incentives from pay or use 
accounting ratios and figures to measure company performance (Conyon & 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Leech, 1994; Girma, Thompson & Wright, 2007; Masson, 1971). Where long-
term incentives such as share options and share grants are included as 
compensation measure, and share returns are used as performance measure, the 
link is much stronger (Abowd, 1990; Main, Bruce & Buck, 1996; Masson, 1971; 
Murphy, 1986; Stathopoulus, Espenlaub & Walker, 2005).  
There are numerous studies that aim to determine the correlation between 
executive compensation and company performance. These studies focus on the 
sensitivity of CEO compensation to company performance. Since cash bonuses, 
share option grants and performance shares are awarded based on company 
performance, these studies investigate the degree to which the incentives are 
aligned to performance. A limitation of these studies is that they are backward 
looking and do not address whether the level and structure of CEO compensation 
is successful in motivating them to perform better in the future. There is a paucity 
of studies that investigate the relationship between CEO compensation and future 
share performance (Balafas & Florackis, 2014; Cooper et al., 2014; Core, 
Holthausen & Larker, 1999; Murphy, 1999). 
South African studies focus on cash pay and short-term incentives, as well as 
accounting measures of company performance, as reflected in column 2 of 
Table_1. No local study satisfactorily considers the further developments reflected 
in the international literature (this is further explained in the literature review). 
Therefore, a South African study that investigates the relationship between pay 
and future performance incorporating total compensation (and so including both 
the short-term component and long-term incentives) and market-related 
shareholder returns will clearly contribute to the development of the body of 
research. 
In addition to the lack of studies reflecting the international developments in pay-
performance sensitivity in South Africa, there is lack of summarised information 
available regarding total compensation of CEOs of listed companies in the 
country. This study is the first to address both of these issues. 
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1.2.Objectives of this study 
The first objective of this study is to analyse and describe compensation levels 
and pay structures for the largest 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) for 2011 to 2013. 
Maximum, minimum, mean, median and standard deviation will be determined 
for the largest 100 companies listed on the JSE in South Africa for the period 
2011 to 2013. Since the largest 100 companies listed on the JSE includes 
companies that vary greatly in size and industry, the compensation will be 
analysed per company size group and industry in order to identify characteristics 
that may be unique to the specific classification. The relative proportion of long-
term incentives to total compensation will also be determined for each size and 
industry group. 
The second objective of this study is to investigate and analyse the relationship 
between the level and structure of CEO compensation and the future total 
shareholder returns in South Africa. 
In order to achieve this, this study first analyses the relationship between the pay 
components and future abnormal total shareholder returns descriptively by 
ranking the companies according to excess CEO compensation; that is: the 
difference between a CEO’s compensation and the median compensation for the 
peer group, based on industry and/or size, of that company. The short-term (two 
years and one quarter) future share returns and dividends of the highest decile 
excess compensation are compared with the lowest decile to investigate whether 
the companies of the highest paid CEOs perform better than lowest paid CEOs. 
The remaining deciles are progressively added to investigate whether the 
relationship is consistent throughout the population. Secondly statistical 
regression analysis is performed in order to confirm whether the descriptive 
relationships are significant. 
The companies are also ranked according to the proportion of long-term 
incentives compared to total compensation (TC) earned by the CEO, from the 
highest proportion LIC to TC to the lowest proportion. The short-term future 
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share returns and dividends of the top decile of LIC to TC ratio are compared to 
the lowest decile. 
In addressing these two research objectives this study seeks to contribute towards 
the debate in South Africa regarding excessive executive compensation in two 
ways: first, by describing the levels and structure of compensation per size group 
and industry for the largest 100 companies listed on the JSE, and second, by 
investigating and analysing the relationship between levels and structure of CEO 
compensation and future shareholder returns. The approach that is followed in this 
study is closest to that of Cooper et al. (2014). 
If it is found that the companies of the highest paid CEOs perform the worst in 
subsequent periods, as was found by Cooper et al. (2014), it would negatively 
reflect on the already contentious issue of the high pay of executives compared to 
the meagre pay of average employee. 
 
1.3.Layout of study 
Chapter 1 discussed the background to the study and provided a brief introduction 
to the literature on CEO compensation. The research objectives of the study were 
also formulated. The study continues with a more detailed review of the literature 
and the formulation of specific research questions arising from the literature 
review in chapter 2. The methodology, limitations and scope follows thereafter in 
chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The results of the study for each of research 
objectives 1 and 2 are reported and analysed in chapter 5 and chapter 6 
respectively. Finally, the contribution of the study and areas for future research 
are presented in chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
2.1.Introduction 
Shareholders of large listed companies rarely have much to do with the day to day 
operations of the companies. Consequently directors are appointed to manage the 
company on their behalf. An important question arising from the separation of the 
ownership and control of companies is how to motivate management (directors 
for the purpose of this study) to act in the best interests of shareholders. A 
common approach to motivate management is to award them annually for the 
results that have been achieved during the year. However, this approach is 
regularly criticised in management accounting textbooks (Drury, 2012; Horngren, 
Datar & Rajan, 2014; Vigario, 2007) for being short sighted. Therefore the 
question arises whether it is possible to reward management in such a way that 
they are also incentivised to create shareholder value in the longer term. 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate whether paying top management 
more (or less) relative to peers and/or including a higher (or lower) proportion of 
long-term incentives in management’s compensation structure translates into an 
increase (or decrease) in shareholder value in the future. A secondary aim is to 
describe levels of CEO pay and the CEO compensation structures within the 
different size groups and industries of the top 100 South African companies listed 
on the JSE. 
The existing body of literature on senior executive pay reflects several main areas 
of interest: theories explaining managerial pay, the relationship between 
compensation and company performance (pay-performance sensitivity) and 
factors affecting this relationship. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: First a brief overview of the 
arguments and popular sentiments surrounding executive compensation is 
presented. This is followed by a discussion of the theories explaining executive 
compensation, as well as the basis on which compensation is benchmarked. The 
chapter continues with a review of the various models of employee compensation 
used internationally and the different measures of company performance used in 
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the pay-performance sensitivity literature. A consideration of both international 
and local studies in the area of executive compensation is presented thereafter. 
The chapter culminates in a summary of the key issues relating to pay-
performance sensitivity and, consequently, the research objectives of this study 
investigating pay-performance sensitivity in South Africa.  
 
2.2.Focus on CEO compensation 
The majority of studies on executive compensation focus on the CEO (Balafas & 
Florackis, 2014; Chalmers et al., 2006; Cooper et al., 2014; Core et al., 1999; 
Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Jensen & Murphy, 1990a; Jensen & Murphy, 1990b; 
Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994) suggesting that while the principles of executive 
compensation applies to the role of the CEO, they are shown to be more acute in 
the role of CEO (Shaw, 2011). 
Further as the CEO is usually the top paid individual in the organisation, there is 
widespread interest in the CEO pay, with the popular press often reflecting the 
opinion that CEOs are grossly overpaid (Pickworth, 2014), disproportionate to the 
value that they add to the entity. 
In 2014 the CEO of Discovery Communications Inc. earned $156 077 912 in cash 
and incentives (AFL-CIO, 2015b). This is 4 429 times the average of production 
and nonsupervisory workers. The average CEO-to-worker ratio in 2014 was 
373:1, up from 331 in 2013 and 42 in 1980 (AFL-CIO, 2015a). During the 
financial crisis of 2008, the CEOs of Wall Street firms collectively earned 
hundreds of millions of dollars at the expense of the indebted middleclass who 
could ill afford secured debt. Further the American tax payer effectively bore the 
cost of the Federal Reserve providing assistance to certain of these failing 
institutions. Such statistics and arguments are frequently reflected in the popular 
press (COSATU, 2014; Pickworth, 2014; Rossouw, 2015) and commonly used in 
political and trade union rhetoric. Even Pope St Francis – the leader of the world’s 
largest religious organisation – said in his first peace message of his pontificate 
that “…huge salaries and bonuses are symptoms of an economy based on greed 
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and inequality…” and called again for nations to narrow the wealth gap (PwC, 
2014). 
In South Africa, industrial action on the mines, as well as the emergence of the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) political party has fuelled the aggression 
towards large corporates who pay large executive salaries and bonuses, while the 
working class is struggling to cover their living expenses. It must however be 
recognised that driving this inequality in South Africa is high levels of 
unemployment coupled with a lack of access to quality education. In 2014 the 
quality of South Africa’s education ranked third from the bottom in a survey of 
148 countries and last for the quality of science and mathematics education 
(World Economic Forum, 2014).  
 
2.2.1. The pay gap 
There are different ways in which inequality, or the pay gap, can be measured. 
The level of pay of the CEO compared to the lowest worker is often used to 
support emotional arguments, since it results in the most extreme figure. It is 
however not representative. A better measure is the ratio between CEO pay and 
the average employee.  A third, more scientific, measure is the Gini coefficient. 
Ranging from 0 (everyone is equal) to 1 (extreme inequality), the Gini coefficient 
appears simple to understand, but is in fact is complex to interpret as it integrates 
many variables, including the unemployment rate. South Africa is widely believed 
to be one of the most unequal countries in the world, with Gini coefficients 
ranging from 0.63 reported by the World Bank and 0.72 reported by Statistics SA, 
in comparison to 0.48 in the U.K. and 0.49 in the U.S. (PwC, 2014). 
The assumption that the high Gini coefficient is due to the wide pay gap is less 
than sound. If the Gini coefficient is recalculated using effective unemployment 
levels of the U.S. (around 10% versus S.A.’s 37% in 2013) the Gini coefficient 
would become 0.54 (PwC, 2014). This is much closer to that of developed 
countries like the U.S. and the U.K., suggesting that South Africa’s high Gini 
coefficient is not driven only by the earning inequality between the highest and 
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lowest paid employees, but the inequality between the pay of the employed and 
the zero earnings of the unemployed (PwC, 2014). According to PwC’s most 
recent Remuneration Report, “A recalibrated work ethic will evolve from an 
educated citizenry, and only then will commentators be in a position to calculate a 
meaningful ratio for sensible commentary” (PwC, 2014:24). They argue that the 
solution to the inequality problem thus lies in reducing unemployment, rather than 
top executives’ compensation (PwC, 2014). 
 
2.2.2. The demand for good CEOs 
Instead of high CEO compensation being the problem and cause of the pay 
inequality gap, it could be argued that it is the solution. The private sector is a 
significant contributor to job creation and employment opportunities. However 
improving company performance is a prerequisite for creating employment 
opportunities, and this in turn requires talented managers. The level of pay affects 
the quality of managers that a company can attract and consequently a pertinent 
question is: “Are current levels of CEO compensation high enough to attract the 
best and brightest individuals to careers in corporate management?” (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990b:17). Jensen & Murphy (1990b) compared the compensation 
earned by the best lawyers and investment bankers, to that of the top CEOs and 
found that the former earn substantially more than the latter. Further, becoming a 
top paid executive can take a lifetime’s investment in one company to achieve. 
Why would a graduate therefore decide to become a manager of a company, if 
they could earn significantly more in a career in law or investment banking 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990b)? In the U.K. 60% of companies are worried that the 
lack of flexibility in recruitment policy will make it more difficult to recruit 
executive directors, especially from overseas (PwC, 2014).  
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2.2.3. Key issues arising from the focus on CEO compensation 
Based on the concerns in the literature as regard the level and structure of CEO 
compensation the key questions are: 
- Rather than whether CEOs are getting paid too much, but whether the 
shareholders are getting what they pay for; and 
- Whether certain measures of compensation are more effective in terms of 
motivating managerial effort and therefore translating into better company 
performance than others. 
Addressing the above questions requires that the level and structure of CEO pay 
be considered relative to company performance. 
 
2.3.Theories explaining managerial pay 
Research into top management pay has been ongoing for more than 85 years and 
comprises hundreds of studies, with the relationship between chief executive 
officer (CEO) compensation and company performance being the most researched 
topic in this area. There are, however, various theories in the literature that 
investigates CEO compensation and that try to explain whether shareholders get 
what they pay for. 
 
2.3.1. Agency theory 
Agency theory considers the question of how to motivate and reward management 
in accordance with their contribution to increase the value of the company. The 
agency problem arises as a result of the managers of the company making 
decisions on behalf of the owners (or shareholders). This separation of control and 
ownership dates back to the joint-stock companies – that emerged in the sixteenth 
century – to exploit monopoly powers by trading as a corporate enterprise. 
Shareholders gained entry by purchasing shares and some were actively involved 
in the operations of the company. Others were “passive investors who delegated 
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management to paid officials directed by governors and assistants elected from 
amongst their ranks” (Jones & Ville, 1996:898). This separation, however, may 
not have been widespread until the latter part of the 19
th
 century with management 
and ownership of companies vesting in the same person until around 1870 
(Lambrechts (1992) cited in Hall (1998)). 
Adam Smith argued that this separation of control is inefficient, since managers 
pursue their personal goals above that of the company, and that the situation raises 
prices to consumers and reduce returns to shareholders (Jones & Ville, 1996). 
Adam Smith is often cited from his 1776 book “The Wealth of Nations” as saying 
that economic behaviour is motived by self-interest. Carlos and Nicholas 
(1996:919) disagree that the separation of control and ownership are inefficient, 
arguing that when there is a high frequency of transactions, “teams of salaried 
managers can coordinate the flow of goods and information more cheaply than the 
market”. 
The separation of control and ownership is common to many organisations. 
Companies benefit from the expertise and specialisation of managers, as well as 
the separation of decision-making and risk-bearing. This, however, causes agency 
problems since the decision managers who initiate and implement the important 
decisions are not the major claimants and therefore do not bear a major share of 
the wealth effects of their decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Asymmetry in 
information between managers and owners could also result in a possible conflict 
of interests (Cohen & Uliana, 1990). The agency theory emphasises that managers 
are self-serving and that formal mechanisms – monitoring and reward structures – 
are meant to align the incentives of top management with the interests of the 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Bebchuk, 
Cremers and Peyer (2011) found evidence that supports the hypothesis that a 
higher CEO Pay Slice (CPS) – CEOs who earn a higher proportion of the 
aggregate pay of the top-five highly paid executives – is associated with agency 
problems. 
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The undesirable activities of the managers can be limited by establishing 
appropriate incentives for the managers and by incurring monitoring costs (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). 
 
2.3.2. Optimal contracting theory 
Optimal contracting theory suggests that an optimal contract should attract the 
right CEOs; incentivise them to exert effort and exploit growth opportunities; and 
reject wasteful projects while limiting the cost of doing so (Edmans & Gabaix, 
2009). 
Jensen and Murphy (1990a) suggested that the focus of designing an optimal 
contract should be linking management’s expected utility to the owners’ wealth, 
thereby creating a strong correlation between the financial benefit received by 
management and the profit maximisation of the shareholders. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990a) suggests that, since the objective of shareholders is to 
increase their wealth – even though shareholder wealth is affected by many 
factors, including public policy, supply and demand, and actions of executives 
and employees of the company – it is appropriate to pay CEOs on the basis of 
shareholder wealth. 
A positive relationship between CEO compensation and company performance 
would be consistent with agency theory (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
However, optimal contracting theory suggests that the problem of appropriate 
CEO compensation is not just a question of how much the executive managers 
should be paid, but also how their compensation packages should be structured 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990b). If an optimal contract does exist it is suggested that a 
company would want to apply it. For CEOs this relates to their compensation 
structure which will be considered in section 2.4. 
However, agency theory and optimal contracting theory are not the only theories 
explaining the CEOs compensation package. Other theories, namely managerial 
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power and labour market theory, may also have an influence on CEO pay levels 
and pay structures. 
 
2.3.3. Theory of managerial power 
A strong correlation between CEO compensation and company performance is 
often lacking in the literature, therefore other theories are put forward to explain 
the variety in level and structure of CEO compensation. Various authors submit 
the theory of managerial power as a determinant of CEO compensation. 
In contrast to the optimal contract approach that has dominated research in the 
field of executive compensation, the theory of managerial power suggests that 
executives have power over their boards to influence their own compensation and 
extract “rents” (Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, 2002). “Rents” refers to value received 
by executives in excess of that which they would receive under optimal 
contracting, and Bebchuk et al. (2002) argues that managers with more power can 
extract greater rent. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) found that the influence that CEOs have over the board 
of directors plays a role in the determination of incentives. This theory of 
managerial power is echoed by O’Reilly and Main (2010:676) who report that a 
number of studies propose that boards of directors can be “captured” by the CEO 
and made to serve his or her interests rather than serving the shareholders’ 
interests. Likewise, Cheng and Indjejikian (2009) found that CEOs have strong 
negotiating powers with their boards as regards to their own compensation. A 
U.K. study on the effect of board control and remuneration committees on 
management compensation found that the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board, the presence of a remuneration committee and CEO duality had only 
a limited effect on the level of top management pay (Conyon & Peck, 1998). They 
did conclude, however, that top management pay and corporate performance are 
more aligned in companies with outsider-nominated board and remuneration 
committees.  
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If management and the owners both aim to maximise their own value there is 
reason to believe that the managers might not always act in the best interest of the 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). O’Reilly and Main (2010) found 
evidence that it is likely that CEOs and boards, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, may be biased in ways that affect the amounts and type of pay the 
CEO receives. 
 
2.3.4. Labour market theory 
Even though management might have some power over boards and how their own 
pay is determined, the labour market theory suggests that supply and demand play 
an important role. CEO compensation is viewed by this theory as the efficient 
outcome of a labour market in which companies optimally compete for 
managerial talent (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). 
The labour market theory postulates that the level of CEO compensation reflects 
the company’s demand for talented managers, and thus it aligns the interests of 
the manager with the shareholders (Chalmers et al., 2006). A natural supply and 
demand is created by labour market forces which undermines most factors in 
determining CEO remuneration (Shaw, 2011). Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) 
argued that the value of a CEOs services to the company is raised by the limited 
supply of suitably talented managers that are capable of running large companies. 
Other studies have found that companies need to re-price share options in order to 
retain key employees (Carter & Lynch, 2001; Chidambaran & Prabhala, 2003). 
The labour market theory therefore suggests that adequate compensation is a 
prerequisite for corporate performance. 
 
2.3.5. Benchmarking 
Bizjak et al. (2008) report that the practice of benchmarking the level of CEO 
compensation is widely spread and that it has a significant impact on CEO 
compensation. Their results support the view that benchmarking is a practical and 
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efficient mechanism to determine the market salary necessary to attract and retain 
valuable managerial talent as suggested by labour market theory. 
Since companies typically benchmark CEO pay on peer groups based on industry 
and size (Albuquerque, De Franco & Verdi, 2013; Bizjak et al., 2008), the 
industry and size of the company may have an effect on the relationship between 
the level of CEO compensation and the performance of the company. Faulkender 
and Yang (2010) also found that industry and size are important in explaining the 
composition of compensation peer groups. Consequently, it may be necessary to 
control for the industry and size of the companies in a study of the relationship 
between pay and performance. 
While some studies explain that industry and size is used to benchmark 
compensation, others only mention company size. Gabaix and Landier (2006) 
showed that a large portion of cross-country differences in the level of CEO 
compensation can be explained by differences in the size of the companies. They 
found that in the US, both the size of the company and the size of a benchmark 
company in the same industry are significant predictors of CEO compensation. 
There are different ways in which company size may be defined. Kaplan and 
Rauh (2010) used equity market value as a proxy for size, while O’Reilly and 
Main (2010) found that CEO compensation is strongly related to revenue as a 
measure of company size. Cooper et al. (2014) benchmarked CEO compensation 
on both industry and size, and reported similar results between using revenue and 
market capitalisation as a proxy for size. 
 
2.3.6. Key issues arising from the theories explaining managerial pay 
This study investigates the relationship between the level and structure of CEO 
compensation and future company performance. Agency theory suggests that 
there may be no such relationship unless the levels and structure of CEO 
compensation are aligned with that of shareholder wealth creation, the argument 
put forward by optimal contracting theory. Labour market theory would suggest a 
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positive relationship between the level and structure of CEO pay and future 
company performance as a result of more talented managers (that are more 
capable of directing the company) attracting larger salaries. In contrast the theory 
of managerial power suggests that there may be no, or only a weak, relationship 
between levels and structure of CEO pay and company performance. The practice 
of companies benchmarking CEO pay on peer groups based on industry and size 
may affect the relationship between the level of CEO compensation and the 
performance of the company. 
A positive relationship between company performance and various variables 
comprising compensation would suggest that using those variables as incentives is 
effective in aligning management’s interests and company performance. Before 
this relationship can be examined, however, consideration must first be given to: 
- the components that need to be investigated as part of compensation 
(section 2.4); as well as 
- the means by which company performance is meaningfully measured 
(section 2.5).  
 
2.4.Compensation 
CEOs are rewarded and incentivised in various ways. According to the Chartered 
Institute of Personnel and Development (2015) the process of designing and 
implementing reward policies and practices that support and advance company 
(and shareholder) objectives as well as employee aspirations is called “strategic 
reward”. Armstrong and Brown (2006) refer to the “total reward concept” as the 
new approach to strategic reward. “Total reward” is classified into transactional 
rewards (also known as total remuneration, transactional rewards are made up of 
base pay, contingent pay and employee benefits) – tangible rewards emanating 
from the transactions between employers and employees; and relational rewards 
– intangible rewards such as learning, professional development and the work 
experience. The focus of this study will be on transactional rewards which will 
be referred to as compensation. 
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2.4.1. Components of CEO compensation 
CEO compensation typically consists of a short-term and a long-term component. 
The short-term component usually includes the base salary and annual cash 
bonus, plus other benefits paid for by the company. The long-term component 
consists mostly of performance share grants and share option grants. 
The terms used to describe these compensation components varies from study to 
study, but all the components of total compensation (TC) can be classified under 
either short-term cash compensation (SCC) or long-term incentive compensation 
(LIC). 
Shaw (2011) defines executive remuneration as all the financial benefits that a 
CEO and other senior executives receive, and classifies it into: fixed pay; other 
benefits; and short- and long-term incentives. Bognanno (2010) defines CEO 
compensation as the sum of base pay, bonuses, share- and option grants and 
benefits, while Sharma and Smith (2001) classifies compensation into three 
components: cash compensation (salary and bonus), other benefits (insurance, 
club memberships, other noncash rewards, etc.) and long-term incentives (share 
options and other deferred compensation). In a recent comprehensive U.S. study 
investigating pay for future performance, three measures of compensation were 
used: (i) total compensation (salary, bonus, total value of restricted shares granted, 
total value of share options granted, and long-term incentive pay-outs); (ii) cash 
compensation (salary and bonus); and (iii) incentive compensation (the difference 
between total- and cash compensation) (Cooper et al., 2014). 
The components of total compensation (TC) that emerge from a review of the 
literature and the annual financial statements of the top 40 JSE listed companies in 
South Africa can be broadly classified into short-term cash compensation (SCC) 
(which includes base salary, other benefits and cash bonus) and long-term 
incentive compensation (LIC) (which includes deferred cash bonus, share grants, 
share option grants and gains on shares held). This classification, presented in 
Table 2, includes all the components of compensation addressed in the literature, 
but classifies it according to the difficulty with which each component is valued. 
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Table 2: Components of total compensation 
Total compensation (TC) 
Short-term cash compensation 
(SCC) 
Long-term incentive compensation 
(LIC) 
CASH 
 
Total guaranteed pay (TGP): 
- Base salary 
- Other benefits 
 
Short-term incentive compensation 
(STI): 
- Cash bonus (CB) 
CASH 
 
Deferred STI (bonus) 
 
SHARE-BASED (2.4.2) 
 
Performance shares (2.4.2.1) 
Share options (2.4.2.2) 
Gains on shares held (2.4.2.3) 
 
 
The value of cash compensation is readily available since it is disclosed in the 
remuneration reports and poses no valuation difficulties. Other benefits include 
perquisites that are not paid directly to the CEO, but rather on behalf of the CEO 
(for example pension fund contributions and membership fees). A limitation of 
including long-term incentives (with the exclusion of deferred cash bonus) into 
pay-performance sensitivity studies is the difficulty of valuing these instruments, 
since the amount of compensation that will be received is uncertain at the time the 
compensation is awarded (Lambert, Larcker & Weigelt, 1993). Shares or options 
may be granted with complex vesting conditions that make it difficult to value. 
The International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) on Share-based payments 
(IFRS2) requires share-based compensation to be recognised in the financial 
statements at fair value, but is disclosed globularly and not per employee. The 
number of share options and share grants, as well as the conditions attached to 
them, must however be disclosed individually per director. It is therefore possible 
to calculate the value of the long-term incentives, although it is highly impractical 
for large studies. The various types of long-term incentives are discussed in the 
next section, as well as the valuation thereof. 
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2.4.2. Long-term share-based incentives 
There are predominantly two types of long-term share-based incentives, namely 
performance shares and share options. The main distinction between the two is 
that performance shares are issued in full and share options only grant the right to 
acquire shares in the company. 
 
2.4.2.1.Performance shares 
Performance shares are shares that are issued to employees under a share grant 
program once performance and/or other criteria have been met. No consideration 
is generally payable by participants (Bussin, 2011). Most share grant programs 
can be categorised into two main types, namely Forfeitable Share Plans (FSPs) 
and Conditional Share Plans (CSPs). 
Under a FSP all the rights to the shares are transferred to the employee on the date 
of the grant. This means that the employee becomes entitled to vote, attend annual 
general meetings (AGMs) and receive dividends. If the performance criteria 
attached to the shares are not met or the employee’s employment is terminated by 
a specified date, the shares revert back to the company (i.e. are forfeited by the 
employee). 
When conditional shares are granted the employee does not become the owner of 
the shares on the grant date and thus does not receive the rights attached to the 
shares. Some CSPs however do allow the employee rights to receive dividends 
declared during the period before the shares vest, but these dividends are only 
received along with the transfer of the shares at the end of the performance period, 
and if the performance targets are reached. 
Any dividends received under a FSP are taxed at the dividend tax rate of 15% in 
South Africa, whereas dividends received under a CSP are taxed at the 
employee’s marginal tax rate. 
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Valuation techniques 
The valuation of FSPs and CSPs is the same. Since there are no quoted market 
prices for forfeitable or conditional shares, the fair value of these performance 
shares is estimated by determining the expected value of the shares granted in a 
given year. 
The following variables are used to calculate an expected value for the share 
awarded during the year, taking into account the probabilities of each of the 
outcomes taking place: 
-  the time-value-of-money (TVM), 
- the risk (or probability) of forfeiture, which will happen if the employee’s 
service is terminated before the shares vest, or 
- the risk (or probability) of the share never vesting due to the performance 
targets attached to the FSP not being reached before the expiry date. 
Valuations applied in the literature 
Due to the complexity of the valuation of performance shares, as well as the 
limited availability of information, it is highly impractical to accurately value 
performance share grants in comprehensive studies. 
The approach in the literature is inconsistent. Instead of attempting to value the 
share grants, simplifying assumptions are made as regard the value of these 
grants. Lambert et al. (1993) multiply the number of performance shares awarded 
by the target value (or pay-out per share if the performance criteria are met) and 
they value conditional shares at the share price on the grant date. Dommisse 
(2011) values performance shares at the average unconditional share price. Other 
studies mention performance shares granted, but fail to describe how these grants 
are valued (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2014). 
Generally less consideration is given in the literature to the accuracy of the value 
of performance share grants than that of share options. 
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2.4.2.2.Share options 
Share options are instruments granted to employees that carry a right, but not the 
obligation, to buy a certain amount of shares in the company at a predetermined 
price, or “strike/offer price”. Employees must typically wait for a specified 
vesting period before being allowed to exercise the options. If the performance 
criteria are not met at a specified date, some or all of the options might not vest 
(Bussin, 2011). 
If the company’s shares are trading at a price above that of the share option’s 
strike price at vesting date the options are said to be “in the money” and the 
option holder, or employee, may decide to exercise the option by buying the 
company’s shares at the strike price. If the employee wishes to cash out the value 
of the options, the option needs to be exercised and the underlying share needs to 
be sold at the market price. The difference is the intrinsic value of the option. 
Where the strike price is higher than the market price of the underlying share, the 
option is said to be “out of the money”. 
The actual value received from share options depend on the company’s share 
price performance after the grant date, whether the employee remains with the 
company and the employee’s risk preference affecting his/her incentive to 
exercise the options (Lambert et al., 1993). 
Valuation techniques 
Options are generally valued using one of two methods, namely the Black-
Scholes-Merton option pricing model (Black & Scholes, 1973) and the binomial 
option pricing model (also referred to as the “lattice model or “binomial tree 
model”) (Cox, Ross & Rubinstein, 1979). These two models are also specifically 
mentioned in the Basis for Conclusions (BC) to IFRS2, but neither is given 
preference. Regardless of which method is used, the following six inputs need to 
be considered: 
i. current price of the underlying share 
ii. exercise price of the option 
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iii. expected volatility of the price of the underlying share 
iv. expected dividend yield of the underlying share 
v. risk-free interest rate for the term of the option 
vi. expected term of the option 
The binomial model is generally regarded as producing a better estimate of an 
option’s fair value since share options may have certain features that preclude the 
use of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula in estimating its fair value. The 
binomial model can, however, be considerably more complicated than using the 
Black-Scholes-Merton formula (EY, 2007). By far the majority of studies 
reviewed in the literature (Benmelech, Kandel & Veronesi, 2010; Bizjak et al., 
2008; Cooper et al., 2014; Jensen & Murphy, 1990a; Malmendier & Tate, 2008; 
Masson, 1971) use the Black-Scholes model to price employee share options. 
The assumptions used as input variables should ideally be adjusted for any 
specific conditions for each option grant. Prior studies have, however, used 
blanket assumptions on all companies included in the sample, for example Jensen 
and Murphy (1990a) who used 5-year government securities as the risk-free rate, 
the dividend yield for the prior year, the past 5-year share price volatility and the 
number of months until expiry for the option term. 
IFRS includes guidance for valuing share options. Since there is no quoted market 
pricing for share options awarded to employees, IFRS2 requires companies to 
estimate the fair value of these awards using option pricing models. The BC to 
IFRS2 states that no particular option pricing model is regarded as theoretically 
superior and that the most appropriate model for the circumstances should be 
used. The only requirement is that the valuation technique be consistent with 
generally accepted valuation methodologies for pricing financial instruments, 
incorporating all factors and assumptions that knowledgeable, willing parties 
would normally consider with respect to the relevant instrument (EY, 2007). 
Valuations applied in the literature 
The valuation of share option grants poses a major difficulty for the purpose of 
pay-performance sensitivity studies. Since the expected value of share options is 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
included in the share-based payment expense granted instead of disclosed 
individually per employee, the options awarded to each executive need to be 
calculated using a complex option pricing model. This makes the valuation 
thereof a very time consuming exercise for comprehensive studies. 
Various different methods for determining the value of share options are used in 
the literature, including the Black-Scholes option pricing model (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990a), the binomial valuation model (Cordeiro & Veliyath, 2003) and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) method (Carpenter & Sanders, 
2004). Lambert et al. (1993) assigned a value equal to 25% of the option’s 
exercise price to each share option, which produces values in the same range as 
more sophisticated option pricing models (Lambert, Larcker & Verrecchia, 1991). 
Dommisse (2011) simply assign a value to share options at the average 
unconditional share price. 
Even though research has shown that the various option-pricing methods produce 
highly correlated values (Carpenter & Sanders, 2004); the option pricing method 
that is used by the majority of studies reviewed (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Bizjak et 
al., 2008; Chalmers et al., 2006; Cheng & Indjejikian, 2009; Cooper et al., 2014; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990a; Malmendier & Tate, 2008) is the Black-Scholes model. 
While the literature is inconsistent as regard the simplifying assumptions used to 
value share options, it is consistent as regard the need to make use of simplifying 
assumptions instead of accurate share option valuation techniques. 
 
2.4.2.3.Gains on shares held 
Gains on shares held by CEOs in their own companies are not consistently viewed 
as part of long-term incentives. Jensen and Murphy (1990b) includes CEO 
shareholding as a measure of CEO wealth, but said that most CEOs hold trivial 
fractions of their companies' shares and ownership levels have declined over the 
past 50 years (Jensen & Murphy, 1990a). Main et al. (1996) on the other hand 
exclude shareholding since they feel it constitutes a personal investment and that 
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shareholders do not have a moral suasion to retain a substantial company 
shareholding and can sell out at any time. Since Cadman (2008) noted that CEOs 
diversify their company equity holdings after vesting, Cooper et al. (2014) also 
exclude CEO shareholding, explaining that it is difficult to measure the CEO’s 
wealth outside the company’s shareholding (once they have replaced shares in the 
employer company with shares of another company). Theunissen (2012) included 
gains on shares held as the sole component of long-term incentives in one of only 
two South African studies found to have included any form of long-term 
incentive. 
 
2.4.3. Inclusion of long-term incentives in pay-performance studies 
Numerous international studies – mostly in the U.S. (Balafas & Florackis, 2014; 
Bizjak et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2014; Core et al., 1999; Jensen & Murphy, 
1990a; Jensen & Murphy, 1990b; Masson, 1971) and Australia (O’Neill & Iob, 
1999) – investigating the relationship between pay and performance include both 
short-term cash and long-term incentive compensation. Some international studies 
however, (Abowd, 1990; Girma et al., 2007; Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan & Zhou, 
2006) excluded long-term incentive compensation. 
In contrast, most local South African studies (Bradley, 2011; Scholtz & Smit, 
2012; Shaw, 2011), omit long-term incentives altogether due to unavailability of 
the expected value of share options and share grants. It is also difficult to 
determine the value of long-term incentives, since the future value of share 
options or performance shares is highly uncertain (Sharma & Smith, 2001). The 
only South African studies that have incorporated long-term incentives as part of 
compensation included only gains on shares held (Theunissen, 2012) or valued 
performance shares and share options at the unconditional average share price 
(Dommisse, 2011). The approaches used to include long-term incentives in South 
Africa are criticised by Main et al. (1996) who suggest that shares held by the 
CEO should be excluded since it constitutes a personal investment, and that 
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valuing performance shares and share options at the full share price will grossly 
overvalue these incentives by ignoring vesting conditions. 
Given the potential significance of long-term incentives (LIC), a possibility exists 
that excluding LIC from an investigation into the relationship between pay and 
performance may give inaccurate results. Since long-term incentives are barely 
addressed in the local literature, there is a paucity of research into the effect long-
term incentives may have on company performance in SA. 
 
2.4.3.1.Relative importance of cash- and incentive compensation 
Disagreement exists in the literature regarding the importance of including long-
term incentives in pay-performance sensitivity studies. Numerous pay-
performance sensitivity studies omit long-term incentives for various reasons, but 
the studies that do include them suggest that long-term incentives are an important 
component of total compensation. In contrast, Bradley (2011) argues that 
incentive compensation is less relevant than cash compensation to the study of the 
effect of CEO compensation on company performance, since a Tower Perrin 
study showed a decline in the U.S. in the ratio of share options to total 
compensation from 38% in 2004 to 23% in 2008. However, Bradley (2011) did 
not consider the increase in the proportion of performance share plans from 8% to 
21% over the same period.  
The figure therefore rather suggests a replacement of one type of long-term 
incentive (share options) with another type (performance share plans), instead of 
an overall decline in the proportion of long-term incentives to total compensation. 
Since a share option does not transfer a full share, but rather an option to purchase 
a share at a reduced price (the strike/offer price), a relatively larger amount of 
share options than performance shares is required to be granted in order to award 
the same fair value of compensation, causing an augmented dilutive effect on 
shareholders’ positions. This might explain the shift from share options to 
performance shares. 
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Adams and Mehran (2003) provide evidence that the compensation structure of 
CEOs in the financial services industry in the U.S. differs from other industries 
and that banking companies pay a relatively larger proportion cash (fixed pay and 
STI) compensation than long-term incentives to CEOs. For this reason, Shaw 
(2011) omitted long-term incentives from his study on CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity in South African financial services companies
1
. 
In contrast to the argument that long-term incentives are unimportant, Sigler 
(2011) cites a 2010 Salary Survey by the Economic Research Institute (ERI) that 
showed an increase in the proportion of incentive pay from 84% (of total pay) to 
88.8% from 1997 to 2010 in the U.S. In a comprehensive study, including the 
S&P1500 companies from 1994 to 2011, Cooper et al. (2014) found that at the 
median level, 52% of total pay is incentive pay. In South-Africa, over the last 
decade or so, incentives (bonuses and share awards) increased from 38% of total 
compensation to nearly 67% (PwC, 2013). Cooper et al. (2014) also report a near 
perfect correlation of LIC and TC (98.6%), but with total cash pay only 
explaining 37.7% of total pay (Cooper et al., 2014). 
Therefore, even though accurate valuation of long-term incentives is not practical 
(as argued in section 2.4.2) it is important for pay-performance sensitivity studies 
in South Africa to include long-term incentive compensation for two reasons: 
Firstly, international studies indicate that long-term incentives make up a 
significant portion of total compensation. Secondly, no research in South Africa 
attempts to establish the relative value of the two major compensation 
components (short-term cash and long-term incentives) and it can thus not be 
ignored on the grounds that it is insignificant. 
 
2.4.4. Key issues relating to the measurement of compensation 
An assimilation of the literature suggests that a study into pay-performance 
sensitivity should give adequate consideration to the inclusion of both short-term 
                                                 
1
 The results of the present study suggest otherwise (refers section 5.4.3) 
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cash and long-term incentives in defining the pay component. Three specific 
considerations arising from the literature are: 
Firstly, the significance of the long-term component relative to the short-term 
cash component should be established. This needs to be analysed both by industry 
and size in order to investigate the effect of benchmarking on CEO pay levels 
(refer 2.3.5). 
Secondly, both short-term cash compensation and long-term incentives should be 
included in the definition of compensation. There is merit in evaluating these 
relative to company performance not only in total but also separately. In order to 
investigate the suggestion of optimal contracting theory (refers 2.3.2) that certain 
compensation structures may be more effective than others in terms of 
incentivising greater managerial effort. 
Finally, simplifying assumptions are required to be made in order to assign a 
value to the long-term share based incentives, for practical purposes for a study of 
even moderate sample size. The accuracy of the value assigned to the incentive on 
the basis of the simplifying assumptions should be considered. The literature is in 
agreement as to the acceptability of assigning a value to long-term share-based 
incentives on the basis of simplifying assumptions, in order to deal with the 
practical dilemma posed by the detail and complexity inherent in performing 
accurate valuations for the volume of companies included in studies of this nature. 
The accuracy of the simplifying assumptions is generally not tested in the 
literature, and presents a problem for investigation in future research.  
 
2.5.Measuring company performance 
It is necessary to establish a suitable measure of company performance in order to 
investigate the pay-performance relationship. Various measures are used in the 
literature to define company performance. These measures can be classified into 
two broad categories, namely: accounting measures (referring to measures based 
on financial accounting figures reporting in the annual financial statements) and 
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shareholder returns (referring to value received by shareholders based on market 
information) (Eriksson & Lausten, 2000). These two categories of performance 
measures are considered in the sections that follow. 
 
2.5.1. Accounting measures 
Accounting measures are verifiable and widely understood, and they are 
commonly used as a basis for management incentive bonuses (Murphy, 1999). 
Accounting measures, used as proxies for company performance in pay-
performance sensitivity studies, vary from sales and profit growth (Girma et al., 
2007), to common accounting ratios such as return on equity (ROE) (Bradley, 
2011; Shaw, 2011; Theunissen, 2012), earnings per share (EPS) (Bradley, 2011; 
Shaw, 2011) and return on assets (ROA) (Bradley, 2011). The use ROE is 
supported by Hagel, Brown and Davidson (2010) (cited in Bradley (2011)) who 
suggest that ROE as a performance measure remains popular, since it focuses on 
shareholder returns which is of primary importance to investors. It is further 
argued that ROE is a measure of how well the company uses debt in its capital 
structure to maximise shareholder returns.  
 
2.5.1.1.Shortcomings of accounting measures 
The basic problem with using accounting measures as an indication of company 
performance is that accounting measures do not measure shareholder value (the 
basic principle underpinning modern finance theory is that the value of an 
entity/instrument/project is the future cash flows discounted at the risk-
appropriate rate (Correia, Flynn, Uliana & Wormald, 2013)). Performance, in the 
context of pay-performance sensitivity studies, implies a change in shareholder 
value (an argument supported by Bradly (2011), despite being a proponent of the 
use of ROE as a measure of shareholder value). 
A further significant problem for pay-performance sensitivity studies is that many 
accounting measures (like revenue; income; profit after tax (PAT); earnings 
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before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA); and market 
capitalisation) are reflective of the size of the company, rather than company 
performance. It is well established in the literature that company size and CEO 
pay are strongly related (Albuquerque et al., 2013; Bizjak et al., 2008), as set out 
in section 2.3.5. Studies that investigate the relationship between CEO pay and 
any of these measures are consequently investigating the relationship between 
CEO pay and company size, rather than company performance. 
It is also well recorded in the literature that accounting measures have further 
specific weaknesses which would affect their reliability as a measure of company 
performance. Healy (1985) argues that accounting measures may be manipulated 
in various ways, including adjusting discretionary amounts and moving earnings 
between different periods. Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) found evidence 
suggesting that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are 
at their maximum. Accounting measures can also be inconsistent from company 
to company by failure to adjust for differences in systemic risk, tax laws, and 
accounting conventions, especially across industries (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 
1988). 
Despite the fact that accounting measures are commonly used as a basis for 
management incentivisation, a shortcoming well documented in the literature is 
that accounting measures encourage managers to focus on short-term profitability 
at the cost of long term value creation (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Drury, 2012). 
The financial accounting measures most commonly used in pay-performance 
sensitivity studies are ROA, ROE and EPS, and so the specific shortcomings of 
these warrant further consideration. 
Return on assets (ROA) 
ROA ignores leverage which affects shareholder value. Furthermore, if current 
assets are included, working capital policy will influence the ROA figure, and by 
only using non-current assets the remaining useful life and the depreciation policy 
might affect the relative ROA results between companies. Consequently, ROA 
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does not directly reflect shareholder value, and inconsistency in ROA between 
companies undermines comparability between companies and across industries. 
Return on equity (ROE) 
The ROE figure is affected by transactions that result in a change in ROE that is 
not reflective of the change in the wealth of shareholders. Consider the following 
illustration: Suppose three identical companies (Company A, Company B and 
Company C) achieve an ROA of 10% and the interest cost amounts to 5% of debt 
(taxation is ignored). Suppose Company A pays no dividend, retaining the cash 
for planned growth, Company B pays dividends of R25 million out of cash 
reserves, while Company C pays dividends of R25 million, funding the dividend 
payment with debt. The ROE earned by Company A, B and C would amount to 
15%, 20% and 25% respectively (refer to Table 3 below).  
Table 3: An illustrative example on the effect of dividend payments on 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
 Company A 
(R’000) 
Company B 
(R’000) 
Company C 
(R’000) 
Total assets 100 000 75 000 100 000 
Total debt 50 000 50 000 75 000 
Total equity 50 000 25 000 25 000 
    
Profit before interest 10 000 7 500 10 000 
Interest (at 5%) (2 500) (2 500) (3 750) 
Profit after interest 7 500  5 000  6 250 
    
Return on assets 10% 10% 10% 
Return on equity 15% 20% 25% 
 
The above illustrates the sensitivity of ROE to changes in the accounting data 
with the result that the changes in ROE may not be reflective of the change in 
shareholder wealth (arguably, the use of ROE would overvalue Companies B and 
C relative to Company A, having better growth and future cash flow prospects). In 
additional to these specific factors affecting ROE, the issues regarding the use of 
ROA would be similarly applicable to ROE. It is therefore argued that ROE, or 
changes therein, are not suitable measures of shareholder wealth. 
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Earnings per share (EPS) 
EPS is calculated by dividing earnings (profits) by the number of shares in issue 
(Bradley, 2011). Thus, transactions involving altering the number of shares in 
issue will have a direct effect on EPS that is likely to be unrelated to a 
corresponding improvement in company performance. A share repurchase would 
result in an increase in EPS while a share issue will result in a decrease. Where 
shares are repurchased or issued at market value the wealth of shareholders would 
be unaffected, despite the change in EPS. If shares were overvalued at the time of 
the repurchase shareholder wealth of the remaining shareholders will decrease, in 
contrast to the implication of the increase in EPS. 
The fifteen non-financial U.S. companies that reported the highest value of share 
repurchases in 2014, found that eleven of these companies based a portion of 
CEO incentives on earnings per share (Barinka, 2015). Barinka (2015) also 
reports that EPS is included as a performance measure in a larger proportion of 
the top 15 companies that repurchased the most shares versus all the Fortune 500 
companies. Similarly Chivaka, Siddle, Bayne, Cairney and Shev (2009) report 
that the number one reason for doing a share repurchase in South Africa for the 
period 1999 to 2004 was to increase earnings per share. Consequently EPS cannot 
be used as a reliable measure of shareholder wealth for pay-performance 
sensitivity studies. 
Less conventional performance measures 
Two less conventional measures of company performance are economic value 
added (EVA) (Chen & Dodd, 1997) and “Tobin’s q” (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). 
EVA requires a company’s cost of capital as an input variable, which is not 
readily available for South African companies. As a result the use of EVA is 
impractical. Similarly, one of the input variables of Tobin’s q is the replacement 
cost of the assets held by the company. This information is not disclosed in annual 
reports, thus rendering Tobin’s q impractical for a large sample size (Bradley, 
2011). 
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General 
Many studies focussing on the relationship between executive compensation and 
company performance produced inconclusive results (Cosh, 1975; Hirschey & 
Pappas, 1981; Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970; McGuire, Chiu & Elbing, 1962; 
Meeks & Whittington, 1975). According to Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) these 
investigations use accounting performance measures, creating measurement errors 
and biased empirical results. 
Due to the shortcomings of accounting ratios as a measure for company 
performance the trend in the pay-performance sensitivity literature is moving 
towards a market related measure of shareholder wealth: total shareholder return 
(TSR) (Abowd, 1990; Conyon & Leech, 1994; Main et al., 1996; Masson, 1971; 
Murphy, 1986; Stathopoulus et al., 2005). 
 
2.5.2. Total shareholder return (TSR) 
Even though accounting measures do convey information regarding the 
performance of companies, they do not measure shareholder wealth creation, the 
main aim of shareholders. 
The most direct measure of shareholder wealth is total shareholder return (TSR), 
defined as capital growth plus dividends. This is supported by O’Neill and Iob 
(1999:68) who argue that TSR is “generally regarded as the best indicator of 
company performance” as it combines capital growth and cash flow (dividends) to 
provide ultimate shareholder returns. So too, Abowd (1990) uses market 
performance (total shareholder return (TSR)) as well as accounting measures 
(economic profit) as performance measures; and he found evidence that market 
performance measures shows a stronger positive correlation with variable 
(incentive) pay than accounting measures. 
Kozan and Boulanger (2004), cited in Bradley (2011), raises the concern that TSR 
may reflect the performance of the stock market rather than that of the company.  
This reflects a similar perspective adopted in management accounting education 
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that shares are not an effective management incentive as the share price is 
influenced by many factors that are outside of management’s control. The effect 
of the general performance of the stock market can be excluded by comparing 
TSR between companies. Coughlan and Schmidt (1984) argue in favour of 
abnormal share price performance as an objective measure that is not at the 
discretion of management. Cooper et al. (2014) also used abnormal returns, 
calculated in excess of the average return of an industry, size and lagged return 
matched portfolio, to measure future performance for current pay. 
Future performance 
Since share returns are the basis of the incentive compensation of many CEOs, a 
positive relationship between CEO compensation and company share returns 
would be expected. The CEO pay level is dependent on the share price. Thus, in 
order to break the dependent link between performance and pay, the relationship 
between CEO compensation and future share returns need to be investigated. 
Lagged-returns matched portfolios 
Another effect of CEO incentive compensation being based on share returns is 
that CEOs with the highest level of excess pay, typically experience strong current 
and past share performance. Due to the tendency for over- or undervalued shares 
to revert back to the mean (mean reversion), the share price of companies with 
CEOs earning higher pay as a result of superior past and present performance 
would perform comparatively worse in subsequent periods than companies with 
weaker past performance. Cooper et al. (2014) use a lagged return matching 
approach to control for mean reversion. 
General 
Due to accounting measures of company performance being vulnerable to 
manipulation by management as well as being affected by factors that does not 
directly affect shareholder value creation, market-related measures of shareholder 
returns are preferred in pay-performance studies. 
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2.5.3. Key issues relating to the measurement of company performance 
A study investigating the relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance should define company performance in terms of market related 
measures rather than accounting ratios. 
The literature argues that TSR (share price movement adjusted for dividends) is 
the most accurate measure of shareholder wealth. However, it is necessary to 
exclude the effect of general stock market movements on TSR. Abnormal returns 
measured with reference to a suitable benchmark are argued to be the most 
rigorous means of achieving this. 
The tendency of over- and undervalued shares to revert back to the mean value 
can be controlled for using lagged return matching, provided that the sample 
consists of sufficient number of companies. 
 
2.6.Pay-performance sensitivity 
Research into the relationship between executive compensation and company 
performance dates back to at least the mid-1920’s when William Baumol put 
forward the sales maximisation hypothesis. This theory argues that executive 
salaries appear to be far more closely correlated with the scale of operations 
(represented by revenue) of the company than with its profitability (McGuire et 
al., 1962). Consequently, during the latter half of the 20
th
 century, the study of 
pay-performance sensitivity has experienced a dramatic increase. 
The rest of this section reviews the early international studies, later international 
developments, and considers the local studies in South Africa in terms of the 
international literature. 
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2.6.1. Early international studies (pre-2000) 
Early (pre-2000) studies investigating the relationship between CEO pay and 
company performance have reported inconsistent results. The majority of early 
pay-performance sensitivity studies originate from the United States of America 
(U.S.). 
 
2.6.1.1.United States of America (U.S.) 
Early studies investigate factors explaining the level of executive compensation. 
Roberts (1959) found that the relationship between executive compensation and 
sales appeared to be stronger than the relationship between compensation and 
profits, supporting Baumol’s sales maximisation hypothesis. The number of 
studies investigating the link between executive pay and company performance in 
the U.S. started increasing in the early 1970’s and largely rendered results in 
contradiction to Baumol’s sales maximisation theory. Lewellen & Huntsman 
(1970) tested whether executive compensation was determined by sales, profit or 
share returns, for 50 “bluechip” companies from the S&P500. They found that 
profits and share returns were more important than sales in explaining pay levels. 
Masson (1971), investigating executive pay in companies in the electronics, 
aerospace and chemical industries, found that executive compensation was 
primarily related to share market performance and explicitly rejected Baumol’s 
sales maximisation hypothesis. He further found that where the basis of 
compensation paralleled shareholders’ interest, share returns were improved 
(Masson, 1971). 
Later studies further investigate the influence of CEO pay level and structure on 
company performance, as proposed by Masson (1971). Murphy (1986) reported a 
positive statistical relationship between pay and performance, using total 
shareholder return as a measure of company performance. Four years later, in a 
study comparing the change in CEO wealth to the change in shareholder wealth, 
the relationship was still found to be positive, but falling (Jensen & Murphy, 
1990a). In a further paper, they suggested that paying CEOs “better” (referring to 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
how pay is structured), and not just more, results in “better” company 
performance (measured in terms of the change in shareholder wealth). Jensen and 
Murphy (1990b) consider “better” pay to mean CEO shareholding (not just share 
options) and the threat of dismissal in the event of bad performance. They find 
that from 1970 through 1988, the companies included in the top decile of “best” 
CEO pay (based on alignment of compensation structure with shareholder wealth) 
achieved an average annual compound share return of 14.5%, more than one-third 
higher than the average return for the companies included in the bottom decile (in 
terms of “worst” CEO pay structure). A $100 investment in the top decile 
companies (in terms of CEO pay structure) in 1970 would have grown to $1,310 
by 1988, as opposed to only $702 for a similar investment in the ten percent of 
companies with the “worst” CEO pay structure (Jensen & Murphy, 1990b). 
Jensen and Murphy (1990b) recognise that cash based incentives are argued as 
being more effective than shared-based incentives  in motivating management due 
to share based incentives being subject to non-controllable factors outside of 
management’s control. Yet collectively, Jensen and Murphy’s research indicated 
that including long-term share-based incentives (in particular the ownership of 
shares) in CEO pay were effective in encouraging shareholder wealth creation and 
found only a weak link between cash compensation and company performance. 
Applying optimal contract theory to their findings would suggest that long-term 
shares-based incentives are an optimal component of the CEO contract. 
Apart from Jensen and Murphy (1990b), few of the earlier studies directly address 
the question of whether compensation will translate into future performance, until 
Abowd (1990) investigated whether the sensitivity of cash based compensation to 
company performance is positively related to company performance in the 
subsequent year. Compensation was measured as the percentage increase in total 
salary, as well as bonus as a percentage of base pay. He found that where there 
was a stronger relationship between company performance and CEO pay in the 
base year, companies performed better in the subsequent year. His sample 
included 16 000 managers from 250 large companies for the period 1981 to 1986; 
and he found only a weak association when employing accounting-based 
performance measures, but stronger evidence when using economic and market 
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measures. This study suggests that increasing the sensitivity of compensation to 
economic and market related returns may be associated with better future 
performance.  
 
2.6.1.2.Other international studies 
Studies in the United Kingdom (U.K.) that exclude long-term incentives from 
compensation found a weak positive relationship between pay and performance in 
large listed companies (Benito & Conyon, 1999; Conyon & Leech, 1994). Benito 
and Conyon (1999) found that compensation is positively related to both 
shareholder returns and company size, with the latter showing a stronger link. 
In contrast, the first large U.K. study incorporating long-term incentives found a 
strong link between company performance (TSR and sales) and compensation 
(Main et al., 1996). This study included the Black-Scholes value of share options 
in the compensation variable. The inputs into the Black-Scholes model were not 
discussed. 
A stronger pay-performance relationship that is reported in the study including 
long-term incentives is reflective of the findings recorded in the U.S. literature. 
However, in Australia, O’Neill and Iob (1999) reported an inverse relationship 
between compensation (including share options) and the 5-year lagged TSR, 
comparing current compensation to the performance over the previous five years. 
A longer performance term was used to eliminate short-term volatility, but this 
may also have been the reason for the inverse relationship: i.) the CEO might have 
been replaced by a new one (at high cost) due to prior bad performance, and ii.) 
compensation may have been based on more recent performance. O’Neill and Iob 
(1999) concluded that job size and complexity largely determine compensation. 
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2.6.1.3.Key findings from early studies 
Two key findings emanating from the early studies in pay-performance sensitivity 
are that: 
- Long-term incentives are more closely related with shareholder wealth 
creation and therefore an important component of the optimal contract; 
and 
- A strong positive pay-performance relationship is associated with 
improved future performance. 
 
2.6.2. More recent international studies (post-2000) 
More recent studies continue to report a greater pay-performance sensitivity 
where long-term incentives are included in compensation and shareholder returns 
are used to measure company performance. The more recent literature remains 
consistent with earlier studies, except for findings related to the relationship 
between pay and future performance. 
 
2.6.2.1.Consistency with prior literature 
Stathopoulos et al. (2005) examined the impact of extreme share performance on 
pay by grouping U.K. publicly listed companies into three sub-samples: extremely 
well- and poor performing, and neutral. They found a strong link between 
abnormal share returns – over the benchmark Financial Times All Share Index – 
and compensation, which included long-term incentives. Barber, Ghiselli and 
Deale (2006) similarly found a positive but weak correlation among CEO 
compensation (including long-term share-based incentives), sales, profit and share 
price in the U.S. restaurant industry. They report that the relationship between pay 
and share price is stronger for big companies, but the relationship between change 
in pay and change in revenue is stronger for smaller companies, suggesting that 
growth is an important factor.  
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Girma et al. (2007) exclude long-term incentives from compensation and use 
accounting-based measures of company performance and found a weak pay-
performance relationship. They however report a strengthening of the relationship 
between company size and pay over the fifteen year period 1981 to 1996 in their 
U.K. study (Girma et al., 2007).  
Eichholtz, Kok and Otten (2008) used both accounting and market-related 
measures of performance, and included long-term incentive compensation to 
study the drivers of executive compensation in the U.K. property industry. They 
report that compensation is strongly linked to company size (similar to the 
findings of Girma et al. (2007)) and also to executive shareholding (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990b). Eichholtz et al. (2008) also report that long-term incentives – 
but not cash pay – are explained by performance, consistent with the earlier 
studies of Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), and Masson (1971). 
 
2.6.2.2.Development of the prior literature: future performance 
How performance affects compensation is well researched, but limited research 
exist on the reciprocal relationship of how compensation affects future 
performance (Murphy, 1999). Where the first study considering the relationship 
between executive pay and future performance investigated the relationship 
between pay-performance sensitivity and future company performance (Abowd, 
1990), more recent studies address the question of how compensation affects 
future performance. 
Core et al. (1999) report that a 40% increase in excess compensation is associated 
with a cumulative loss in share returns of between -4.97% and -8.88% for holding 
periods between one and five years. A recent, comprehensive study by Cooper et 
al. (2014), similarly reports evidence that CEO pay is negatively related to future 
share returns for periods of up to three years. They found that companies, with 
CEOs in the top decile in terms of excess pay, earn negative abnormal returns 
over the subsequent three years amounting to nearly -8%. Cooper et al. (2014) 
suggest that this effect may be driven by CEO overconfidence. Similar to these 
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U.S. studies, Balafas and Florackis (2014) report that companies paying their 
CEOs at the bottom of the compensation distribution earn positive abnormal 
returns and outperform those at the top of the distribution. 
Where a period of only one year was considered in the earlier study investigating 
the relationship between compensation and future performance, more recent 
studies have extended this investigation to a period of up to five years. Pay-
performance studies also regularly include quantitative factor analysis to try and 
find common characteristics for inconsistencies in the pay-performance 
relationship, but no qualitative studies were found that try to explain these 
inconsistencies. 
 
2.6.3. Approach to pay-performance sensitivity studies in the international 
literature 
The findings of more recent studies largely reflect those of the early studies in the 
pay-performance literature. Table 4 summarises the international pay-performance 
sensitivity studies into four quadrants on the basis of the variables of CEO 
compensation (cash- and long-term incentive compensation) as well as the 
measures of company performance (accounting measures and market related 
measures) used. The majority combines the inclusion of long-term incentives in 
CEO compensation with the use of market related measures of company 
performance (like TSR). 
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Table 4: A summary of the variables used in international pay-performance 
sensitivity studies 
 
Accounting measures Market-related measures 
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Eichholtz et al. (2008) 
Jensen & Murphy (1990a) 
Jensen & Murphy (1990b) 
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 Abowd (1990) 
 
Girma et al. (2007) 
 
 
 
 
Abowd (1990) 
Benito & Conyon (1999) 
Conyon & Leech (1994) 
 
 
The consistency of the international literature in combining the use of long-term 
incentives and TSR in pay-performance sensitivity studies is evident in the above 
table, indicating the preference of the international literature. The level of 
acceptance of the use of accounting-based measures of company performance is 
potentially over-represented by the inclusion of the first five studies (in italics) in 
the first quadrant of Table 4 and the first study (in italics) in quadrant three, as 
accounting measures were included as a comparative to the use of TSR as a 
company performance measure in these studies, and weaker results reported. 
 
2.6.4. South African studies 
The literature on the link between executive pay and performance in South Africa 
is in its infancy. A search on Google Scholar provided very little early research on 
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the topic in the local context. Cohen and Uliana (1990) evaluated the effect of 
corporate ownership structures on employee, management and shareholder 
compensation for JSE listed companies and found no difference in compensation 
between different control structures. The study, however, only covered a single 
year (1987) and is thus very limited in scope. In a survey of JSE listed companies, 
Hall (1998) found evidence in support of the agency problem in South Africa with 
a substantial number of managers pursuing goals that are irreconcilable with 
shareholder value creation. Hall (1998) qualitatively explored the agency 
problem, agency cost and proposed solutions thereto in South African listed 
companies. 
However, the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation has only 
attracted the interest of SA researchers since 2011, with a number dissertations 
and a handful of papers written on the subject in the last five years. A varied 
selection of studies has been carried out locally: 
- Bradley (2011) studied the Top 40 JSE listed companies and found no 
correlation between short-term cash compensation and accounting 
measures related to company performance (ROE, ROA and EPS), nor was 
the relationship influenced by the industry in which the company operates. 
- Shaw (2011) similarly reports no relationship between SCC and 
performance related accounting measures (HEPS and ROE) for the largest 
30 financial services companies on the JSE. He does, however, report a 
strong positive relationship between SCC and accounting measures 
influenced by company size (EBITDA and PAT). 
- Theunissen (2012) explored the ability to apply Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) as a mathematical model to benchmark CEO 
compensation using similar variables as considered by pay-performance 
sensitivity studies as input and output variables. She found DEA to be a 
useful tool to identify benchmark CEOs as well as to suggest 
improvements for inefficient CEOs by comparing them to the benchmark 
group. The study used short-term cash compensation, but included gains 
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on shares held to represent long-term incentives, and accounting measures 
of company performance. 
- Scholtz and Smit (2012) report a strong relationship between short-term 
cash compensation and total assets as well as sales (both related to 
company size), but a weak relationship when measuring company 
performance by means of EBITDA (also size related) for companies listed 
on the South African Alternative Exchange (AltX). A significant strong 
positive relationship between SCC and change in share price was reported 
for the period between 2003 and 2010, but this relationship was 
insignificant during the post-crisis period of 2008 to 2010, suggesting 
inconsistencies in the results. 
- A study aimed at investigating the effects of race on pay-performance 
sensitivity found that mean compensation did not differ significantly 
between CEOs from previously disadvantaged groups and white CEOs, 
but the pay-performance relationship was stronger for former group 
(Barrett, 2014). Barrett (2014) also reports that short-term cash 
compensation correlates strongly with PAT and EBITDA (size-related), 
but not with ROE and change in share price (performance related). 
- Theku (2014) found a moderate to strong relationship between short-term 
cash compensation and size-related accounting measures (revenue, 
EBITDA and market capitalisation) in the mining industry. Similar to 
prior SA studies, the relationship between SCC and performance related 
accounting measures (ROE, ROA and EPS) are either weak or non-
existent. Similarly, no correlation between SCC and change in share price 
is found. 
- The only study to include share options and share grants (LIC) as part of 
compensation is a study on whether total compensation of CEOs of the 
120 top JSE listed companies could be justified by the turnover and profit 
(both related to company size) of the companies (Dommisse, 2011). 
Consistent with prior research reporting a strong relationship between 
company size and CEO pay, the study reports a strong positive correlation 
in more than 80% of the sample over a five year period. 
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2.6.5. Shortcomings of local studies relative to the international literature 
Research in the area of executive compensation in South Africa only recently 
started gaining popularity and numerous opportunities exist to extend the existing 
local literature. This section highlights some of the shortcomings of the studies 
that have been conducted in the area of executive compensation in the South 
African context. 
All the studies reporting a strong positive relationship between SCC and company 
performance, measured performance in terms of size-related accounting measures 
such as sales, profit and market capitalisation (Dommisse, 2011; Barrett, 2014; 
Scholtz & Smit, 2012; Shaw, 2011; Theku, 2014). These studies essentially report 
the relationship between CEO pay and company size, rather than reflecting the 
sensitivity of CEO pay to company performance. This confirms the finding that 
company size is positively related to CEO pay which is well documented in the 
literature, and suggests the practice of companies benchmarking CEO 
compensation on the pay of peer companies of similar size occurs (Bizjak et al., 
2008). 
Studies that investigated the relationship between SCC and accounting measures 
that are related to company performance (ROE, ROA and EPS) reported either an 
inconsistently weak relationship or no relationship at all (Barrett, 2014; Bradley, 
2011; Cohen & Uliana, 1990; Shaw, 2011; Theku, 2014). 
Only three studies included some form of market related measure of company 
performance (change in share price), but found no consistent relationship with 
SCC (Barrett, 2014; Scholtz & Smit, 2012; Theku, 2014). There may be several 
reasons for the lack of a relationship between SCC and change in share price. 
Firstly, dividends were not taken into account. Secondly, a period of only one 
year was considered. Since it arguably takes time for managerial actions to 
manifest in terms of company performance, performance over a period longer 
than one year should be considered. 
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Apart from Dommisse (2011) who covered the largest 120 companies listed on 
the JSE, all the other South African pay-performance sensitivity studies were 
limited to one specific industry or size group of companies (Top 40 or AltX). 
Only two local studies include some measure of long-term incentives (Dommisse, 
2011; Theunissen, 2012). Theunissen (2012) included gains on shares held as part 
of long-term incentive compensation. Some international studies do include gains 
on shares held, while others exclude these arguing shares held constitutes a 
personal investment of the CEO. Dommisse (2011) includes share grants and 
share options (long-term incentive compensation) at the average share price. 
Simplifying assumptions regarding the value of share options and share grants are 
widely used in the international literature, but most studies do however use a 
value lower than that of the share price, since it will overvalue these incentives. 
Therefore, even though three studies included changes in share price as a market-
related company performance measure and one study included LIC in CEO 
compensation, South African studies in general are not normative in terms of 
international studies. No South African study incorporates both long-term 
incentives at their expected values as a component of CEO compensation, as well 
as TSR as a measure of company performance. 
This gap in the literature is apparent from Table 5, which presents a summary of 
the key variables included in the South African pay-performance sensitivity 
studies, being: 
- CEO compensation (cash- and long-term incentive compensation); 
- Accounting measures of company performance (size related and non-size 
related) 
- Market-related measures of company performance (change in share price 
and total shareholder return (TSR)); 
- Timeframe of the study; and 
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- Strength and direction of the pay-performance relationship reported by the 
various studies where a weak and strong positive relationship are 
represented by “+” and “++” respectively (no relationship is indicated as 
“NR”). 
Table 5: A summary of the variables used in South African pay-performance 
sensitivity studies 
Study 
Sample Time frame 
(in years) 
CEO 
pay 
com-
ponent 
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Dommisse (2011) JSE Top 120 2002 – 2009 x x1 ++    
Scholtz & Smit (2012) JSE Alternative 
Exchange 
2003 – 2010 x  ++/
+ 
 ++/
NR
2
 
 
Barrett (2014) Sample from JSE 2004 – 2013 x  ++ NR NR2  
Theku (2014) Mining industry 2009 – 2013 x  ++ +/ 
NR 
NR
2
  
Shaw (2011) Financial services 
industry 
2005 – 2010 x  ++ +/ 
NR 
  
Bradley (2011) JSE Top 40 2006 – 2010 x   +/ 
NR 
  
Cohen and Uliana 
(1990) 
Industrial industry 1987 x   NR   
1. Share option grants and performance grants were valued at the average full share price 
2. Volume-weighted average share price for the year 
++ Strong positive relationship 
+ Weak positive relationship 
NR No relationship 
 
It is clear from Table 5 that most studies in South Africa exclude long-term 
incentives and that none measure company performance in terms of TSR, which is 
increasingly becoming the norm internationally. Studies that report a positive 
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relationship between pay and performance define company performance in terms 
of size-related accounting measures and are therefore concluding on the 
relationship between CEO pay and company size, rather than performance. The 
strong correlation between the size of the company and CEO pay are consistent 
with the findings of the international literature. 
Where accounting measures related to company performance are used, the 
reported relationship between pay and company performance is either weak or 
non-existent, and there is a lack of corroboration of inconsistent results within 
individual studies (where a cell contains both “NR” and “+”, the pay-performance 
relationship was inconsistent when using different measures of company 
performance). This highlights the futility of using accounting measures in 
investigating the relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance, as well as limitation of drawing conclusions based on one measure 
of company performance. 
Barrett (2014) determines the effect of company size on CEO pay using analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) and Theku (2014) acknowledges the link, but both studies 
fail to control for the effect of company size in CEO pay in their pay-performance 
regression analyses. Shaw (2011) includes the book value of assets as a dependent 
variable in his multivariate regression analysis in order to control for size, but 
reports some degree of multicollinearity, thus making it impossible to draw a clear 
conclusion regarding the degree to which a pay-performance relationship exists.  
Since no South African study reflects the international developments of including 
both long-term incentives as a component of CEO pay and TSR as measure of 
company performance, nor adequately control for influence of size, there is a void 
in the SA pay-performance literature. 
 
2.6.6. Key issues relating to pay-performance sensitivity 
The literature reports a variety of findings regarding the direction and strength of 
the pay-performance relationship. The international studies that excluded long-
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term incentives or used only accounting measures for company performance 
mostly report a weak relationship between pay and performance, similar to the 
findings of the SA studies that investigate the relationship between SCC and non-
size related accounting measures of company performance. SA studies measuring 
company performance using size-related measures, report a strong relationship to 
CEO pay, which is reflective of the strong correlation between CEO pay and 
company size that is reported internationally. The international studies that 
combine the inclusion of long-term incentives with the use of TSR as the measure 
of company performance generally report a stronger relationship that is positively 
correlated. This might be as a result of LIC being more closely correlated with TC 
than SCC (99% compared to 38%) (Cooper et al., 2014), thus if LIC are excluded, 
the CEO compensation will differ significantly from TC. Consequently, if SCC is 
not closely correlated with TC, studies that use SCC as a proxy for TC will report 
unreliable results. Further, any study investigating the pay-performance sensitivity 
relationship should control for company size. 
A few international studies raise a further question regarding the existence of a 
causal relationship between compensation and company performance. The early 
literature suggests that long-term incentives as a component of compensation are 
an effective in improving company performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990b). The 
generally strong, positive pay-performance relationship reported in later literature 
seems to support this suggestion. However, three studies investigating the 
relationship between CEO compensation and future share returns suggest the 
opposite (Balafas & Florackis, 2014; Cooper et al., 2014; Core et al., 1999) and 
raise the importance of considering future company performance. 
Since long-term incentives are regularly awarded on the basis of TSR, it is 
expected that the positive correlation between TSR and long-term incentives will 
result in the positive relationship between pay and performance found in the pay-
performance sensitivity literature. The goal of long-term incentives, however, is to 
encourage long-term performance, and therefore it is important to consider future 
performance (in terms of TSR). There is a paucity of studies internationally, and 
none locally, that investigate pay relative to future performance.  
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Therefore, the existing literature investigating the pay-performance relationship 
informs future research into the relationship between CEO compensation and 
company performance in the following ways: 
- The relationship between CEO compensation and future company 
performance (TSR) should be investigated, with company size controlled 
for; 
- A negative relationship is anticipated based on the findings of previous 
studies internationally; 
- If, however, the suggestion regarding the effectiveness of LIC as an 
incentive is accurate, a positive relationship should be reported, unless the 
relationship is affected by other factors, such as overconfidence. 
 
2.7. Summary of key issues arising from the literature review 
The main considerations arising from the existing body of literature that inform 
future research in the area of pay-performance sensitivity are presented in Table 6 
below.  
 
Table 6: Key issues arising from the literature 
No. Issue Section 
1. The level and structure of CEO pay should be considered 
relative to company performance, instead of in isolation. 
 
2.2.3 
2. A positive pay-performance relationship would be 
explained by: 
 
- Effective alignment of interests (agency theory); 
- Optimal structuring of components of CEO 
compensation (optimal contracting theory); and 
- Labour market theory (pay for managerial 
talent). 
 
A lack of a positive relationship would be explained by: 
 
- Managerial power 
- Over-confidence 
 
 
 
 
2.3.6/2.6.6 
2.3.6/2.6.6 
 
2.3.6 
 
 
 
 
2.3.6 
2.3.6/2.6.6 
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3. The relationship between CEO pay and company 
performance should be examined in terms of excess pay, so 
to eliminate the tendency towards similarity in pay in 
companies of similar size and industry sector, as suggested 
by benchmarking, as well as the close relationship reported 
between CEO pay and size-related accounting measures of 
company performance. 
 
2.3.6/ 
2.4.4/ 
2.6.6 
4. The most important distinction between compensation 
components is SCC and LIC, and so the relative 
significance of both SCC and LIC should be established  
 
Values can be assigned to long-term share-based incentives 
on the basis of simplifying assumptions. The accuracy of 
the result thereof should be considered. 
 
2.4.4 
 
5. Market related measures of company performance 
preferable to accounting ratios. The literature argues that 
TSR (share price movement adjusted for dividends) is the 
most direct measure of shareholder wealth. 
 
However the effect of general stock market movements on 
TSR should be excluded, therefore abnormal returns on 
excess peer groups (industry and size) are argued to be 
more rigorous. 
 
Lagged-return matching is suggested to control for mean 
reversion, although this requires adequate sample sizes. 
 
2.5.3/2.6.6 
6. The relationship between CEO compensation and future 
TSR should be considered for three reasons: 
 
- Since some component of compensation is 
frequently awarded on the basis of TSR, a positive 
relationship between TC and TSR is expected; 
- The aim of long-term incentives are to motivate 
CEO to perform better in future; and 
- A general paucity of studies investigating pay for 
future performance, and none in South Africa. 
 
2.6.6 
 
The design and methodology to be followed in this study – which is further 
discussed in Chapter 3 – is informed by these key issues, as well as the research 
objectives and questions that follow in the next section. 
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2.8.Research objectives and questions 
Research objective 1 
The first research objective of this study is to analyse and describe compensation 
levels and pay structures for the largest 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) for 2011 to 2013. 
The first research question to address this objective responds to the lack of 
information readily available regarding average levels of CEO compensation as 
well as the variation therein. 
Research question 1: What are the maximum and average levels of, and variation 
in, CEO compensation, in total (TC) and per component 
(SCC and LIC), for the top 100 JSE listed companies 
overall, and how does this vary between companies of 
different size and in different industries? 
Research questions 2 and 3 consider the findings reported in the literature of 
company size being a significant determinant of CEO compensation levels, as 
well as the practice of benchmarking of CEO pay on company size and industry 
being widely used internationally, with some evidence of the existence thereof 
reported locally (Theunissen, 2012). 
Research question 2: Is company size significant in explaining the level of total 
compensation? 
Research question 3: Is the industry sector significant in explaining the level of 
total compensation? 
The international literature identifies the significance of long-term incentives in 
terms in the value thereof relative to total compensation. Further the contrast in 
findings between pay-performance sensitivity studies that include and exclude 
long-term incentives is also evident, potentially as a result of LIC being a more 
significant driver of TC than SCC. Research question 4 and 5 raise the question of 
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the relative significance of LIC in South Africa, given that the importance of these 
is dismissed in the local literature (Shaw, 2011). 
Research question 4: What is the proportion of long-term incentive compensation 
(LIC) relative to total compensation (TC)? 
Research question 5: Is LIC more closely correlated to TC than SCC? 
Cooper et al. (2014) report a near perfect correlation of 98.6% between LIC and 
TC, but only 37.7% between SCC and TC, suggesting that LIC better explains TC 
than SCC. Many South African studies use SCC as a proxy for TC. If SCC is not 
closely correlated with TC, similar to the finding in the U.S., then any conclusion 
drawn regarding the relationship between SCC and company performance cannot 
be concluded to be true of the relationship between TC and company 
performance. 
Research objective 2 
The second objective of this study is to investigate and analyse the relationship 
between the level and structure of CEO compensation and the future total 
shareholder returns in South Africa. 
The general experience reported in the international literature is a positive pay-
performance relationship where long-term incentives are included in total 
compensation and TSR is used to measure company performance. This is 
considered the most appropriate approach internationally (refer section 2.6). The 
pay-performance sensitivity relationship using this combination of variables has 
not been tested in South Africa. 
Three studies in the international literature extend the investigation of the pay-
performance relationship to consider future company performance. The reason for 
doing so is two-fold: To exclude any possible correlation between the value 
assigned to the LIC and company performance (both being influenced by the 
current share price), and to identify any possible causal relationship between the 
level and structure of compensation and future company performance. In all three 
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cases the relationship between pay and future company performance were 
surprisingly found to be negative in the international literature. 
Research questions 6 to 8 consider this un-researched relationship in the South 
African context, questioning whether a positive relationship between 
compensation in total and for each component (SCC and LIC) and future 
company performance (measured by TSR) exists. Research question 9 considers 
whether the pattern of the relationship between pay and future performance is 
consistent across three measures of compensation (TC, SCC and LIC). 
Research question 6: Does a positive relationship between TC and future 
company performance (as measured by TSR) exist? 
Research question 7: Does a positive relationship between SCC and future 
company performance (as measured by TSR) exist? 
Research question 8: Does a positive relationship between LIC and future 
company performance (as measured by TSR) exist? 
Research question 9: How do the pay-performance relationships based on TC, 
SCC and LIC respectively, compare? 
A suggestion in the literature exists that LIC might be an optimal component of 
CEO compensation package in terms of incentivising improved future company 
performance. This question has also not been investigated in South Africa and this 
is addressed by research question 10. 
Research question 10: Does an indication exist in the South African context that 
long-term incentives may represent an optimal component 
in the CEO compensation package? 
All of the above research questions are un-researched in the SA context, creating a 
glaring void in comparison to the norm in the international literature. In 
addressing these research questions this study seeks to contribute towards filling 
the void in the SA literature and give a first glimpse of how the SA situation 
compares to that reported internationally. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHDOLOGY 
This study describes the level and structure of CEO compensation for the largest 
100 companies listed on the JSE in South Africa for the period 2011 to 2013. The 
relationship between CEO compensation (in total and by component) and future 
company performance as measured by TSR is then investigated. The study is 
based primarily on data that is publicly available, but also includes data supplied 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) that is subject to a confidentiality agreement 
(further details are provided below). Consequently, this empirical study is both 
descriptive and quantitative, making use of secondary data. 
 
3.1.Data 
3.1.1. Sample 
One of the shortcomings shared by the numerous South African studies 
addressing the relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance are the small sample sizes. This study includes the top 100 JSE listed 
companies for the years 2011 – 2013. Even though some international studies 
include a much longer period, other studies including only three years have 
reported statistically significant results (Core et al., 1999). The reason for limiting 
the sample to the top 100 (which includes large- and mid-cap companies) is the 
availability of the expected value of the long-term incentives for these companies 
as calculated and supplied by PwC. The top 100 companies represent a significant 
proportion of the overall market, with a combined market capitalisation of 94% of 
the total JSE capitalisation as at 7 May 2015 (calculated using fundamentals data 
downloaded from the Sharenet database). Included in the top 100 company codes 
on the JSE are other instruments, including exchange traded notes (ETNs) and 
warrants which are not operating companies managed by a CEO, and 
consequently were excluded from the sample. The number of companies 
remaining in the sample is 79 in 2011, 92 in 2012 and 92 in 2013.  
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The variables used to measure CEO pay and company performance in this study 
are defined in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 respectively. The design of the study 
follows thereafter. 
 
3.1.2. Compensation variables 
The measures of CEO compensation used in this study are categorised as per the 
summary of the literature (presented in Table 2, section 2.4.1) and indicated in 
Table 7 below. 
All categories of compensation identified in the literature are included in this 
study, except for gains on shares held, in agreement with the view of Main et al 
(1996) that these constitute a personal investment, not compensation. 
 
Table 7: Compensation variable included in this study 
Total compensation (TC) 
Short-term cash compensation 
(SCC) 
Long-term incentive compensation 
(LIC) 
 
CASH 
Total guaranteed pay (TGP): 
- Base salary 
- Other benefits 
Short-term incentive 
compensation (STI): 
- Cash bonus (CB) 
 
This 
study: 
 
Included 
Included 
 
 
Included 
 
CASH 
Deferred STI (bonus) 
 
SHARE-BASED  
Performance shares  
Share options  
Gains on shares held  
This 
study: 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Included 
Excluded 
 
The compensation data has been obtained from PwC who publishes an annual 
report on the practices and trends of executive remuneration (PwC, 2014). The 
SCC was retrieved directly from the annual financial statements by PwC. Spot-
checks to the INETBFA database were performed in order to confirm the 
accuracy of this data. 
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The valuation methodology of the expected values of the long-term incentives (of 
the CEOs of the top 100 JSE listed companies for the three years 2011 to 2013) 
was discussed with PwC. The valuation methodology is generally accepted in 
finance theory and the assumptions are considered to be reasonable. The detail 
thereof cannot be fully disclosed due to the confidentiality agreement, but is 
further discussed in broad terms. 
LIC refers to all cash- and equity settled awards that accrue to an employee based 
on individual and/or company performance for a period more than twelve months. 
Long-term incentives included in this study are classified as either performance 
share grants (including Forfeitable Share Plans (FSPs) and Conditional Share 
Plans (CSP)) or share options. 
Performance Shares 
The value of FSPs and CSPs are calculated as the number of shares granted 
during the financial year multiplied by the expected value of the shares. Since the 
exact methodology used by PwC is subject to a confidentiality agreement, the 
detailed calculations are not disclosed in this section. The valuation takes into 
account the following variables: the vesting period, the probability of vesting and 
the current share price. 
Share options 
The Black-Scholes-Merton model was used by PwC to price the options. The 
following six inputs were considered: 
i. current price of the underlying share 
ii. exercise price of the option 
iii. expected volatility of the price of the underlying share 
iv. expected dividend yield of the underlying share 
v. risk-free interest rate for the term of the option 
vi. expected term of the option 
In order to review the reliability of the option values, the assumptions surrounding 
each input variable were discussed with the senior manager from PwC. Apart 
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from the first two input variables, namely the underlying share price at the grant 
date and the exercise price of the option – both of which are known, the following 
assumptions were made for each input variable used in the pricing of the share 
options:  
iii. expected volatility of the price of the underlying share: The historic 
share prices for a specific period were used to determine the share 
price volatility 
iv. expected dividend yield of the underlying share: The historic dividend 
yield for a specific period was used to determine the expected dividend 
yield 
v. risk-free interest rate for the term of the option: A specific government 
bond rate was used 
vi. expected term of the option: A specific period between the grant date 
and the expiry date was used as the expected term of the option 
Even though the above assumptions should ideally be adjusted for specific 
conditions for each option grant, simplifying assumptions are widely used in the 
literature. The level of detail in the assumptions used in applying the Black-
Scholes-Merton option pricing model in the present study arguably results in a 
more accurate valuation than that of numerous international studies (refer section 
2.4.2.2). 
In order to describe compensation levels and structures, raw pay levels were used. 
Compensation for 2011 and 2012 was adjusted for inflation to reflect 2013 values. 
The year-on-year Consumer Price Index (CPI) (StatsSA, 2015) for the financial 
year-end month of each company was used to adjust the compensation level of the 
CEO of each company. The pay for a specific year was adjusted using the CPI 
rate for the following year, in order to exclude the effects of inflation in 
comparing the results across the three years. 
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3.1.3. Performance variables 
Total shareholder return (TSR) is used to measure company performance, since it 
is the most direct measure of shareholder wealth, defined as capital growth plus 
dividends. This is supported by O’Neill and Iob (1999:68) who argue that TSR is 
“generally regarded as the best indicator of company performance” as it combines 
capital growth and cash flow (dividends), being the actual returns received by 
shareholders. 
This study calculates TSR as (P1 – P0 + D) / P0 where: 
- P1 is the closing share price at the end of the quarter 
- P0 is the closing share price at the end of the previous quarter 
- D is the dividends declared and paid of which the last day to trade (LDT) 
falls within the specified quarter 
Closing share prices and dividends for the top 100 JSE listed companies were 
downloaded from the Sharenet database for the period 2010 to 2015. The TSR for 
each quarter was calculated by adding the dividend to the share price appreciation 
for the quarter in which the LDT for the dividend fell. 
For dividends disclosed in foreign currency, the relevant exchange rates were 
downloaded and applied on the inclusion date (LDT). Daily historical midpoint 
exchange rates were downloaded from Oanda.com. 
 
3.2.Research design 
3.2.1. First research objective 
The first research objective of this study was to analyse and describe 
compensation levels and pay structures for the largest 100 companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for 2011 to 2013 in South Africa. 
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3.2.1.1.Research question 1 
What are the maximum and average levels of, and variation in, CEO 
compensation, in total (TC) and per component (SCC and LIC), for the top 100 
JSE listed companies overall, and how does this vary between companies of 
different size and in different industries? 
In order to address research question 1, the maximum, minimum, mean, median 
and standard deviation were determined for the largest 100 companies listed on 
the JSE in South Africa for the period 2011 to 2013. 
Bizjak et al. (2008) found that most companies use benchmarking to determine 
levels of executive compensation, with peer groups typically being based on 
industry and size. Since the largest 100 companies listed on the JSE includes 
companies that vary greatly in size and industry, compensation was further 
analysed per company size group and industry in order to identify characteristics 
that may be unique to the specific classification. The relative proportion of long-
term incentives to total compensation was also determined for each size and 
industry group. 
Gabaix and Landier (2006:1) found that “the size of large firms explains many of 
the patterns in CEO pay, across firms, over time, and between countries”. In 
developed economies such as the U.S. and the U.K. the top 100 listed companies 
are large peer companies of similar size. In South Africa, however, the top 100 
JSE listed companies comprise a very diverse group. One quarter of the 100 
largest companies report revenue that is less than 2% of the revenue reported of 
the largest company. It is therefore of interest to describe the maximum, average 
and variation in compensation of companies of different sizes.  
Revenue was selected as a proxy for company size, based on consistent reports in 
the literature of compensation being strongly related to company size. O’Reilly 
and Main (2010:699) found that “CEO compensation is more strongly related to 
organization size, measured as revenues, than firm performance”. Bizjak et al. 
(2008) reports that most peer groups appear to be based on firms of similar size 
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(usually based on revenues) and Cooper et al. (2014) reported similar size groups 
when using revenue compared to market capitalisation as a proxy for size. 
Revenue figures were downloaded from the standardised financial statements 
available in the INETBFA database. For banks and listed property companies 
“Turnover” and “Interest Received” (codes 051 & 055) were used as revenue and 
for other financial services companies such as fund managers and insurance 
companies “Turnover” and “Surplus Sale Investment” (codes 051 and 060) are 
used. For all the other companies only “Turnover” (code 051) is used, since these 
companies derive their main income from sales. 
Where financial results were reported in foreign currency (i.e. any currency other 
than South African Rands - ZAR) the foreign currency revenue figure was 
converted to ZAR using the average midpoint exchange rate for the specific 
company’s financial year obtained from Oanda.com. 
Four distinct size groups (based on revenue) were formed. Revenue for the top 
100 companies for 2013 ranged from R8 million to R583 billion. The groups 
containing the largest (labelled “mega”) and smallest (labelled “small”) 
companies were defined as companies with revenue of more than R100 billion 
and less than R10 billion respectively. Further consideration was given as to how 
to define the “medium” and “large” groups (with reported revenue between R10 
billion and R100 billion). The midpoint could be established either in terms of the 
absolute value of revenue (R55 billion) or in terms of the relative ratio of the 
highest and lowest revenue in each of the two groups (i.e. the ratio calculated as 
the highest revenue divided by the lowest revenue included in each group are the 
same, so that the relative size between the largest and smallest companies in each 
group is constant). 
If the absolute approach was taken and revenue of R55 billion used as the 
midpoint, this would create the situation where the biggest company (in terms of 
revenue) was 5.5 times the size of the smallest company in the same group (R55 
billion / R10 billion), while this ratio for the second group will only 1.8 (R100 
billion / R55 billion). It cannot be argued that the smallest company in the first 
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group was as equal a peer to the largest company in that group, compared to group 
two. If the relative size approach was followed and the companies split into two 
groups in such a way to create two size groups that are proportionately equal in 
terms of the largest to smallest company in each group (in terms of revenue) the 
midpoint (split point) would be R31.6 billion in revenue (where R100 billion / 
R31.6 billion = 3.16 = R31.6 billion / R10 billion). However, this results in a 
contrast that is too great in absolute terms and again it can hardly be argued that a 
company with revenue of R31.6 billion is a peer of a company reporting a revenue 
figure of R100 billion. As a compromise between the two approaches R40 billion 
(the nearest R10 billion increment to the average of R55 billion and R31.6 billion) 
was selected as the splitting point between the “medium” and “large” groups of 
companies. Consequently, the “medium” and “large” size groups were defined as 
R10 billion to R40 billion, and R40 billion to R100 billion, respectively (refer to 
Table 8 below). 
Table 8: Size groups (based on revenue) 
Size group Revenue 
(R Billions) 
Number of observations 
2011 2012 2013 
Mega >100 8 9 11 
Large 40 – 100 17 22 21 
Medium 10 – 40 33 35 36 
Small < 10 21 26 24 
 
Apart from controlling for company size, Cooper et al. (2014) grouped the 
population into 49 industry portfolios. Due to the limited sample size of this study 
the companies are grouped into the four distinct industry groupings used by PwC 
in their annual remuneration report (PwC, 2014), namely: Basic Resources (BR), 
Financial Services (FS), Industrials (I) and Services (S) (refer to Table 9). 
Table 9: Industry groups 
Industry Number of observations 
2011 2012 2013 
Basic Resources (BR) 21 21 20 
Financial Services (FS) 20 27 23 
Industrials (I) 11 12 13 
Services (S) 27 32 36 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
These industries represent the most fundamental categories of companies in South 
Africa. Financial services includes listed property companies, while 
manufacturing companies are included with industrials. Services encompasses all 
other industries, including retail, healthcare and telecommunication. 
 
3.2.1.2.Research question 2 
Is company size significant in explaining the level of total compensation? 
In order to address research question 2 the following null hypothesis was set: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The distributions of the level of CEO total compensation of 
companies in four different size groups (based on revenue) 
are the same. 
In order to test hypothesis 1 a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances was 
performed on the total compensation between each pair of the four size groups 
previously identified. A scatter graph of the data shows that the distributions of 
the observations are such that it allows for a t-test, however, due to the large 
amount of variation in the sample, a Mann-Whitney U test for non-parametric 
data was also performed for corroborative purposes. 
 
3.2.1.3.Research question 3 
Is the industry sector significant in explaining the level of total compensation? 
In order to address research question 3 the following null hypothesis was set: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The distributions of the level of CEO total compensation of 
companies in four industry sectors are the same. 
In order to test hypothesis 2 a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances, as 
well as a Mann-Whitney U-test (again for corroborative purposes) test was 
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performed on the total compensation between each pair of the four industry 
groups previously identified. 
 
3.2.1.4.Research question 4 
What is the proportion of long-term incentive compensation (LIC) relative to total 
compensation (TC)? 
In order to address research question 4, the proportion of LIC to TC was 
calculated for the largest 100 companies listed on the JSE in South Africa for the 
period 2011 to 2013 overall, and per size/industry group. This proportion was 
calculated by dividing the total LIC by the total TC, as well as dividing the 
median LIC by the median TC, overall and for each size/industry group. 
 
3.2.1.5.Research question 5 
Is LIC more closely correlated to TC than SCC? 
In order to address research question 5 the following hypothesis was set: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The correlation between LIC and TC is stronger than the 
correlation between SCC and TC. 
In order to test hypothesis 3 the correlation between the components of 
compensation was determined. 
 
3.2.2. Second research objective 
The second research objective of this study was to investigate and analyse the 
relationship between the level and structure of CEO compensation and the future 
total shareholder returns in South Africa. The approach followed to achieve this 
objective is closest to that of Cooper et al. (2014). 
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3.2.2.1.Research question 6 
Does a positive relationship between TC and future company performance (as 
measured by TSR) exist? 
The relationship between TC and TSR was investigated in terms of excess TC and 
abnormal TSR. It was necessary to use excess compensation – that is, the absolute 
pay less the median of pay of the peer group – rather than the absolute value of 
compensation in order to control for the effect of benchmarking on compensation. 
Abnormal TSR was used in order to eliminate the effect of general share market 
movements, calculated as the TSR of each company less the benchmark of the 
equally weighted (EW) TSR of the top 100 JSE listed companies. In order to 
address research question 6, the following hypothesis was set: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): A positive relationship between excess total compensation 
(TC) and abnormal future total shareholder return (TSR) 
exists. 
The approach taken to test hypothesis 4 was to firstly analyse the situation 
descriptively in order to establish the apparent relationship between excess TC 
and abnormal TSR. This relationship was then tested statistically in order to 
confirm or reject the hypothesis. 
Descriptive analysis of the relationship between excess total compensation and 
abnormal total shareholder return 
The approach taken in the descriptive analysis was to first compare the abnormal 
returns of the extreme cases of excess pay, since the distinction would be clearest 
when contrasting the situations of companies with highest and lowest excess pay 
relative to peers, given the obvious existence of other factors affecting abnormal 
returns. In order to do this, companies were ranked on excess TC and decile 
portfolios were formed. The abnormal TSR of the top and bottom deciles of 
excess pay were compared. This is consistent with the approach taken by Cooper 
et al. (2014) who also primarily focused on the extremes, giving only limited 
consideration to the remaining deciles. 
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In order to investigate whether the relationship between excess compensation and 
abnormal returns was consistent across the remaining deciles, with abnormal 
returns declining as excess pay diminished, the remaining deciles were taken into 
consideration. The groupings were progressively broadened to include the next 
highest/lowest decile and the average abnormal returns for the larger groups were 
calculated. This process was repeated until the entire sample was split into two 
groups, being the top and the bottom half. A steadily decreasing abnormal return 
across groupings from highest to lowest decile would indicate a consistently 
positive relationship between excess TC and abnormal TSR. 
The abnormal future TSR for nine quarters was calculated for the top and bottom 
decile portfolio of excess total compensation. Excess compensation was 
calculated as the absolute compensation of a CEO less the median compensation 
for the peer group (based on size/industry groupings as previously described in 
section 3.2.1) to which the CEO’s company belongs. The return holding period is 
limited to nine quarters due the availability of compensation data. Even though 
the incentivisation effect of compensation on company performance may take 
several years to manifest, international studies on the pay for future company 
performance relationship have reported significant results for holding periods as 
short as one year (Cooper et al., 2014; Core et al., 1999). 
The abnormal TSR in excess of the benchmark (JSE top 100 equally-weighted 
index) was calculated for each company in the top and bottom deciles of excess 
compensation. Abnormal TSR was calculated for a period of nine quarters after 
the portfolio formation date. This period was limited by the availability of 
compensation data for the years 2011 to 2013. 
Decile portfolios were formed at the start of the calendar year in which the CEO 
compensation was reported. The companies’ actual financial years were 
disregarded for simplicity of the calculation. This simplification is supported by 
the findings of Cooper et al. (2014) that a similar relationship between pay and 
future performance exists regardless of forming portfolios on calendar year ends 
or financial year ends. Portfolios were created at the start of the calendar year, 
since it is argued that a CEO will be aware of how his/her compensation package 
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is structured at the start of the year and any incentivisation effect would 
commence immediately. The equally weighted abnormal TSR for the companies 
in the top and bottom deciles of excess compensation were then calculated. Equal 
weighting eliminates the disproportionate effect that large companies may have on 
portfolio returns. 
In order to investigate whether the relationship appears to be consistent when 
testing the relationship in different ways, three alternative measures of future 
returns, as well as one alternative measure of excess pay was tested, as follows: 
 Equally weighting the abnormal returns does not show the effect that the 
size of the pay package may have on the relationship between pay and 
future performance. In order to investigate the effect of the level of pay on 
the relationship the abnormal TSR of the top and bottom decile of excess 
total compensation was weighted using the square-root of pay. This 
alternative weighting provides a sense of the importance of pay levels on 
returns within the decile groups. The square-root of pay, rather than the 
actual pay level was used, since the resultant effect of pay on the 
weighting is less pronounced and the results are comparable to that of 
Cooper et al. (2014) as the same approach is followed. 
 Due to the variability in share returns, the relationship may be skewed by 
the effect of extreme cases. The median abnormal TSR was calculated for 
the top and bottom deciles of excess compensation in order to eliminate 
the effect of outliers. Portfolios were formed at the start of the calendar 
year. 
 The financial years of the top 100 JSE listed companies in South Africa 
end in seven different months, as opposed to only two in the U.S. 
Calculating abnormal returns from the start of the company specific 
calendar years is more accurate, since it matches the pay period with the 
TSR period. Equally-weighted abnormal TSR was calculated, but 
portfolios were formed at the start of the financial year in order to 
eliminate the effect of lag between the calendar year end and the financial 
year end. The abnormal return was calculated as the TSR of the company 
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in excess of the equally weighted TSR of the JSE top 100 index for the 
same time period for each company. 
 As a result of the small sample size and the high variability in total 
compensation, calculating excess pay using different cut-off points 
between size groups may affect the relationship between pay and future 
performance. In order to eliminate the effect of different size groupings, 
TC was regressed on company revenue and the resultant residual plots of 
each observation were used as excess pay. Excess pay calculated in this 
manner is referred to as “residual pay” for the remainder of this study, to 
distinguish this approach from the primary method determining excess pay 
used in this study. Abnormal returns were equally-weighted and portfolios 
formed on calendar years. 
A summary of the various descriptive analyses performed and the sections in 
which the results can be found is presented in Table 10 below. 
Table 10: Summary of various descriptive analyses (TC) 
Abnormal total shareholder 
return 
Excess total compensation Results 
Weighting Year-end Basis for determining excess Section 
Equal Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.1.1.1 
Square-root of pay Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.1.1.2 
Median Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.1.1.3 
Equal Financial Absolute vs. median per size group 6.1.1.4 
Equal Calendar Residual vs. predicted 6.1.1.5 
 
Testing of the statistical significance of the relationship between excess total 
compensation and abnormal total shareholder return 
In order to test the statistical significance of the relationships that appear to exist 
in the descriptive analysis, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient was calculated to 
measure the linear correlation between the excess total compensation (in terms of 
the median per size group) and the abnormal TSR for each year. A scatter graph 
of the data shows that the distributions of the observations are such that it allows 
for the Pearson’s correlation. Due to the large variation in TC in the population, 
the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for non-parametric data, which is 
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more robust against outliers, is also calculated for corroborative purposes. The 
abnormal returns were calculated from the start of the financial year to which the 
total compensation relates, in order to better match the compensation and return 
periods. 
As a result of the small sample size, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between excess TC and abnormal TSR 
were also calculated by defining excess TC as the residual plots, relative to the 
predicted TC, when regressing TC on revenue. A summary of the statistical tests 
performed is presented in Table 11 below. 
Table 11: Summary of various statistical tests (TC) 
Test Abnormal total 
shareholder 
return 
Excess total compensation Results 
Correlation Year-end Basis for determining excess Section 
Pearson Financial Absolute vs. median per size group 6.1.2.1 
Spearman Financial Absolute vs. median per size group 6.1.2.1 
Pearson Financial Residual vs. predicted 6.1.2.2 
Spearman Financial Residual vs. predicted 6.1.2.2 
 
3.2.2.2.Research question 7 
Does a positive relationship between SCC and future company performance (as 
measured by TSR) exist? 
In order to address research question 7, the following hypothesis was set: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): A positive relationship between excess short-term cash 
compensation (SCC) and abnormal future total shareholder 
return (TSR) exists. 
In order to confirm hypothesis 5 a similar approach was followed to that which 
were carried out to confirm hypothesis 4, except abnormal future TSR for nine 
quarters were calculated for the top and bottom decile portfolios of excess short-
term cash compensation (SCC). The relationship between pay and future 
performance was descriptively analysed, before being statistically tested. 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Descriptive analysis of the relationship between excess total compensation and 
abnormal total shareholder return 
Abnormal TSR was equally weighted and portfolios formed on calendar years. 
Since the square-root of pay weighting of abnormal TSR and forming portfolios at 
the start of financial year did not change the descriptive relationship between 
excess TC and abnormal TSR dramatically, as well as the latter alternative being 
extremely time consuming, these two alternatives were not re-performed for SCC. 
Median abnormal returns were however tested again for SCC since the graph 
narrowed slightly for two quarters when median abnormal TSR were calculated 
for TC (refer to 6.1.1.3). Furthermore, as a result of the small sample size, median 
returns remain important to eliminate the potential influence of extreme cases. 
The relationship between residual SCC and equally weighted abnormal TSR was 
investigated through regression analysis in order to eliminate the effect of changes 
in size groupings on the ranking of excess SCC. 
A summary of the various descriptive analyses performed, as well as the location 
of the findings, are presented in Table 12 below. 
Table 12: Summary of various descriptive analyses (SCC) 
Abnormal total shareholder 
return 
Excess total compensation Results 
Weighting Year-end Basis for determining excess Section 
Equal Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.2.1.1 
Median Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.2.1.2 
Equal Calendar Residual vs. predicted 6.2.1.3 
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Testing of the statistical significance of the relationship between excess total 
compensation and abnormal total shareholder return 
In order to test the statistical significance of the relationship between excess- and 
residual SCC and abnormal TSR, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient were calculated (refer to Table 13 below). 
Table 13: Summary of various statistical tests (SCC) 
Test Abnormal total 
shareholder 
return 
Excess total compensation Results 
Correlation Year-end Basis for determining excess Section 
Pearson Financial Absolute vs. median per size group 6.2.2.1 
Spearman Financial Absolute vs. median per size group 6.2.2.1 
Pearson Financial Residual vs. predicted 6.2.2.2 
Spearman Financial Residual vs. predicted 6.2.2.2 
 
3.2.2.3.Research question 8 
Does a positive relationship between LIC and future company performance (as 
measured by TSR) exist? 
In order to address research question 8 the following hypothesis was set: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): A positive relationship between excess long-term incentive 
compensation (LIC) and abnormal future total shareholder 
return (TSR) exists. 
In order to confirm hypothesis 6 a similar approach was followed to that which 
were carried out to confirm hypothesis 5, except abnormal future TSR for nine 
quarters was calculated for the top and bottom decile portfolios of excess- and 
residual long-term incentive compensation (LIC). The relationship between 
excess (and residual) LIC and abnormal TSR was first analysed descriptively. The 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
were then calculated between excess- and residual LIC and abnormal TSR to test 
the statistical significance of the relationship. A summary of the various 
descriptive analyses and statistical tests performed is presented in Panels A and B 
respectively of Table 14 on the next page. 
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Table 14: Summary of various descriptive analyses and statistical tests (LIC) 
Panel A: Descriptive analyses 
Abnormal total shareholder 
return 
Excess total compensation Results 
Weighting Year-end Basis for determining excess Section 
Equal Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.3.1.1 
Median Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.3.1.2 
Equal Calendar Residual vs. predicted 6.3.1.3 
Panel B: Statistical tests 
Test Abnormal 
total 
shareholder 
return 
Excess total compensation Results 
Correlation Year-end Basis for determining excess Section 
Pearson Financial Absolute vs. median per size group 6.3.2.1 
Spearman Financial Absolute vs. median per size group 6.3.2.1 
Pearson Financial Residual vs. predicted 6.3.2.2 
Spearman Financial Residual vs. predicted 6.3.2.2 
 
3.2.2.4.Research question 9 
How do the pay-performance relationships based on TC, SCC and LIC 
respectively, compare? 
In order to address research question 9 the results of research questions 6, 7 and 8 
were compared to determine whether the companies in the top deciles of excess 
compensation consistently earn higher or lower abnormal TSR than the bottom 
deciles. The remaining deciles between the extremes were also analysed to 
compare the consistency of the relationships between the different components of 
compensation and the abnormal TSR. International studies have followed a 
similar approach where the remaining deciles were either examined individually 
(Cooper et al., 2014) or cumulatively (Balafas & Florackis, 2014). 
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3.2.2.5.Research question 10 
Does an indication exist in the South African context that long-term incentives 
may represent an optimal component in the CEO compensation package? 
In order to address research question 10 the following hypothesis was set: 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): The companies with CEOs in the top decile of the relative 
proportion of LIC to TC, earn higher equally weighted 
future abnormal TSR than the companies of the CEOs in 
the bottom decile, when forming portfolios at the start of 
the calendar year. 
In order to confirm hypothesis 7 the proportion of long-term incentive 
compensation (LIC) to total compensation (TC) was calculated for all the 
companies. The sample was then sorted in order of the highest to the lowest 
proportion of LIC to TC. 
The equally-weighted abnormal TSR for nine quarters, after forming portfolios at 
the start of the calendar year, was calculated for each company in the top and 
bottom deciles of relative LIC to TC nine quarters. The bottom decile will include 
all the companies that do not pay any LIC. Since companies that award LIC may 
differ from companies that do not pay any form of LIC, the relationship was 
recalculated by excluding the companies not paying any LIC from the sample in 
order to confirm the results, or investigate whether they changed. 
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CHAPTER 4: LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE 
4.1.Limitations 
4.1.1. Limited time frame 
4.1.1.1.Compensation data limited to three years 
This study only covers a three year period. International studies generally include 
a longer period, with Cooper et al. (2014) covering 18 years. The expected value 
of long-term incentives (namely: share options and performance share grants) 
were obtained from PwC, since these are not disclosed in the annual financial 
statements. These values were only calculated by PwC for the three years from 
2011 to 2013. In order to extend the period of the study the expected values of 
share options and performance share grants would have to be calculated using the 
detailed information disclosed in the annual financial statements, a time 
consuming exercise. Core et al. (1999), however, report a significant relationship 
for a sample including only three years. 
 
4.1.1.2.Future return period (holding period) 
One of the main aims of this study is to investigate the relationship between CEO 
compensation and future share returns. Since the value effect of a CEO’s actions 
will only be seen after some time, company performance is defined as TSR using 
a buy-and-hold strategy. Cooper et al. (2014) measured abnormal TSR over one-
year and three-year holding periods, while Core et al. (1999) included a five-year 
holding period as well. Due to the limited availability of long-term incentive 
compensation, the longest holding period possible was used, namely nine 
quarters. This is considered enough time to give a first glimpse into a possible 
relationship, since international studies report significant relationship for holding 
periods as short as one year (Cooper et al., 2014; Core et al., 1999). 
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4.1.2. Top 100 JSE listed companies 
This study is limited to the largest 100 companies listed on the JSE and therefore 
only includes large- and medium capitalisation listed companies. Companies with 
a small market capitalisation are excluded due to the unavailability of the 
expected values of long-term incentives for these companies. Previous pay-
performance sensitivity studies in South Africa were limited to a single industry 
(Shaw, 2011; Theku, 2014) or to only large capitalisation companies (Bradley, 
2011), therefore, despite the limitation to the top 100 companies, this study 
contributes to the literature by extending the population size. Furthermore, the 
largest 100 companies represents 94% of the total JSE capitalisation as at 7 May 
2015 (calculated using fundamentals data downloaded from the Sharenet 
database). 
 
4.1.3. Valuation of long-term incentives 
The assumptions used to calculate the Black-Scholes-Merton value of the share 
options and the expected value of the performance share grants were not tailored 
to each company. Due to time constraints and for the purpose of being consistent, 
blanket assumptions were used for each company for the input variables of the 
expected value of long-term incentives. The approach taken in this study to value 
long-term incentives is arguably still more accurate than the approach taken in the 
literature generally. Prior research has shown that various option-pricing methods 
produce highly correlated values and therefore should not affect the results of the 
pay-performance relationship (Carpenter & Sanders, 2004). 
 
4.1.4. Industry groupings 
The sample was classified into the four major industry groupings in order to test 
for the effect of benchmarking. A more detailed classification of companies into 
specific close industries may provide different results. There are however too few 
companies in the sample. Furthermore, some industries only have one close peer. 
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4.1.5. Mean reversion 
Companies that are overvalued tend to underperform relative to companies that 
are undervalued. As a result of this tendency of share prices to revert back to the 
mean, it may therefore be necessary to control for mean reversion. Due to the 
small sample size and limited time frame of this study, it is not practical to divide 
the benchmark portfolio into smaller benchmark groups. Mean reversion could 
affect the returns of companies, which should be born in mind when interpreting 
the results. 
 
4.2.Scope 
4.2.1. Labour market theory 
The labour market theory postulates that the level of CEO compensation reflects 
the company’s demand for talented managers, and thus it aligns the interests of 
the manager with the shareholders (Chalmers et al., 2006). It could be assumed 
that more talented managers will perform better, hence a positive relationship 
between the level of CEO compensation and company performance may provide 
support for the labour market theory. An investigation of the labour market theory 
is outside the scope of this study. 
 
4.2.2. Managerial power theory 
The theory of managerial power suggests that executives have power over their 
boards to influence their own compensation and extract value in excess of that 
which they would receive under optimal contracting (Bebchuk et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, it was found that the influence that CEOs have over the over the 
board of directors plays a role in the determination of incentives (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2004). Consequently, an inverse relationship between the level (and 
proportion of LIC to TC) of CEO compensation and company performance may 
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be support for the theory of managerial power. Investigating this theory is outside 
the scope of this study. 
 
4.2.3. Other variables affecting compensation 
In order to control for the effect of benchmarking on the level of CEO 
compensation, excess compensation is used to investigate the relationship 
between CEO compensation and future share returns. There are however other 
factors (such as CEO age, CEO tenure, ownership structure, and the composition 
of the compensation committee) that may have an effect on the level and structure 
of CEO compensation (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand & Dalton, 1998; David, Kochhar 
& Levitas, 1998). This study is limited to an investigation of the effect of the level 
and structure of CEO compensation on future share returns. 
 
4.2.4. Measures of company performance 
Accounting measures may induce managers to focus on short-term profitability at 
the cost of long-term value creation (Dechow & Sloan, 1991) and may be affected 
by factors that do not influence company performance (Wernerfelt & 
Montgomery, 1988). Consequently it is suggested that market related measures 
provide a better measure for shareholder value. This is confirmed by O’Neill and 
Iob (1999) confirm that total shareholder return (TSR) – namely: capital growth 
and dividends – is the best indicator of company performance to provide ultimate 
shareholder returns. This study is limited to the relationship between the level and 
structure of CEO compensation and company performance, as measured by future 
TSR and does not investigate the relationship relative to accounting measures of 
company performance to compare the results. 
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4.2.5. Benchmark portfolio creation 
Cooper et al. (2014), the most similar study to this, created benchmark portfolios 
by grouping the companies into 49 distinct industries. Each industry group was 
then broken down into two size groups based on December revenue figures. Since 
CEOs with the highest level of excess pay also typically experience strong current 
and past share performance, they used a lagged return matching approach to 
control for possible lower future returns due to mean reversion from the high 
returns associated with high pay. Due to the limited number of companies in the 
sample, the equally weighted return of the top 100 companies listed on the JSE 
was used as the benchmark.  
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CHAPTER 5: DESCRIPTION OF CEO COMPENSATION 
5.1.Introduction 
The first research objective of this study is to analyse and describe compensation 
levels and pay structures for the largest 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) for 2011 to 2013, a larger sample that covers a broader 
range of company sizes and industries than other studies. 
 
This first research objective is addressed by the rest of this chapter, which is 
structured as follows: The level and structure of CEO compensation is described 
overall for the top 100 JSE listed companies, as well as by company size and 
industry groupings. Thereafter the relative significance of the short-term cash and 
long-term incentive components is considered. 
 
5.2.Description of level and structure of CEO compensation 
This section describes the levels and structure of CEO compensation in addressing 
the first research question that was set. 
Research question 1: What are the maximum and average levels of, and variation 
in, CEO compensation, in total (TC) and per component 
(SCC and LIC), for the top 100 JSE listed companies 
overall, and how does this vary between companies of 
different size and in different industries? 
The description of CEO compensation for the top 100 companies overall is 
presented in section 5.2.1 below, and the descriptions of CEO compensation for 
companies of different sizes, and in different industries are presented in sections 
5.2.2 and 5.2.3 respectively. 
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5.2.1. Overall 
The level of total CEO compensation (TC) varies greatly amongst the largest 100 
companies, ranging from a maximum annual TC of R137 million to a minimum 
annual TC of R1.4 million being paid to CEOs across the three year period. This 
excludes one CEO who did not earn any compensation at all over the three year 
period. This range might support the impression that CEOs in South Africa earn 
excessive pay packages; however, the majority of CEOs’ TC is skewed towards to 
bottom, as is evident from Figure 1. The mean total compensation for the period 
was R20.5 million per year and nearly two thirds of CEOs in the largest 100 listed 
companies in South Africa earned less than the mean total compensation. This is 
further highlighted by the median annual TC of R14.7 million being below the 
mean. 
Figure 1: Percentage of companies per CEO total compensation bracket 
 
The high level of variation in TC is reflected in the standard deviation of 
R18.9_million. Table 15 reports descriptive statistics on inflation adjusted levels 
of CEO compensation and its components (short-term cash compensation (SCC) 
and long-term incentive compensation (LIC)) for the pooled population over 2011 
to 2013. The SCC component is broken down further into total guaranteed 
package and annual cash bonus. 
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics on compensation components for the JSE Top 
100 companies 
 
 Total 
guaranteed 
package 
(TGP) 
R’000 
Annual cash 
bonus (CB) 
R’000 
Short-term 
cash 
compensati
on (SCC) 
[TGP + CB] 
R’000 
Long-term 
incentives 
(LIC)  
R’000 
Total 
compensati
on (TC) 
[SCC + 
LIC]  
R’000 
Mean 7 824 4 912 12 737 7 757 20 494 
Median 6 039 3 843 10 348 3 479 14 709 
Std. dev. (P) 6 546 4 966 9 146 13 058 18 882 
Std. dev. (S) 6 559 4 976 9 164 13 082 18 918 
Maximum 50 001 27 230 52 842 130 454 136 713 
Minimum 1 128 - 1 431 - 1 431 
% of sum 38% 24% 62% 38% 100% 
% at median   72% 28% 100% 
 
The maximum cash compensation granted to any CEO during the three years 
from 2011 to 2013 was R53 million, whereas the maximum long-term incentive 
compensation was two and a half times higher at R130 million. Although 
maximum SCC was smaller than maximum LIC, the difference between the two 
is not as extreme as in the U.S., where the maximum LIC was nearly six times 
that of the maximum SCC (Cooper et al., 2014). Similar to the U.S., the standard 
deviation in South Africa showed less variation in cash compensation than LIC, 
although the difference in variation between SCC and LIC is smaller locally. The 
standard deviation of cash compensation in SA is nearly 70% of that of incentive 
compensation, while the same relationship is only one fifth in the U.S. (Cooper et 
al., 2014). 
The median short-term cash compensation and long-term incentive compensation 
were R10.3_million and R3.5 million respectively, in contrast to $1 million and 
$1.4 million respectively in the U.S. (Cooper et al., 2014). It is clear from the 
above results that in South Africa, cash compensation makes up a relatively larger 
portion of total pay than in the U.S. Out of the 263 observations (over the three 
year period 2011 to 2013), 70 pay packages (nearly 27%) did not include any 
long-term incentive compensation as part of overall compensation and 91% of 
CEOs earned LIC less than R20 million (refer Figure 1) suggesting a small 
proportion of CEOs earn a large portion of their wealth in the form of LIC. 
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5.2.2. Description by company size group 
The previous section provided an overview of compensation levels and structures 
for the top 100 companies listed on the JSE overall. In order to address the second 
part of research question 1 (refer section 2.8), this section divides the top 100 
companies into four distinct size groups, based on revenue, and analyses the 
compensation levels and structures for each size group. 
Since it is common practice for companies to benchmark pay on size and/or 
industry (Bizjak et al., 2008) and O’Reilly and Main (2010) found that CEO 
compensation is strongly related to company size as measured by revenue, 
research questions 2 and 3 are also addressed by testing two null hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2) to establish whether company size (based on 
revenue) and/or industry sector are determinants of CEO compensation levels.  
Revenue of the top 100 companies ranges from R7 million to R583 billion. These 
companies were split into four groups on the basis of revenue and are referred to 
as “mega” (revenue more than R100 billion), “large” (revenue from R40 billion 
and R100 billion), “medium” (revenue from R10 billion to R40 billion) and 
“small” (revenue less than R10 billion). 
The mean, median and standard deviation of the various components – short-term 
cash compensation (divided into total guaranteed pay (TGP) and cash bonus 
(CB)) and long-term incentive compensation (LIC) – of compensation per 
company size are presented in Figure 2. It is clear that the mean, median and 
standard deviation increase as the company size increases, supporting the sales 
maximisation hypothesis, as well as the argument that companies benchmark on 
size. 
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Figure 2: Mean, median and standard deviation of the components of 
compensation per company size group 
 
The proportion of long-term incentive compensation is larger for bigger 
companies, but the mean long-term incentives are skewed towards to lower end of 
the scale as a result of 27% of the companies in the population not paying any 
form of long-term incentives. 
It is clear from Figure 2 above that the mean, median and standard deviation 
increase in line with an increase in the size grouping. A similar trend is shown for 
the maximum total compensation (refer Figure 3 on the next page). It is however 
interesting to note that the highest annual TGP of R50 million is reported in the 
“large” size grouping  and not in the “mega” size grouping, where the highest 
annual TGP was R26 million, nearly half. Similarly, the absolute value of the 
highest annual LIC in the “medium” grouping (R49 million) is more than that 
reported in the next biggest group of “large” companies (R31 million). This is 
reflective of the extent of the variation in pay that exists. 
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Figure 3: Maximum, mean and median of the components of compensation 
per company size group 
 
It is not only total compensation overall that is skewed toward the lower end of 
the scale, but within size groups as well. Figure 4 shows that the median total 
compensation is consistently lower than the mean total compensation when 
companies are divided into size groups. This skewness is as a result of a small 
number of very large total compensation packages. 
Figure 4: Mean, median and standard deviation of total compensation per 
size group 
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From Figure 4 it is clear that the standard deviations are lower than the means and 
the medians for each size grouping due to the close relationship between company 
size (in terms of revenue) and total CEO compensation levels. This provides 
further support for the sales maximisation hypothesis, as well as for 
benchmarking on company size. 
Figure 5 clearly depicts the relationship between the mean of each component of 
compensation and the revenue of the company. Furthermore, LIC forms a 
significant part of total compensation, especially in larger companies, as is evident 
from the mean LIC of R29.8 million exceeding the mean SCC of R27.8 million 
for “mega” companies. 
Figure 5: Mean compensation per size group 
 
The relative importance of LIC for mega companies is even more pronounced 
when looking at the median compensation components. Figure 6 on the next page 
shows that “large” companies pay median LIC of close to 50% of median SCC, 
but very large (“mega”) companies pay median LIC in excess of median SCC 
(R31.3 million and R27.6 million respectively). 
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Figure 6: Median compensation per size group 
 
The maximum, minimum, mean, median and standard deviation of each 
component of compensation for each of the four size groupings are presented in 
Tables 39 to 42 in APPENDIX B. 
 
5.2.3. Description by industry 
It is clear that CEOs of larger companies generally earn more than CEOs of 
smaller companies, but apart from size, there is an indication in the literature that 
companies also benchmark according to the industry within which the company 
trades (Albuquerque et al., 2013; Bizjak et al., 2008). 
The companies in the sample population were grouped into four distinct industry 
classifications, being: 
i. Basic Resources (BR) which includes mining, steel, oil & gas, and 
paper companies; 
ii. Financial Services (FS) which is made up of banks, insurance 
companies, real estate and investment funds; 
iii. Industrials (I) which includes logistics, manufacturing, construction; 
and 
iv. Services (S) which is made up of all the companies that do not fall 
within the first three industries, including: retail, telecommunications, 
travel & leisure, healthcare, media and consumer goods. 
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Figure 7 presents the mean, median and standard deviation of the various 
components – short-term cash compensation (total guaranteed pay (TGP) and cash 
bonus) and long-term incentives (LIC) – of compensation per industry. In contrast 
to the different size groups in section 5.2.2 the means, medians and standard 
deviations do not show a marked difference between industries, with a few 
exceptions and other matters of interest. 
Figure 7: Mean, median and standard deviation of the components of 
compensation per industry 
 
As a result of the end of the commodity boom and the resultant decline in the 
prices of basic resources, companies in the mining sector of the basic resources 
industry have severely underperformed companies in the other three main industry 
groupings. This is evident from Figure 8 on the next page that reports a nearly 0% 
mean return in the resources industry, with a median negative return of -34%. 
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Figure 8: Total shareholder return per industry for the period January 2011 
to April 2015 
 
Mean and median pay for basic resources 
The mean and median compensation for basic resources companies stand out as 
being higher than the other industry groupings. The highest mean and median 
TGP (R9.6 million and R8 million respectively) are also reported in the BR 
industry, with the next highest mean and median TGP earned in the Services 
industry (R9 million and R5.9 million respectively). The high pay in basic 
resources companies may be reflection of the size of the companies rather than the 
industry, since the three biggest companies (in terms of revenue) in 2013 were 
included in the basic resources industry grouping. 
Returns of mining companies 
The total shareholder returns of mining companies in the basic resources industry 
are mostly negative, despite paying relatively large pay packages. Descriptively, 
therefore, there seems to be no relationship between CEO pay and company 
performance in the basic resources industry. 
Maximum 
The maximum total compensation relative to the mean and median is presented in 
Figure 9 for each industry grouping. The CEO earning the highest annual LIC was 
in the financial services (valued at R130 million), while the highest annual TGP 
and CB were earned by a CEO from the services industry. 
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Figure 9: Maximum, mean and median of the components of compensation 
per industry 
 
Skewness 
Figure 9 above also highlights the skewness of pay components when reported by 
industry. The only industry with a maximum total compensation does not exceed 
250% of the mean total compensation is in the industrial grouping. 
Variation in compensation 
The variation in total compensation is similar across industries (refer Figure 10 on 
the next page) except for industrials that shows a noticeably lower standard 
deviation. Even though each industry grouping contains a similar distribution in 
terms of company size, the companies in the industrial grouping are a much 
tighter group in terms of specific industry (mostly manufacturing). The services 
grouping, however, incudes telecommunications, healthcare, retailers and 
technology; and the financial services grouping is made up of banks, insurance 
companies and real estate. Another reason for the lower standard deviation in the 
industrial grouping is the lower proportion of LIC, the component that is subject 
to more variation. 
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Figure 10: Mean, median and standard deviation of total compensation per 
industry 
 
Benchmarking 
Visually the effect of size on benchmarking appears to be more pronounced than 
that of industry (refer Figure 4). It cannot, however, be concluded that 
benchmarking does not take place on the basis of industry, but if it does it is likely 
to be on the basis of a more detailed grouping (closer peers) than the four major 
industry groupings used in this study. Each of the four industry groupings 
contains a wide range of different companies. It is however not meaningful to 
analyse companies at a more detailed level, due to the limited number of 
companies in each specific industry (one only in some cases).   
Long-term incentive compensation (LIC) 
Mean LICs are similar across industries, except for industrial where the mean is 
notably lower. It is only in the financial services industry where the mean LIC 
comes close to the mean SCC (R9.2 million and R10 million respectively). In all 
three the other industries, mean LIC is well below mean SCC (refer Figure 11 on 
the next page). 
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Figure 11: Mean compensation per industry group 
 
Figure 12 below, however, reports that median LIC is consistently significantly 
lower than SCC in all four industries, mainly as a result of all four industries 
containing companies that do not pay any form of LIC. 
Figure 12: Median compensation per industry group 
 
The maximum, minimum, mean, median and standard deviation of each 
component of compensation for each of the four industry groupings are presented 
in Tables 43 to 46 in APPENDIX C. 
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5.3.Significance of long-term incentives relative to total compensation 
From the mean and median total compensation per size group described in section 
5.2.2 above it seems clear that there is a big difference in the level of total 
compensation between the different size groups. However, even though the total 
compensation levels and the structure of the compensation packages vary amongst 
industry groups, the pattern is not as clear as with the size groups. 
This section statistically investigates whether CEO compensation is determined 
by company size and/or the industry in which the company operates in order to 
address research questions 2 and 3. 
Research question 2: Is company size significant in explaining the level of total 
compensation? 
Research question 3: Is the industry sector significant in explaining the level of 
total compensation? 
A null hypothesis was set for each of these research questions. The hypothesis and 
the findings for research question 2 and 3 are presented in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 
respectively. 
 
5.3.1. Difference in total compensation between size groups 
The following null hypothesis was set in order to address research question 2: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1):  The distributions of the level of CEO total compensation of 
companies in four different size groups (based on revenue) 
are the same. 
The results of a two-sample t-test show a statistically significant difference in pay 
between the four size-groups (at the 5% confidence level), as reported in Table 16 
on the next page, and the null hypothesis is therefore rejected (refer Table 20 at 
the end of the chapter). This supports the findings of previous studies that found 
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that CEO compensation is strongly related to company size as measured by 
revenue (Bizjak et al., 2008; O’Reilly & Main, 2010). 
Table 16: Size groups: Results of Two-sample t-test assuming unequal 
variances and Mann-Whitney U-Test 
 Two sample t-test Mann-Whitney U-test 
Size groups 
Mega 
(p-value) 
Large 
(p-value) 
Medium 
(p-value) 
Mega 
(p-value) 
Large 
(p-value) 
Medium 
(p-value) 
Large 0.009*   0.002*   
Medium 0.004* 0.034*  <0.001* <0.001*  
Small 0.002* <0.001* 0.016* <0.001* <0.001* 0.135 
* Significant at the 5% confidence level 
The Mann-Whitney U-Test corroborates the results of the t-test. 
 
5.3.2. Difference in total compensation between industry groups 
The following null hypothesis was set in order to address research question 3: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2):  The distributions of the level of CEO total compensation of 
companies in four industry sectors are the same. 
The results of a two-sample t-test (see Table 17) report no significant difference in 
pay between the four main industry groupings at the 5% confidence level. This is 
confirmed by the Mann-Whitney U-Test, and Null hypothesis 2 is therefore 
accepted (refer Table 20 at the end of the chapter). 
Table 17: Industry groups: Results of Two-sample t-test assuming unequal 
variances and Mann-Whitney U-test 
 Two sample t-test Mann-Whitney U-test 
Industry 
BR 
(p-
value) 
FS 
(p-
value) 
I 
(p-
value) 
BR 
(p-
value) 
FS 
(p-
value) 
I 
(p-
value) 
Fin. services (FS) 0.893   0.221   
Industrials (I) 0.055 0.201  0.141 0.348  
Services (S) 0.465 0.672 0.163 0.137 0.351 0.982 
* Significant at the 5% confidence level 
It is calculated that size, and not the major industry in which the company 
operates, is significant in explaining the level of CEO total compensation. This 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
supports the findings reported in the literature (Gabaix & Landier, 2006; O’Reilly 
& Main, 2010) and (inadvertently) in five SA studies that used size-related 
accounting measures of company performance. 
 
5.4.Proportion of long-term incentive compensation 
This section considers the relative importance of LIC and SCC as expressed in 
research question 4. 
Research question 4: What is the proportion of long-term incentive compensation 
(LIC) relative to total compensation (TC)? 
This proportion is calculated by dividing the total LIC by the total TC, as well as 
dividing the median LIC by the median TC, overall (section 5.4.1) and for each 
size/industry grouping (sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 respectively) 
 
5.4.1. Overall 
Even though the mean and median long-term incentive compensation (LIC) is less 
than that of short-term cash compensation (SCC) locally, the relative proportions 
of LIC to total compensation (TC) are not insignificant. The median LIC of R3.5 
million is less than half of the mean (R7.8 million) due to 27% of companies not 
awarding any long-term incentives over the three year period 2011 to 2013. 
When considering the pay of all the companies cumulatively, total compensation 
comprises of 62% SCC (salary, benefits and bonus) and 38% LIC. The total 
guaranteed package and cash bonus make up 38% and 24% of TC respectively. At 
the median level of all observations, 72% is SCC and 28% is LIC (refer to Figure 
13 on the next page). Even though the relative proportion of LIC to TC in South 
Africa is smaller compared to the U.S., where Cooper et al. (2014) reported a 
48/52 split between cash and incentive compensation respectively at the median 
level, the proportion of LIC to TC is large enough not to be ignored. 
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Figure 13: Proportion of long-term incentive compensation and short-term 
cash compensation 
 
5.4.2. Compensation structure per size group 
The median short-term cash compensation for small- and medium sized 
companies (R6.3 million and R9.2 million respectively) was three to four times as 
much as the median incentive compensation (R2.1 million and R2.3 million 
respectively), with large companies paying roughly twice as much cash 
compensation as incentive compensation (R14.5 million and R7.4 million 
respectively). Only the group of mega-sized companies reported higher median 
long-term incentive compensation (LIC) than short-term cash compensation 
(SCC) (R31.1 million and R27.6 million respectively). 
Figure 14 clearly shows the relationship between company size and the proportion 
of long-term incentive compensation to total compensation. 
Figure 14: Proportion of long-term incentives to total compensation per size 
group 
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A large proportion of the companies in the mega size group are dual listed 
multinational companies, thus reflecting the higher incentive component that was 
found by Cooper et al. (2014) in the U.S. Mega companies in total reported 48% 
cash compensation followed by large-, medium- and then small companies (64%, 
69% and 73% respectively). 
Out of the 71 companies in the small size group, 12 CEOs (17%) did not earn any 
cash bonus and 26 (37%) did not receive any long-term incentives as part of their 
compensation. Table 18 below presents the number and percentage of companies 
that did not pay incentives (cash bonus and long-term incentive compensation). It 
is noticeable that the number of companies not paying LIC increase with a 
decrease in company size. 
Table 18: Companies with no cash bonus or long-term incentive 
compensation per size group 
Company 
size grouping N 
No cash bonus No long-term incentive 
compensation 
Number of 
companies 
Percentage of 
companies 
Number of 
companies 
Percentage of 
companies 
Small 71 12 17% 26 37% 
Medium 104 16 15% 30 29% 
Large 60 14 23% 11 18% 
Mega 28 5 18% 3 11% 
 
Figure 15 on the next page clearly depicts how long-term incentives make up a 
smaller proportion of total compensation in smaller companies relative to larger 
companies. 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
Figure 15: Proportion of companies with no long-term incentive 
compensation per size group 
 
It is interesting to note that a relatively larger percentage of CEOs in the large- 
and mega size-groups did not earn cash bonuses, than in the small- and medium 
size-groups. Conversely, a much smaller percentage of the CEOs in the former 
two groups received no long-term incentives compared to the CEOs of the latter 
two groups. 
 
5.4.3. Compensation structure by industry 
Proportions of incentive pay to total compensation vary greatly by industry (see 
Figure 16 on the next page), with a near equal split in the financial services 
industry (with 48% in the form of long-term incentive compensation) to 26% of 
total compensation in the industrial sector making up long-term incentives. Basic 
resources and other services (including retail, consumer goods, health care, 
telecommunications and media) also have reasonably low levels of long-term 
incentive compensation (41% and 32% respectively). 
Shaw (2011), in a study investigating the pay-performance relationship in the 
financial services industry in SA, excluded LIC from CEO compensation on the 
basis of Adams and Mehran’s (2003) findings that banking companies in the U.S. 
rely less on LIC in their CEO compensation packages. Shaw (2011), however, 
assumed this applies to companies other than banks (insurers and fund managers) 
in South Africa. These assumptions have not been investigated locally prior to this 
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study. It is interesting to note that the financial services industry grouping – which 
includes banks, insurers, fund managers and real estate – pays the highest 
proportion of long-term incentives to total compensation of any industry 
grouping, as well as the highest maximum annual long-term incentive 
compensation (R130 million – refer Figure 9 earlier). 
Figure 16: Proportion of long-term incentives to total compensation per 
industry group 
 
 
5.5.Correlation of components of compensation 
This section determines the correlation between the different components of 
compensation in order to address research question 5. 
Research question 5: Is LIC more closely correlated to TC than SCC? 
In order to address research question 5 the following hypothesis was set: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3):  The correlation between LIC and TC is stronger than the 
correlation between SCC and TC. 
The correlation is calculated between the different components of CEO 
compensation: Total compensation, short-term cash compensation (SCC), and 
long-term incentive compensation. The different components of SCC (total 
guaranteed package and cash bonuses) are also included. 
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The variation in total compensation is driven by both incentive and cash 
compensation, being positively correlated to all aspect of compensation (refer 
Table 19 below). It is interesting to note that short-term cash compensation 
comprises a larger proportion of total pay overall and at the median level. Despite 
this the long-term incentive compensation is more closely correlated to total pay 
than short-term cash compensation.  
Table 19: Correlations between components of raw compensation 
 TC SCC LIC TGP CB 
Total compensation (TC) 1.000     
Short-term cash compensation (SCC) 0.781 1.000    
Long-term incentive compensation (LIC) 0.899 0.429 1.000   
Total guarantee package (TGP) 0.673 0.851 0.377 1.000  
Short-term cash bonus (CB) 0.551 0.721 0.292 0.248 1.000 
 
Consequently hypothesis 3 is accepted (see Table 20). 
Even though both the correlation between total guaranteed package (TGP) and 
short-term cash compensation (SCC), and the correlation between short-term cash 
bonuses (CB) and SCC seem to suggest a close relationship (85% and 72% 
respectively), TGP seems to play a more significant role in driving SCC. This is 
supported by the overall median and maximum TGP (R6 million and R50 million 
respectively) compared to the overall median and maximum CB (R3.8 million and 
R27 million respectively). 
Our findings suggest relatively close relationships between both short-term cash 
compensation (SCC) and total compensation (TC), as well as long-term incentive 
compensation (LIC) and TC. Furthermore, there is a close relationship between 
total short-term cash compensation, and both total guaranteed pay (salaries and 
benefits) and bonuses. This is inconsistent with results from the U.S. where total 
incentive pay showed a near perfect correlation of 98.6% with total pay, but total 
cash pay only explaining 37.7% of total pay (Cooper et al., 2014). As for the 
components of cash pay, a U.S. study reported a 98.5% correlation between 
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bonuses and total cash pay, but only 49.8% between salary and total cash 
compensation. 
It appears as if cash compensation plays a relatively more important role in 
determining total pay in South Africa than the U.S., as does the guaranteed cash 
portion of the total cash pay. The strong correlation between SCC and TC (78.1%) 
may suggest that using short-term cash compensation as a proxy for total 
compensation (as most prior SA studies have done) is not entirely inappropriate. 
 
5.6.Conclusion to research objective 1 
In this chapter the maximum and average levels of, and variation in, CEO 
compensation, in total (TC) and per component (SCC and LIC), for the top 100 
JSE listed companies overall were described. The variation between companies of 
different size and in different industries was also described (Research question 1). 
A two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances confirmed that company size is 
significant in explaining the level of total compensation, whereas the major 
company industry is not (Research questions 2 and 3). The proportion of long-
term incentive compensation (LIC) relative to total compensation (TC) was 
established (Research question 4), as well as whether LIC is more closely 
correlated to TC than SCC (Research question 5). 
The results of the hypotheses tested in order to address research objective 1 is 
summarised in Table 20 below. 
Table 20: Results of Chapter 5: Description of CEO compensation 
No. Hypothesis Result 
H1 The distributions of the level of CEO total compensation of companies in 
four different size groups (based on revenue) are the same. 
 
Reject 
H2 The distributions of the level of CEO total compensation of companies in 
four industry sectors are the same. 
 
Accept 
H3 The correlation between LIC and TC is stronger than the correlation 
between SCC and TC. 
 
Accept 
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAY 
AND FUTURE PERFORMANCE 
Prior international studies on the relationship between CEO pay and future 
company performance report negative abnormal returns for the highest paid 
executives (Balafas & Florackis, 2014; Cooper et al., 2014; Core et al., 1999). 
The results suggest that managerial compensation components such as long-term 
incentives – meant to align the interests of management with shareholder value – 
do not necessarily translate into higher future shareholder returns. 
This chapter reports on this relationship in South Africa in addressing the second 
research objective of this study, to investigate and analyse the relationship 
between the level and structure of CEO compensation and the future total 
shareholder returns in South Africa. This relationship is based on excess 
compensation, which is loosely described as the difference between the total and 
average CEO compensation. Since a close relationship between pay and company 
size is found to exist in South Africa (refer section 5.3.1), excess compensation 
was more specifically defined as the excess of total compensation over the median 
compensation per peer group based on size as determined in Chapter 5. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Firstly the relationship between excess CEO 
compensation levels (in total and by component) and future TSR is analysed. 
Thereafter the relationship between CEO compensation structure and future TSR 
is investigated. 
 
6.1.The relationship between total compensation (TC) and future total 
shareholder return (TSR) 
This section analyses the relationship between TC and future company 
performance in addressing the sixth research question that was set. 
 
Research question 6: Does a positive relationship between TC and future 
company performance (as measured by TSR) exist? 
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In order to address research question 6 the following hypothesis was set: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): A positive relationship between excess total compensation 
(TC) and abnormal future total shareholder return (TSR) 
exists. 
In order to investigate hypothesis 4 the relationship was first analysed 
descriptively in order to establish the apparent relationship between excess TC 
and abnormal TSR using different methods. This relationship was then tested 
statistically in order to confirm or reject the hypothesis. 
 
 
6.1.1. Descriptive analysis 
The relationship between excess TC and abnormal TSR are investigated in 
different ways in order to establish whether the methodology followed has an 
effect on the direction of the relationship. First the abnormal returns of the top and 
bottom deciles are weighted equally, and secondly weighted on the basis of the 
square-root of pay. Thirdly, the median abnormal returns are investigated in order 
to eliminate the effect of outliers. For simplicity, all portfolios are formed on 
calendar years. One test is, however, repeated forming the portfolios on financial 
years in order to investigate whether the relationship is affected by the portfolio 
formation date. Finally, portfolios are formed by ranking companies according to 
residual pay, as opposed to excess pay over the median of the peer group, to 
investigate whether the results are affected by the company size peer groupings. 
The various descriptive analyses are presented in sections 6.1.1.1 to 6.1.1.5 as 
detailed in Table 21 on the next page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
Table 21: Summary of various descriptive analyses (TC) 
Abnormal total shareholder 
return 
Excess total compensation Results 
Weighting Year-end Basis for determining excess Section 
Equal Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.1.1.1 
Square-root of pay Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.1.1.2 
Median Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.1.1.3 
Equal Financial Absolute vs. median per size group 6.1.1.4 
Equal Calendar Residual vs. predicted 6.1.1.5 
 
6.1.1.1.Weighting of abnormal TSR: Equal 
In order to investigate this relationship companies were first ranked on the basis 
of excess total compensation (as defined by total compensation less median total 
compensation per peer group based on company size, as described in the previous 
chapter), and divided into deciles. Abnormal TSR was calculated from the start of 
the calendar year to which the excess CEO compensation related, defined as the 
excess TSR over the equally weighted (EW) TSR of the top 100 JSE listed 
companies. 
The abnormal TSR of the top and bottom deciles were calculated on the basis of 
equal weightings of abnormal TSR for each company. In the year after the 
companies are classified into the highest and lowest excess compensation deciles 
respectively (column titled “Quarter (+4)”), companies in the highest total 
compensation decile earn positive abnormal return of 2.8%. In contrast, the 
companies in the lowest compensation decile earn negative abnormal returns of -
9.4%. The performance worsens more significantly over time for the lowest 
decile, while the abnormal returns in the highest decile remain positive but reduce. 
In the nine quarters after the classification period, companies in the high 
compensation decile earn positive abnormal returns of 3.2%, while the companies 
in the lowest compensation decile earn negative abnormal return of -16.1%. 
Figure 17 reflects the cumulative quarterly abnormal TSR earned by the top and 
bottom decile of excess CEO compensation.  The graph shows a widening gap 
between the abnormal TSR of the top and bottom deciles, with a small positive 
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cumulative abnormal return for the top decile and increasingly negative abnormal 
TSR for the bottom decile. 
Figure 17: Equally-weighted abnormal returns earned by companies with CEOs 
in the top and bottom deciles of excess total compensation 
 
This description is in direct contrast to the international studies that report a 
relationship in the opposite direction, with negative abnormal returns being earned 
by companies with CEOs in the top deciles of excess compensation.  
 
6.1.1.2.Weighting of abnormal TSR: Square-root of pay 
In order to test whether the relationship is augmented by the absolute level of total 
compensation, abnormal TSR was recalculated weighting the returns using the 
square root of pay. This places more emphasis on proportionately higher CEO pay 
packages. 
Even though the square-root of pay (SRoP)-weighted abnormal portfolio returns 
are less pronounced, the relationship remains positive (see Figure 18 on the next 
page). 
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Figure 18: Square-root of pay weighted abnormal returns earned by 
companies with CEOs in the top and bottom deciles of excess total 
compensation 
 
The less pronounced returns suggest that the incentivisation effect is weaker for 
the CEOs earning the highest excess compensation (refer Table 22). This is in 
contrast to Cooper et al. (2014) who found stronger results using this alternative 
weighting method.  
 
6.1.1.3.Weighting of abnormal TSR: Median 
In order to test whether the results were driven by outliers the relationship was 
also investigated on the basis of median abnormal returns. Median abnormal 
returns for the highest compensation decile were found to be 4.2% and 3.4% for 
the first four and nine quarters respectively, and companies in the lowest 
compensation decile earn -5.5% (first year) and -4.3% (first nine quarters), 
therefor resulting in a similar pattern than the average returns (refer Figure 19 on 
the next page). 
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Figure 19: Median abnormal returns earned by companies with CEOs in the top 
and bottom deciles of excess total compensation 
 
The results are not driven by outliers, consistent with Cooper et al (2014), even 
though outliers may augment the extent of the abnormal returns. 
 
6.1.1.4.Year-end: Financial 
In order to investigate whether forming portfolios at the start of the calendar, 
rather than the companies’ specific financial years, has an effect on the 
relationship between excess pay and future company performance, the portfolios 
were formed at the start of the financial year of each company and the abnormal 
returns for each quarter calculated relative to the benchmark for the same time 
period for each company. The use of financial years instead of calendar years 
better matches the return periods with the compensation periods and is therefore 
more accurate. 
The top decile remain associated with positive abnormal returns and the bottom 
decile remain associated with negative abnormal returns (refer Figure 20 on the 
next page). The highest compensation decile companies earn an EW abnormal 
return 5.9% in the first year, slightly contracting to 4.9% for the full nine quarters. 
Similar to Cooper et al. (2014) the direction of the relationship between TC and 
abnormal future TSR does not change when forming on dates other than calendar 
year ends. 
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Figure 20: Equally-weighted abnormal returns earned by companies with 
CEOs in the top and bottom deciles of excess total compensation (portfolios 
formed on financial year-end) 
 
The companies in the lowest decile, however, report negative abnormal returns of 
-5.7% with performance worsening over time to -14.4% after nine quarters. The 
pattern of the relationship between pay and future company performance is 
therefore not affected by the lag between the financial year end and the calendar 
year end. 
 
6.1.1.5.Basis for determining excess pay: Residual 
In order to test whether the relationship between TC and future performance is 
generally unaffected by the methodology used, the company peer size groupings 
were disregarded and the companies ranked according to residual TC to form 
decile portfolios. 
The top decile remains associated with positive and increasing abnormal returns, 
while the bottom decile initially showed negative abnormal returns for one year, 
which diminished over time (refer Figure 21 on the next page). The highest 
compensation decile companies earn an EW abnormal return of 4.3% in the first 
year, increasing to 12.7% for the full nine quarters. The EW abnormal return of 
the bottom decile is -2.5% after one year, but end up only slightly negative after 
the full nine quarters (-0.9%). 
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Figure 21: Equally-weighted abnormal returns earned by companies with 
CEOs in the top and bottom deciles of residual total compensation 
 
Even though the companies in the top decile outperform the companies in the 
bottom decile, both deciles’ abnormal return lines have moved upwards. This shift 
in returns is explained by the movement of companies between deciles when 
ranking companies differently to form portfolios. The largest mega-sized 
company for instance, moved from the top decile to the bottom when sorting on 
excess- and residual TC respectively, thus indicating that the methodology may 
have the potential to affect the results, especially where a weak relationship is 
found. The statistical analysis will show whether the apparent change is 
significant or not. 
 
6.1.1.6.Conclusion to descriptive analysis 
Panels A and B of Table 22 report cumulative abnormal returns for one year 
(Quarter +4) and two years and one quarter (Quarter +9) after the portfolio 
formation date for the companies with CEOs in the top and bottom deciles of 
excess total compensation. 
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Table 22: Abnormal return calculated against Top100 JSE Listed companies 
Panel A: Highest excess compensation decile (Total Compensation) 
Return weighting Compensation 
Portfolio 
formation 
N 
Quarter 
(+4) 
Quarter 
(+9) 
Equal Excess Calendar year 26 2.8% 3.2% 
Square-root of pay Excess Calendar year 26 1.5% 2.1% 
Median Excess Calendar year 26 4.2% 3.4% 
Equal Excess Financial year 26 5.9% 4.9% 
Equal Residual Calendar year 26 4.3% 12.7% 
Panel B: Lowest excess compensation decile (Total Compensation) 
Return weighting Compensation 
Portfolio 
formation 
N 
Quarter 
(+4) 
Quarter 
(+9) 
Equal Excess Calendar year 27 -9.4% -16.1% 
Square-root of pay Excess Calendar year 27 -6.3% -8.1% 
Median Excess Calendar year 27 -5.5% -4.3% 
Equal Excess Financial year 27 -5.7% -14.4% 
Equal Residual Calendar year 27 -2.5% -0.9% 
 
The companies with the highest paid CEOs (in terms of excess total 
compensation) consistently outperform the lowest paid CEOs regardless of 
whether equally-weighted or square-root of pay weighted average abnormal 
returns are used. Forming the portfolios at the start of the calendar- or financial 
year returns similar results. Median abnormal returns show less pronounced 
abnormal returns (a narrower gap between the top and bottom deciles of excess 
TC), but the direction of the results remain the same. A similar relationship is 
reported when sorting companies on residual TC in order to form portfolios, even 
though the abnormal returns are more positive at both extremes. 
 
Additional deciles tested 
Since the results reported on above are based on only top and bottom deciles, the 
extremes of excess total compensation, and contrast against the international 
literature, the relationship between excess pay and abnormal future TSR was also 
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tested for the remaining deciles to investigate whether the relationship remained 
constant for the remaining deciles. The portfolios were formed at the start of each 
calendar year and the abnormal returns were equally-weighted. 
The positive relationship between higher excess TC and future abnormal TSR was 
found to persist for the top half of the deciles, but weakened after the top three 
deciles. Table 23 below reports cumulative abnormal returns for one year (Quarter 
+4) and two years and one quarter (Quarter +9) after portfolio formation date for 
the companies in the top and bottom deciles of excess total compensation, as well 
as the top and bottom two, three, four and five deciles respectively. All extended 
portfolios in the bottom half consistently reported negative abnormal TSR. 
Table 23: Abnormal total shareholder return (TSR) cumulative decile trends 
(Portfolios sorted on excess total compensation) 
 
Equally weighted abnormal 
TSR 
Median 
abnormal TSR 
Portfolio Q(+4) Q(+9) Q(+4) Q(+9) 
Top 10% 2.8% 3.2% 4.2% 3.4% 
Top 20% 3.6% 10.4% 3.1% 14.1% 
Top 30% 4.2% 8.3% 4.6% 12.7% 
Top 40% -0.2% 0.7% 2.2% 6.2% 
Top 50% 0.5% 1.0% 1.6% 4.7% 
Bottom 50% -2.8% -7.3% -3.7% -10.1% 
Bottom 40% -3.0% -6.0% -1.2% -3.5% 
Bottom 30% -2.3% -5.9% 1.0% -2.3% 
Bottom 20% -5.9% -11.0% -2.8% -3.8% 
Bottom 10% -9.4% -16.1% -5.5% -4.3% 
 
If a positive relationship exists between excess TC and abnormal TSR, a trend – 
from highest to lowest abnormal TSR – would be expected if the deciles are 
ranked in terms of excess TC. Certain deciles, however, stand out as starkly 
inconsistent suggesting that the relationship is not linear. The second and third 
deciles outperform the top deciles regardless of how it the relationship is tested. 
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This may be a limited reflection of the overconfidence phenomenon reported by 
Cooper et al. (2014). The declining positive abnormal returns fall sharply when 
the fourth decile is included in the cumulative abnormal returns (from 4.2% to -
0.2%) and recovers somewhat when added the fifth decile, before sharply 
declining again in decile six. A detailed review of the data shows a high 
concentration of extremely poor performing mining companies in decile four and 
six.  
Even though the positive relationship between excess TC and future abnormal 
TSR weakens closer to the average, overall the companies paying in the top half 
of excess TC seem to outperform those in the bottom half. This is in contrast to 
Cooper et al. (2014) who found a non-linear relationship with no relation in the 
bottom deciles, and a negative relationship in the top three deciles of excess pay. 
 
6.1.2. Statistical analysis 
In order to test the statistical significance of the relationship that appears to exist 
in the descriptive analysis in the previous section, the correlation between excess 
TC and abnormal TSR, as well as the correlation between residual TC and 
abnormal TSR, is calculated. 
 
6.1.2.1.Correlation between excess total compensation and abnormal total 
shareholder return 
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient are reported in Table 24, with statistically significant correlations (at 
the 5% confidence level) depicted in bold in the highlighted cells. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
Table 24: Pearson's correlation coefficient and Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient for excess TC and abnormal TSR 
 2011 
n = 79 
2012 
n = 92 
2013 
n = 92 
 Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Quarter r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
R p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
Q1 -0.00 0.99 0.04 0.72 -0.05 0.64 0.03 0.81 0.26 0.01 0.19 0.08 
Q2 0.02 0.83 0.07 0.53 -0.06 0.55 -0.03 0.78 0.27 <0.01 0.21 0.05 
Q3 0.06 0.62 0.16 0.17 -0.02 0.86 0.06 0.55 0.28 <0.01 0.16 0.12 
Q4 0.09 0.44 0.13 0.24 -0.00 0.98 0.12 0.26 0.25 0.02 0.12 0.24 
Q5 0.11 0.32 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.71 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.02 0.16 0.13 
Q6 0.10 0.41 0.10 0.41 0.06 0.54 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.05 0.13 0.20 
Q7 0.12 0.31 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.41 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.12 0.25 
Q8 0.13 0.25 0.19 0.11 0.06 0.57 0.12 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.34 
Q9 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.40 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.38 
 
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient for normally distributed samples reports a 
statistically significant, though weak, positive correlation between excess TC and 
abnormal. No correlation is reported in 2011 and 2012 using this test. As a result 
of the large variation in compensation and returns in the sample, the Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient was also calculated for robustness against outliers. No 
correlation between excess TC and abnormal TSR is reporting using this 
alternative test. The inconsistent results the different years, as well as between the 
two tests, indicate that any positive relationship between excess TC and abnormal 
TSR is very weak. 
 
6.1.2.2.Correlation between residual total compensation and abnormal total 
shareholder return 
In order to test whether different methods of calculating excess TC alter the 
results, the correlations between residual TC and abnormal TSR is also calculated. 
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient are reported in Table 25 with statistically significant correlations (at 
the 5% confidence level) depicted in bold in the highlighted cells. 
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Table 25: Pearson's correlation coefficient and Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient for residual TC and abnormal TSR 
 2011 
n = 79 
2012 
n = 92 
2013 
n = 92 
 Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Quarter r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
Q1 0.04 0.70 0.10 0.39 -0.03 0.77 0.01 0.92 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.46 
Q2 0.04 0.75 0.07 0.55 0.01 0.92 0.01 0.91 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.34 
Q3 0.09 0.46 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.47 0.11 0.29 0.21 0.04 0.13 0.21 
Q4 0.12 0.30 0.13 0.26 0.07 0.51 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.04 0.11 0.29 
Q5 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.40 0.16 0.12 0.23 0.03 0.16 0.14 
Q6 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.09 0.41 0.17 0.11 0.23 0.03 0.16 0.12 
Q7 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.17 0.11 
Q8 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.06 0.13 0.22 0.19 0.07 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.23 
Q9 0.20 0.09 0.22 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.04 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.32 
 
Similar to the excess TC correlations, only a few quarters in 2013 (as well as the 
ninth quarter of 2012) report a significant, albeit weak positive relationship 
between residual TC and abnormal TSR. 
 
6.1.3. Conclusion to research question 6 
Despite the statistically significant positive relationship reflected for five quarters 
in 2013 calculating the Pearson’s correlation, no statistically significant 
relationship is reported for the majority of the 27 quarter period. It is telling that 
the tougher Spearman’s correlation reflects a statistically significant relationship 
for only one quarter. Descriptively there appears to be a relationship, but not 
statistically. Hypothesis 4 is therefore rejected (refer Table 37 at the end of this 
chapter). 
These findings indicate that the situation in South Africa appears to be different to 
the international situation that report diminishing cumulative abnormal returns for 
the highest excess pay (Balafas & Florackis, 2014; Cooper et al., 2014; Core et 
al., 1999); and the results of this study do not support the suggestion that paying 
CEOs more leads to value destroying behaviour. 
The sporadic evidence of a statistically significant relationship between excess TC 
and abnormal TSR may be a result of a complete lack of a relationship between 
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one of the components of TC and abnormal TSR, as suggested in the international 
literature that generally finds no (or a weak at best) relationship between short-
term cash compensation and company performance, and a strong relationship 
when long-term incentives are considered. The relationship between each of these 
two components of TC and future company performance is now considered. 
 
6.2.The relationship between short-term compensation (SCC) and future 
total shareholder return (TSR) 
The relationship between SCC and future company performance is analysed in 
this section which addresses research question 7. 
 
Research question 7: Does a positive relationship between SCC and future 
company performance (as measured by TSR) exist? 
 
It is necessary to investigate the relationship between SCC and future abnormal 
TSR separately for three reasons. Firstly, international pay-performance studies 
report a weak or non-existent relationship between pay and future performance 
when excluding LIC from compensation. Secondly, it was established in 
Chapter_5 that SCC makes up a more significant portion of TC in South Africa 
than internationally. Lastly, since local pay-performance sensitivity studies use 
SCC as a proxy for TC, it is important to know whether the relationship between 
SCC and future performance is consistent with the relationship between TC and 
future performance. 
 
In order to address research question 7 the following hypothesis was set: 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): A positive relationship between excess short-term cash 
compensation (SCC) and abnormal future total shareholder 
return (TSR) exists. 
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In order to test hypothesis 5 the relationship was analysed descriptively in order to 
establish the apparent relationship between excess SCC and abnormal TSR using 
different methods. This relationship was then tested statistically in order to 
confirm or reject the hypothesis. 
 
6.2.1. Descriptive analysis 
Since very similar results for the relationship between excess TC and EW 
abnormal future TSR were found using square-root of pay weightings and 
company financial year-ends in the previous section (6.1), the relationships 
between SCC and future company performance were not tested on these two 
bases. As a result of the small number of companies in each decile, however, the 
potential effect of outliers remains important. Consequently, the SCC-
performance relationship is retested using median abnormal returns. The 
relationship was also described in terms of residual short-term cash compensation 
due to the small sample size and large variation within peer groups based on 
company size. 
In order to investigate this relationship companies were ranked on the basis of 
excess short-term cash compensation (as defined by short-term cash compensation 
less median short-term cash compensation per peer group based on company size, 
as described in the previous chapter), as well as residual short-term cash 
compensation (as defined by the difference between the actual SCC and the 
predicted SCC), and divided into deciles. 
The various descriptive analyses are presented in sections 6.2.1.1 to 6.2.1.3 as 
detailed in Table 26 below. 
Table 26: Summary of various descriptive analyses (SCC) 
Abnormal total shareholder 
return 
Excess total compensation Results 
Weighting Year-end Basis for determining excess Section 
Equal Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.2.1.1 
Median Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.2.1.2 
Equal Calendar Residual vs. predicted 6.2.1.3 
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6.2.1.1.Weighting of abnormal TSR: Equal 
In order to investigate this relationship the abnormal TSR of the top and bottom 
deciles were calculated on the basis of equal weightings of abnormal TSR for 
each company. Abnormal TSR was calculated from the start of the calendar year 
to which the excess CEO compensation relates, defined as the excess TSR over 
the equally weighted TSR of the top 100 JSE listed companies. 
The relationship was found to be qualitatively similar the relationship between 
excess total compensation and future abnormal TSR, reported in section 6.1. The 
companies with the highest paid CEOs in terms of excess SCC earn positive 
abnormal future TSR, but the abnormal returns are more pronounced using SCC 
instead of TC (see Figure 22 below). In the first year after sorting on cash 
compensation, for the Quarter (+4) window, the companies in the highest decile 
of excess SCC earn abnormal TSR of 14.7%, which increase to 18.5% at the end 
of nine quarters. The companies in the lowest cash compensation decile earn 
negative abnormal returns of -9.2% in the first year, worsening to -20.2% after 
two years and one quarter. 
Figure 22: Equally-weighted abnormal returns earned by companies with CEOs 
in the top and bottom deciles of excess short-term cash compensation 
 
Furthermore, the positive abnormal returns improve over time while the negative 
abnormal return keeps on worsening, unlike the relationship between total 
compensation and future TSR in section 6.1, where the abnormal return of the 
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highest decile reverts back to zero after two years. This may be an indication that 
SCC is more effective than TC in incentivising CEOs as regards future 
performance, or it may be as a result of talent attraction. 
 
6.2.1.2.Weighting of abnormal TSR: Median 
In order to test whether the results were driven by outliers, the relationship 
between SCC and abnormal future TSR was also investigated on the basis of 
median abnormal returns. 
A similar pattern is reported using median returns, again suggesting that the 
results are not driven by outliers (refer Figure 23). 
 
Figure 23: Median abnormal returns earned by companies with CEOs in the top 
and bottom deciles of excess short-term cash compensation 
 
Median abnormal returns for the lowest cash compensation companies are -10.3 
(Q+4) and -16.5% (Q+9), suggesting outliers did not cause the clear divergence 
between the top and the bottom cash compensation deciles. 
In order to investigate whether there is an indication that the effect of SCC on 
future abnormal return is caused by the cash bonus component, the percentages of 
cash bonus and TGP were calculated for the top and bottom deciles companies of 
excess SCC. In the top decile the cash bonus comprised 36% of SCC (close to the 
average of 39% for the population overall), while for the cash bonus amounted to 
only 9% of SCC for the companies in the bottom decile. Since this indicated that a 
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relationship might exist between the cash bonus and future abnormal TSR, the 
relationship between the two was tested. Surprisingly the gap between the 
abnormal TSR of the companies in the top and bottom deciles of excess cash 
bonus was narrower than the gap depicted in Figure 22 with companies in the top 
decile earning cumulative abnormal TSR of 9.2% by the ninth quarter (less than 
half of that reflected in Figure 22). Similarly the negative abnormal TSR of 
companies in the bottom decile in terms of excess cash bonus was only -12.1% by 
the ninth quarter, also notably less than the -20.2% reflected in Figure 22. 
Therefore the TGP was similarly investigated and again the relationship between 
the abnormal TSR for companies in the top and bottom deciles of excess TGP was 
narrower than that reflected in Figure 22, with positive abnormal returns 
amounting to only 2% by the ninth quarter, and small negative abnormal returns 
being reflected in the first year. The negative cumulative abnormal TSR of the 
bottom decile companies amounted to -7.9% by the end of the ninth quarter. The 
distinction in abnormal TSR is more pronounced relative to the excess total SCC 
than to either the cash bonus or TGP component thereof. 
When sorting on the relative proportion of cash bonus to total SCC, the top decile 
(paying the largest proportion of SCC as a cash bonus) earns a positive 
cumulative abnormal return of 19.2% at the end of the ninth quarter, compared to 
negative abnormal returns of -8.8% over the same period for the companies who 
pay no CB. 
 
6.2.1.3.Basis for determining excess pay: Residual 
In order to test whether the relationship between SCC and future performance 
remains consistent regardless of the company size groupings used as peers to 
benchmark SCC, companies were ranked according to residual SCC to form 
decile portfolios. 
The top decile remains associated with positive and increasing abnormal returns 
(20.5% after nine quarters), while the bottom decile initially shows negative 
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abnormal returns, that disappear for a few quarters to end slightly negative (-
1.2%) at the end of quarter nine (refers Figure 24). 
Figure 24: Equally-weighted abnormal returns earned by companies with 
CEOs in the top and bottom deciles of residual short-term cash compensation 
 
When comparing the equally-weighted abnormal return graph using excess SCC 
to form portfolios (Figure 22) with the same graph using residual SCC (Figure 24) 
it is clear that there was significant variation in the companies included in the top, 
and especially the bottom, decile portfolios. The trend of the top decile in terms of 
excess/residual SCC outperforming the bottom decile, however, persists. 
 
6.2.1.4.Conclusion to descriptive analysis 
The relationship between excess SCC and future company performance is 
important due to the proportional significance of SCC to TC for South African 
companies. The results suggest that excess SCC is more closely related to 
improved company performance in the future than excess TC. It is also noted that 
improved future performance is associated with the payment of cash bonuses, 
however, it is clear that the greatest distinction between positive and negative 
abnormal TSR is related to the extent of the total SCC paid relative to peers. This 
finding could be explained by labour market theory which suggests that a 
premium is paid to attract and retain top talent, which in turn produces top results. 
In chapter 5 it was noted that South African companies pay a relatively higher 
proportion of a CEOs TC as SCC (62%, refer 5.4.1) than the average in the U.S. 
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(48%) (Cooper et al., 2014). The pronounced relationship between excess SCC 
and future abnormal TSR supports a higher SCC component of TC in South 
Africa. 
Panels A and B of Table 27 below report cumulative abnormal returns for one 
year (Quarter +4) and two years and one quarter (Quarter +9) after portfolio 
formation date for the companies in the top and bottom deciles of excess short-
term cash compensation. 
Table 27: Abnormal return calculated against Top100 JSE Listed companies 
sorted on Short-term Cash Compensation 
Panel A: Highest excess short-term cash compensation decile 
Return weighting Compensation 
Portfolio 
formation 
N 
Quarter 
(+4) 
Quarter 
(+9) 
Equal Excess Calendar year 26 14.7% 18.5% 
Median Excess Calendar year 26 11.6% 10.2% 
Equal Residual Calendar year 26 15.1% 20.5% 
Panel B: Lowest excess short-term cash compensation decile 
Return weighting  
Portfolio 
formation 
N 
Quarter 
(+4) 
Quarter 
(+9) 
Equal Excess Calendar year 27 -9.2% -20.2% 
Median Excess Calendar year 27 -10.3% -16.5% 
Equal Residual Calendar year 27 -2.5% -1.2% 
 
International studies that exclude long-term incentive compensation generally 
report a weak or no relationship between pay and company performance. The 
strong positive relationship between SCC and future company performance found 
in this study, together with the strong correlation (78.1%) between SCC and TC 
reported in section 5.5, however, supports the positive relationships reported in 
earlier South African studies where long-term incentive compensation was 
excluded. This underscores the legitimacy of investigations into pay-performance 
sensitivity in SA that are based only on SCC. 
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Additional deciles tested 
Since the results reported on above are based on only top and bottom deciles, the 
extremes of excess short-term cash compensation, and contrast against the 
international literature, the relationship between excess pay and abnormal future 
TSR was also tested for the remaining deciles to investigate if the relationship 
remained constant throughout the population. The portfolios were formed at the 
start of each calendar year and the equally-weighted abnormal returns, as well as 
the median abnormal returns were calculated. 
The positive relationship between higher excess SCC and future abnormal TSR 
was found to persist for the top half of the deciles, but weakened towards the 5
th
 
decile. Table 28 below reports cumulative abnormal returns for one year (Quarter 
+4) and two years and one quarter (Quarter +9) after portfolio formation date for 
the companies in the top and bottom deciles of excess short-term cash 
compensation, as well as the top and bottom two, three, four and five deciles 
respectively. All portfolios in the bottom half consistently reported negative 
abnormal TSR.  
Table 28: Abnormal total shareholder return (TSR) cumulative decile trends 
(Portfolios sorted on excess short-term cash compensation) 
 
Equally weighted abnormal 
TSR 
Median 
abnormal TSR 
Portfolio Q(+4) Q(+9) Q(+4) Q(+9) 
Top 10% 14.7% 18.5% 11.6% 10.2% 
Top 20% 9.1% 8.8% 7.8% 12.0% 
Top 30% 7.0% 8.3% 7.3% 11.2% 
Top 40% 3.2% 4.9% 3.8% 8.1% 
Top 50% 1.1% 0.2% 2.0% 3.9% 
Bottom 50% -3.4% -5.2% -3.4% -4.7% 
Bottom 40% -3.4% -5.6% -4.3% -5.4% 
Bottom 30% -3.7% -5.5% -4.5% -7.4% 
Bottom 20% -5.8% -7.7% -5.2% -6.3% 
Bottom 10% -9.2% -20.2% -10.3% -16.5% 
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The deciles appear to be more consistently ordered than TC from high to low 
abnormal returns, with a steady trend of declining TSR from the top to the bottom 
deciles, regardless of using the equally-weighted average or median TSR. The 
relationship between excess SCC pay and abnormal TSR are therefore more 
consistent than the relationship between excess TC and abnormal TSR. The 
abnormal returns in the middle deciles show much less variation, opening up at 
the extremes. This may imply that in order for companies to perform significantly 
better (or worse) than the benchmark, the CEOs need to be paid significantly more 
(or less) than their peers, which surprisingly suggests a strong relationship 
between SCC and future company performance. 
 
6.2.2. Statistical analysis 
There appears to be a much stronger positive relationship between excess SCC 
and future TSR than excess TC. In order to test whether this relationship is 
statistically significant, the correlation between excess SCC (as well as residual 
SCC) and abnormal TSR is determined. 
 
6.2.2.1.Correlation between excess short-term cash compensation and abnormal 
total shareholder return 
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient are reported in Table 29 on the next page, with statistically significant 
correlations (at the 5% confidence level) depicted in bold. The Pearson’s 
correlation reports a statistically significant relationship between excess SCC and 
abnormal TSR for the later quarters of 2012 and most of 2013. The Spearman’s 
correlation, which is more robust against outliers, reports a statistically significant 
relationship between excess SCC and abnormal TSR for all three years. 
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Table 29: Pearson's correlation coefficient and Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient for excess SCC and abnormal TSR 
 2011 
n = 79 
2012 
n = 92 
2013 
n = 92 
 Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Quarter r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
Q1 0.09 0.44 0.10 0.41 0.09 0.40 0.06 0.55 0.22 0.04 0.25 0.02 
Q2 0.06 0.58 0.12 0.31 0.06 0.57 0.01 0.94 0.30 <0.01 0.30 <0.01 
Q3 0.19 0.10 0.21 0.07 0.10 0.36 0.13 0.20 0.31 <0.01 0.32 <0.01 
Q4 0.20 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.31 <0.01 0.30 <0.01 
Q5 0.18 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.23 0.03 0.30 <0.01 0.31 <0.01 
Q6 0.15 0.19 0.12 0.29 0.23 0.03 0.24 0.02 0.28 <0.01 0.25 0.02 
Q7 0.18 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.23 0.03 0.27 <0.01 0.25 0.02 0.24 0.02 
Q8 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.07 0.22 0.03 0.24 0.02 0.19 0.07 0.18 0.09 
Q9 0.22 0.05 0.25 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.18 
 
It is therefore clear that the positive relationship between excess SCC and 
abnormal future TSR that was reported descriptively in section 6.2.1 is not only 
stronger than the positive relationship between excess TC and abnormal TSR 
(refers section 6.1.1), but statistically significant. 
There is, however, only one statistically significant quarter in 2011 when 
calculating the Spearman’s correlation, compared to seven quarters in 2013 
regardless of the test. This inconsistency between years reflects the inconsistency 
of the findings in the literature, suggesting that the time frame or period covered 
by the research is a factor that influences the results. 
The question is raised of whether a change in company performance could be 
detectable in only nine quarters. A longer term view is important since it may take 
five years or more to affect change in company performance. 
The underlying data was scrutinised to investigate the reason for the difference in 
correlations. The average excess SCC decreased by 11% from 2011 to 2012, 
before increasing by 29% in 2013. The cumulative quarterly abnormal returns 
generally increased during the quarters where a statistically significant 
relationship was reported, while decreasing where this relationship was 
insignificant, being most of 2011 and the first half of 2012. 
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6.2.2.2.Correlation between residual short-term cash compensation and abnormal 
total shareholder return 
In order to test whether different methods of calculating excess TC alter the 
results, the correlation between residual TC and abnormal TSR was also 
determined. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient are reported in Table 30, with statistically significant 
correlations (at the 5% confidence level) depicted in bold. The Pearson’s 
correlation reports a statistically significant positive relationship between residual 
SCC and abnormal TSR for just under half of the quarters in 2012 and 2013, but 
only the ninth quarter in 2011, while the more robust Spearman’s correlation 
reports an even stronger significant positive relationship for more than half of all 
the quarters across all three years. 
Table 30: Pearson's correlation coefficient and Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient for residual SCC and abnormal TSR 
 2011 
n = 79 
2012 
n = 92 
2013 
n = 92 
 Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Quarter r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
Q1 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.06 0.10 0.34 0.05 0.63 0.10 0.32 0.14 0.18 
Q2 0.08 0.47 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.34 0.04 0.68 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.05 
Q3 0.20 0.08 0.25 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.03 
Q4 0.20 0.08 0.22 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.19 0.07 0.23 0.03 0.20 0.06 
Q5 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.22 0.03 0.25 0.02 0.25 0.02 
Q6 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.23 0.03 0.24 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.24 0.02 
Q7 0.21 0.06 0.26 0.02 0.24 0.02 0.28 <0.01 0.24 0.02 0.23 0.03 
Q8 0.20 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.25 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.18 0.08 0.17 0.10 
Q9 0.23 0.04 0.27 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.28 <0.01 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.25 
 
Different results are found when comparing the two tests, but there is an overlap 
in terms of the time period. This suggests that when correlations are weak – which 
is to be expected when investigating CEO pay and company performance, due to 
the large number of factors influencing compensation and share returns – the 
results appear to be sensitive to the type of test used. Therefore, when dealing 
with weak correlations it is advisable to perform corroborative statistical tests. 
This is equally valid for small sample sizes and distributions that contain large 
variation. 
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The results of the statistical analysis suggest that at least during some quarters, 
sometimes as much as seven consecutive quarters, the relationship between excess 
(and residual) SCC and abnormal TSR is statistically significant. The correlation 
varies between 22% and 32% and a positive relationship exists, but is considered 
to be weak. 
 
6.2.3. Conclusion to research question 7 
The positive relationship between excess SCC and abnormal TSR descriptively 
appears to be stronger than the relationship between excess TC and abnormal 
TSR. This positive relationship in terms of SCC is statistically significant, though 
weak, thus Hypothesis 5 is accepted (refers Table 37 at the end of this chapter). 
 
6.3.The relationship between long-term incentive compensation (LIC) and 
future total shareholder return (TSR) 
This section analyses the relationship between LIC and future company 
performance in addressing the eighth research question that was set. 
 
Research question 8: Does a positive relationship between LIC and future 
company performance (as measured by TSR) exist? 
 
It is necessary to investigate the relationship between LIC and future abnormal 
TSR separately, since LIC is excluded from prior South African studies and so 
getting a first glimpse of the relationship in SA is of interest. Internationally a 
strong relationship between CEO pay and company performance is reported and 
Cooper et al. (2014), investigating the relationship between pay and future 
company performance, found stronger results for LIC than any other component 
of compensation.  
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In order to address research question 8 the following hypothesis was set: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): A positive relationship between excess long-term incentive 
compensation (LIC) and abnormal future total shareholder 
return (TSR) exists. 
In order to test hypothesis 6 the relationship was first analysed descriptively using 
a similar approach to that was used in section 6.2.1, after which it was tested for 
statistical significance in order to accept or reject the hypothesis. 
 
6.3.1. Descriptive analysis 
In order to investigate this relationship companies were first ranked on the basis 
of excess long-term compensation (LIC) (as defined by actual LIC less median 
LIC per peer group based on company size, as described in the previous chapter), 
divided into decile portfolios and the equally-weighted abnormal TSR calculated 
for each portfolio. The median abnormal TSR for each portfolio was then 
calculated in order to test for the effect of outliers. Lastly, excess LIC was 
calculated in terms of residual long-term incentive compensation (as defined by 
the difference between the actual LIC and the predicted LIC) and the equally-
weighted abnormal TSR calculated for each decile portfolio. 
The various descriptive analyses are presented in sections 6.3.1.1 to 6.3.1.3 as 
detailed in Table 31 below. 
Table 31: Summary of various descriptive analyses and statistical tests (LIC) 
Abnormal total shareholder 
return 
Excess total compensation Results 
Weighting Year-end Basis for determining excess Section 
Equal Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.3.1.1 
Median Calendar Absolute vs. median per size group 6.3.1.2 
Equal Calendar Residual vs. predicted 6.3.1.3 
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6.3.1.1.Weighting of abnormal TSR: Equal 
The abnormal TSR of the top and bottom deciles was calculated on the basis of 
equal weightings of abnormal TSR for each company. Abnormal TSR was 
calculated from the start of the calendar year to which the excess LIC relates, 
defined as the excess TSR over the equally weighted TSR of the top 100 JSE 
listed companies. 
From Figure 25 it is evident that the abnormal returns of the top and bottom 
deciles of incentive compensation follow a similar general trend than when using 
total compensation or short-term cash compensation.  
Figure 25: Equally-weighted abnormal returns earned by companies with CEOs 
in the top and bottom deciles of excess long-term incentive compensation 
 
The companies with CEOs earnings the highest excess long-term incentive pay 
earn abnormal returns of 3.6% in the first year, which improve to 10.2% over the 
subsequent five quarters. The CEOs in the lowest excess LIC decile earned a 
negative return of -4.6% in the first year. 
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6.3.1.2.Weighting of abnormal TSR: Median 
The relationship between LIC and abnormal future TSR was again investigated on 
the basis of median abnormal returns, in order to investigate the influence of 
outliers. 
A similar pattern is reported using median returns. The negative abnormal TSR of 
the bottom decile disappeared, while the positive abnormal TSR of the top decile 
remain largely unchanged, suggesting that only the bottom decile is affected by 
outliers (refer Figure 26). 
Figure 26: Abnormal returns (median) earned by companies with CEOs in the 
top and bottom deciles of excess long-term incentive compensation 
 
The small negative abnormal returns of the bottom decile of excess LIC that 
disappear after two years is consistent with the findings of Cooper et al. (2014). 
The top decile of excess LIC, however, moves in the opposite direction from the 
U.S. study, where the top 10% of companies in terms of LIC is associated with 
negative abnormal returns of up -9.38% after three years. 
 
6.3.1.3.Basis for determining excess pay: Residual 
In order to test whether the relationship between LIC and future performance 
remain consistent regardless of the company size groupings used as peers to 
benchmark LIC, companies were ranked according to residual TC to form decile 
portfolios. 
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The top decile remains associated with higher positive and increasing abnormal 
returns (13.2% after nine quarters), while the bottom decile reports negative 
cumulative abnormal TSR only for the first year, after which it turns positive to 
end on 5.3% after the full nine quarters (refers Figure 27). 
Figure 27: Equally-weighted abnormal returns earned by companies with 
CEOs in the top and bottom deciles of residual long-term incentive 
compensation 
 
The graphical relationship between LIC and abnormal TSR changes when excess 
compensation is calculated in different ways, suggesting that the apparent 
relationship is less clear than for TC and SCC, and in fact there may be little to no 
distinction. 
 
6.3.1.4.Conclusion to descriptive analysis 
The graphs depicting the relationship between excess/residual LIC and abnormal 
TSR when reporting only the extreme deciles suggest a weaker relationship 
between LIC and future company performance. Caution should, however, be 
taken when only comparing the top and bottom deciles, since there may be greater 
variation in the rest of the sample. It was therefore necessary to investigate the 
remaining eight deciles in further detail. 
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Additional deciles tested 
Similar to sections 6.1 and 6.2 the remaining eight deciles were also considered 
and no consistent relationship is visible across the remaining deciles (refer Table 
32 below). 
Table 32: Abnormal total shareholder return (TSR) cumulative decile trends 
(Portfolios sorted on excess long-term incentive compensation): 
 
Equally weighted abnormal 
TSR 
Median 
abnormal TSR 
Portfolio Q(+4) Q(+9) Q(+4) Q(+9) 
Top 10% 3.6% 10.2% 4.6% 10.2% 
Top 20% 2.9% 3.8% 4.6% 4.6% 
Top 30% -0.1% -1.8% 2.5% -0.1% 
Top 40% -3.0% -4.5% -0.6% -3.7% 
Top 50% -3.3% -5.7% -1.4% -4.9% 
Bottom 50% 1.1% -0.6% 2.7% 2.2% 
Bottom 40% 0.6% -1.6% 2.9% 2.0% 
Bottom 30% -1.5% -7.2% 1.9% -1.4% 
Bottom 20% -5.6% -11.7% -1.9% -5.8% 
Bottom 10% -4.6% -4.4% -3.3% -0.1% 
 
Even though the top decile in terms of excess LIC earned higher abnormal TSR 
than the bottom decile, there is clearly not a consistent trend in the relationship. 
The conclusion can therefore not be drawn that paying more LIC compared to 
peer companies consistently result in improved future performance. 
There is no consistent relationship between decreasing excess LIC and decreasing 
abnormal TSR, as is evident form the jumbled abnormal TSRs reported in Table 
32 above. There is a very sudden drop in cumulative abnormal TSR at the third 
decile, while the return of the second to last decile is significantly lower than the 
last decile. 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
There could be several reasons for this lack of a clear trend: 
- The first possible reason could be that, as a result of mega companies 
paying such large LIC relative to the other size groups, the mega 
companies paying positive excess LIC would be in high deciles while the 
mega companies paying lower LIC than their peers (negative excess LIC) 
would be in lower deciles. This is in comparison to the medium and small 
companies that have much lower median LIC, where any excess LIC paid 
by these smaller companies (whether positive or negative) would be much 
less than the excess paid by the mega companies, and thus would be 
concentrated in the middle deciles. This would result in a small or medium 
company paying no LIC (with a small negative excess LIC of less than 
R2.1 million or R2.3 million respectively) being ranked in a higher decile 
than a mega company paying a large LIC that is less than the median of 
R31 million for their peer group. 
This prompts the questions that surely it is better to pay something rather 
than nothing in terms of incentivising future performance? To test whether 
this was the reason for the jumbled results, the companies paying no LIC 
were removed from the sample and the test re-performed. The same results 
were however found with the deciles remaining as jumbled. 
Given the suggestion of labour market theory, which postulates that 
companies paying more to attract better talent, which produces better 
results, portfolios were formed on the basis of the absolute values of the 
LIC, as opposed to the excess LIC. A closer relationship between 
abnormal TSR and total LIC was found than with excess LIC, but the 
deciles were still (though less severely) jumbled. 
- The second reason for the lack of a clear trend is the negative returns 
earned by the resource companies in the mining sector that still paid large 
LIC. This resulted in a concentration of the mining companies in certain of 
the higher deciles, having a strong negative influence on the abnormal 
TSR of those deciles (refer to the top 40% and top 50% in Table 32). 
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- A third reason for the jumbled results, could be that unlike the SCC 
package of CEOs that remain relatively constant form year to year, the 
LIC component varies notably within the same company from year to 
year. For example, 30% of companies (for which three years’ data were 
available) were found to pay no LIC in one year, but make a large LIC 
payment in another. The company that paid the highest LIC for sample as 
a whole (in the financial services (FS) industry, refer 5.2.3) in one year, 
paid no LIC in the following year. This lumpiness in LIC payments would 
result in these companies being included in very high deciles in the years 
that they paid LIC and lower deciles in the years they didn’t. To illustrate 
this, the FS company in question was included in the top decile of excess 
LIC in 2011 and the bottom decile in 2012. Therefore it cannot be 
concluded that companies in the low deciles are not incentivised in terms 
of future performance, as the CEOs might have been awarded large LIC in 
previous years, and so in fact are incentivised as regard future 
performance. To control for the lumpiness of LIC payments the average 
inflation adjusted LIC for the three year period was calculated and the 
portfolios reformed on this basis. The results, however, were no more 
consistent than originally found, with the top two deciles showing strong 
positive abnormal TSR, while the rest of the deciles remaining jumbled. 
 
Conclusion on descriptive relationship 
The abnormal TSRs of the top and bottom deciles show that the top decile of 
excess LIC consistently outperforms the bottom decile. The gap does, however, 
narrow when using median abnormal TSR and other than the top two deciles the 
remaining deciles appear jumbled and no clear relationship between LIC and 
abnormal TSR for these deciles is evident. When using residual LIC to form 
portfolios the gap between the top and bottom deciles is severely diminished. 
The major mathematical reasons that obscure a relationship between LIC and 
abnormal TSR were eliminated as being reasons for the lack of a clear 
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relationship that was found outside of the top two deciles. This, together with the 
stronger relationship that was found between the absolute values of LIC and 
future performance, suggests that other than for the extreme cases, excess LIC 
relative to the peer group does not appear particularly effective in incentivising 
future performance. These results find no support in South Africa for the 
suggestion in the international literature that LIC is an optimal component of the 
CEO’s pay package, except where LIC is very large relative to the peer group. 
This brings into question the effectiveness of LIC as a mechanism to incentivise 
future performance and potentially supports the argument that LIC is merely an 
unjustified inflation of the CEO’s pay package. 
It has been noted in the literature review that in the international literature a trend 
exists of a shift from share options to performance shares. This study doesn’t 
differentiate between these two types of LIC. Options may have a significantly 
lower value, which might affect the ranking based on excess LIC. 
The superior performance of the top two deciles of excess LIC does, however, 
stand out. This may be explained by the high proportion of “mega”-sized 
companies that pay higher LIC in those deciles, supporting labour market theory 
which suggests that larger companies can afford the best talent, which is capable 
of outperforming their peers. 
 
6.3.2. Statistical analysis 
This relationship between excess LIC and future TSR appears much weaker than 
that of excess TC and SCC. In order to test whether this relationship is statistically 
significant, the correlation between excess LIC (as well as residual LIC) and 
abnormal TSR was calculated. 
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6.3.2.1.Correlation between excess long-term incentive compensation and 
abnormal total shareholder return 
From the results of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient are reported in Table 33 below, it is clear that there is no 
correlation between excess LIC and abnormal TSR. 
Table 33: Pearson's correlation coefficient and Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient for excess LIC and abnormal TSR 
 2011 
n = 79 
2012 
n = 92 
2013 
n = 92 
 Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Quarter r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
Q1 -0.05 0.68 -0.05 0.68 -0.15 0.16 -0.11 0.28 0.13 0.20 0.08 0.46 
Q2 -0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.15 0.16 -0.11 0.30 0.09 0.40 0.04 0.73 
Q3 -0.02 0.90 -0.02 0.87 -0.11 0.28 -0.05 0.64 0.09 0.39 0.04 0.72 
Q4 0.02 0.86 -0.04 0.70 -0.13 0.23 -0.04 0.68 0.08 0.47 0.01 0.94 
Q5 0.04 0.75 -0.04 0.72 -0.10 0.33 -0.04 0.67 0.09 0.39 0.06 0.59 
Q6 0.04 0.74 -0.08 0.47 -0.11 0.28 -0.05 0.62 0.09 0.41 0.08 0.46 
Q7 0.05 0.68 -0.05 0.66 -0.08 0.45 -0.03 0.78 0.11 0.29 0.09 0.40 
Q8 0.06 0.58 -0.04 0.75 -0.12 0.27 -0.08 0.46 0.10 0.34 0.09 0.40 
Q9 0.08 0.50 -0.03 0.83 -0.08 0.43 -0.04 0.68 0.10 0.36 0.11 0.29 
 
In contrast to the correlation between excess SCC and future performance, there is 
no statistically significant relationship between excess LIC and abnormal TSR, as 
expected based on the lack of a steady decline in the cumulative abnormal TSR 
from highest to lowest deciles presented in Table 32. This is in stark contrast to 
the U.S. experience where the pay-performance relationship is generally stronger 
when including LIC. It also contradicts the findings of Cooper et al. (2014) who 
report a statistically significant negative relationship between excess LIC and 
abnormal TSR for the top three deciles as a result of CEO overconfidence. 
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6.3.2.2.Correlation between residual long-term incentive compensation and 
abnormal total shareholder return 
In order to test whether the calculation of excess LIC affected the relationship, the 
Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations are recalculated using residual LIC instead 
of excess LIC. The results of these correlations, reported in Table 34 below, 
confirm that there is no statistically significant relationship between LIC and 
future company performance, for the three year period. 
Table 34: Pearson's correlation coefficient and Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient for residual LIC and abnormal TSR 
 2011 
n = 79 
2012 
n = 92 
2013 
n = 92 
 Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Quarter r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
R p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
r p-
val. 
ρ p-
val. 
Q1 -0.02 0.84 -0.02 0.87 -0.14 0.19 -0.07 0.51 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.40 
Q2 -0.00 1.00 -0.05 0.64 -0.07 0.49 -0.01 0.92 0.10 0.36 0.02 0.82 
Q3 -0.00 0.98 -0.05 0.68 -0.02 0.86 0.02 0.83 0.13 0.23 0.06 0.59 
Q4 0.04 0.76 -0.07 0.53 -0.05 0.64 0.00 0.98 0.11 0.31 0.03 0.80 
Q5 0.06 0.60 -0.02 0.85 -0.04 0.74 0.01 0.90 0.11 0.28 0.07 0.50 
Q6 0.07 0.52 -0.03 0.77 -0.07 0.53 -0.02 0.86 0.11 0.30 0.09 0.39 
Q7 0.08 0.46 -0.00 0.98 -0.02 0.82 0.01 0.94 0.12 0.26 0.08 0.45 
Q8 0.09 0.41 0.00 0.99 -0.02 0.87 -0.02 0.87 0.11 0.30 0.08 0.46 
Q9 0.10 0.38 0.01 0.92 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.92 0.12 0.27 0.10 0.33 
 
6.3.3. Conclusion to research question 8 
Even though the top decile in terms of excess LIC outperforms the bottom decile, 
the abnormal TSRs of the remaining deciles are jumbled and the statistical tests 
indicate that there is no relationship between excess LIC and abnormal TSR. 
Thus, Hypothesis 6 is rejected (refer to Table 37 at the end of the chapter). 
These results are largely corroborative of those of Cooper et al. (2014), who 
similarly found a lack of a relationship between LIC and company performance, 
(other than for companies paying in the top deciles of excess compensation, where 
a negative relationship exists). These results however are in contradiction to those 
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of other international studies who find that CEO LIC is negatively associated with 
future company performance (Balafas & Florackis, 2014; Cooper et al., 2014). 
This presents a disturbing picture: LIC is intended by corporates to provide 
incentivisation regarding long-term performance and represents substantial 
amounts of cash. If LIC is a generally ineffective (or negatively effective) form of 
incentivisation, or only sporadically effective (as the broad distributions, non-
linear relationship and lack of statistical significance suggest), then the question 
must be asked – why? It is the beyond the ability of quantitative empirical 
research to answer this question and it is suggested that qualitative research into 
the question of why LIC schemes may lack effectiveness (or even be detrimental 
to company performance, as Cooper et al. (2014) suggest) is required. The 
interpretive approach intrinsic in qualitative research would be helpful in allowing 
the reality of the causal effects of long-term incentive schemes to show 
themselves freely, without conditioning it by the parameters set in place by 
quantitative empirical research, contributing to generate new knowledge that 
explains the inconclusive and sometimes contradictory results reported in the 
body of existing literature (Ciao, 2010). 
 
6.4.Similarity of the pay-performance relationship between different 
components of CEO compensation 
This section considers whether the relationship between compensation and future 
company performance can be similarly described when using different measures 
of compensation. This is reflected in research question 9. 
 
Research question 9: How do the pay-performance relationships based on TC, 
SCC and LIC respectively, compare? 
In order to address research question 9 the cumulative abnormal return graphs 
presented in sections 6.1 to 6.3 were compared to determine whether the 
relationships between excess compensation – whether it be TC, SCC or LIC – and 
future performance are described similarly. 
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Even though the descriptive analysis consistently indicated that the companies in 
the top decile of excess compensation, regardless of whether TC, SCC or LIC was 
used as a measure of compensation, earn higher future short-term abnormal 
shareholder returns (whether equally-weighted or median) for up to nine quarters, 
than the companies included in the bottom decile, analysis of the remaining 
deciles indicated that this does not represent a consistent relationship across the 
various deciles. 
A consideration of the trends across deciles indicates a more consistent and direct 
relationship between excess SCC and abnormal TSR, than excess TC and 
abnormal TSR. Further, it showed that no consistency in relationship between 
excess LIC and abnormal TSR exists beyond the extreme deciles. This is clear 
from the trends (or lack thereof) in abnormal TSR reported in Table 35 below for 
the top and bottom deciles, as well as the cumulative abnormal TSR when 
systematically adding the remaining deciles. Cumulative abnormal returns notably 
contradictory to the trend are highlighted in red below. 
Table 35: Equally-weighted abnormal returns of cumulative decile portfolios 
formed on excess TC, SCC and LIC 
 Quarter (+4)  Quarter (+9) 
Portfolio 
Total 
comp. 
Short-
term 
cash 
comp. 
Long-
term 
incentive 
comp. 
Portfolio 
Total 
comp. 
Short-
term 
cash 
comp. 
Long-
term 
incentive 
comp. 
Top 10% 2.8% 14.7% 3.6% Top 10% 3.2% 18.5% 10.2% 
Top 20% 3.6% 9.1% 2.9% Top 20% 10.4% 8.8% 3.8% 
Top 30% 4.2% 7.0% -0.1% Top 30% 8.3% 8.3% -1.8% 
Top 40% -0.2% 3.2% -3.0% Top 40% 0.7% 4.9% -4.5% 
Top 50% 0.5% 1.1% -3.3% Top 50% 1.0% 0.2% -5.7% 
Bottom 
50% 
-2.8% -3.4% 1.1% Bottom 
50% 
-7.3% -5.2% -0.6% 
Bottom 
40% 
-3.0% -3.4% 0.6% Bottom 
40% 
-6.0% -5.6% -1.6% 
Bottom 
30% 
-2.3% -3.7% -1.5% Bottom 
30% 
-5.9% -5.5% -7.2% 
Bottom 
20% 
-5.9% -5.8% -5.6% Bottom 
20% 
-11.0% -7.7% -11.7% 
Bottom 
10% 
-9.4% -9.2% -4.6% Bottom 
10% 
-16.1% -20.2% -4.4% 
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The cumulative abnormal returns after one year (at the end of quarter 4) for each 
portfolio in Table 35 above are graphically represented in Figure 28 below, 
showing a much clearer downward trend from the top decile in terms of excess 
SCC to the bottom decile, than for the corresponding deciles in terms of excess  
LIC. 
Figure 28: Abnormal returns for cumulative decile portfolios after four 
quarters 
 
This stronger trend in the cumulative abnormal returns for portfolios formed on 
the basis of excess SCC, than those formed on the basis of excess LIC, persist at 
the end of the ninth quarter (refer Figure 29). 
Figure 29: Abnormal returns for cumulative decile portfolios after nine 
quarters 
 
A suggestion in the literature exists that LIC might be an optimal component of 
the CEO compensation package in terms of incentivising improved future 
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company performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990b). However, Cooper et al. (2014) 
found the opposite, that negative abnormal TSR was associated with higher 
excess LIC in the top three deciles, and more so for this component of 
compensation than any other. CEO overconfidence was put forward as a possible 
reason for this phenomenon. They found no linear relationship between pay and 
future performance in the remaining deciles. Contrary to the findings of Cooper et 
al. (2014), the descriptive analysis indicates that in the SA context LIC is 
positively associated with relatively better abnormal TSR in the top deciles of 
excess LIC, but this is not so pronounced as the positive relationship between 
excess SCC and abnormal TSR. However, the statistical analysis shows that no 
linear relationship between excess LIC and abnormal TSR exists.  
In contrast to the lack of a relationship between excess LIC and abnormal future 
TSR, both descriptive and statistical analysis show a positive relationship between 
excess SCC and abnormal TSR. This suggests that in the SA context SCC is a 
more optimal component of TC than LIC in terms of CEO incentivisation. This 
question is further investigated in section 6.5 which follows, investigating 
whether the relative values of the two components comprising the structure of the 
CEO compensation package is of influence in the pay-performance sensitivity 
relationship.  
 
6.5.The relationship between the compensation structure (LIC versus TC) 
and future total shareholder return (TSR) 
This section analyses the relationship between the CEO compensation structure 
and future company performance in addressing research question 10 that was set. 
 
Research question 10: Does an indication exist in the South African context that 
long-term incentives may represent an optimal component 
in the CEO compensation package? 
 
In order to address research question 10 the following hypothesis was set: 
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Hypothesis 7 (H7): The companies with CEOs in the top decile of the relative 
proportion of LIC to TC, earn higher equally weighted 
future abnormal TSR than the companies of the CEOs in 
the bottom decile, when forming portfolios at the start of 
the calendar year. 
From the pattern of future abnormal TSR in Figure 30 below, it is clear that pay 
packages that consist of a larger proportion LIC relative to TC results in higher 
future abnormal TSR than compensation packages consisting of short-term cash 
compensation only. 
Figure 30: Abnormal returns (equally-weighted) earned by companies with 
CEOs in the top and bottom deciles of long-term incentive compensation as a 
percentage of total compensation (including companies paying no LIC) 
 
The top decile sorted on the LIC to TC ratio includes companies whose CEOs 
earn between 54% and 95% of their total compensation by means of long-term 
incentives. The bottom “decile” is not a true decile in that it includes all 
companies that compensated their CEOs by means of 100% cash pay. 
Companies who’s CEOs earn a relatively larger proportion of their overall 
compensation by means of long-term incentives outperform CEOs earning only 
cash compensation in the first year, with abnormal returns of 5.2% compared to 
0.9%. Over time the CEOs earning higher LIC continue to outperform their peers 
with an abnormal TSR of 11.0% after nine quarters. The CEOs earning only cash 
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pay perform significantly worse, earning a negative abnormal TSR of -4.4% after 
nine quarters (refer to Table 36 on the next page). 
Since companies that do not pay any long-term incentive compensation may differ 
from companies that do, the relationship in Figure 30 was recalculated by 
removing the companies that did not pay any LIC from the sample. This resulted 
in the bottom decile of companies ranked on the proportion of LIC to TC 
outperforming the top decile (refer Figure 31 below). 
Figure 31: Abnormal returns (equally-weighted) earned by companies with 
CEOs in the top and bottom deciles of long-term incentive compensation as a 
percentage of total compensation (excluding companies paying no LIC) 
 
Since there is no relationship between LIC and abnormal TSR, it is no surprise 
that the abnormal TSR lines of the top and bottom deciles swap around when 
recalculating the relationship between LIC and abnormal TSR in a different way. 
The cumulative abnormal TSR at the end of four and nine quarters is presented, in 
Table 36 on the next page, for the sample including companies that pay zero LIC, 
as well as the sample excluding those companies. 
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Table 36: Abnormal returns (equally weighted) calculated against Top100 
JSE Listed companies for top and bottom deciles sorted on incentive to total 
pay ratio (calendar year portfolio formation) 
Portfolio based on ratio of 
long-term incentive 
compensation to total 
compensation: (LIC : TC) 
Companies paying no 
LIC included 
Companies paying no LIC 
excluded 
N 
Quarter 
(+4) 
Quarter 
(+9) 
N 
Quarter 
(+4) 
Quarter 
(+9) 
Top decile 26 5.2% 11.0% 20 0.9% 5.2% 
Bottom decile 69 0.9%
*
 -4.4%
*
 19 2.4% 6.4% 
* Due to the large number of companies that do not award long-term incentives, more than one 
decile contained companies with a 100% cash component. The bottom “decile” includes all 
companies that paid 0% LIC (2011: N = 23, 2012: N = 25 and 2013: N = 21) 
 
The Pearson’s correlation between the ratio of LIC to TC and the abnormal 
returns was calculated for all nine quarters for the period 2011 to 2013 and no 
statistically significant relationship was found. Thus, regardless of how it is 
tested, no relationship between the structure (proportion LIC to TC) of CEO 
compensation and abnormal TSR is found and Hypothesis 7 is rejected (refer 
Table 37 in section 6.6). 
 
6.6. Conclusion to research objective 2 
Of the four positive relationships hypothesised regarding compensation and future 
company returns (as set out in Table 37 on the next page), Hypotheses 6 and 7 
regarding the existence of a positive relationship between future abnormal TSR 
and LIC, and the structure of CEO compensation, are rejected on the basis of a 
complete lack of a descriptive or statistically significant relationship in any form.  
Hypothesis 5 regarding the positive relationship between excess SCC and 
abnormal TSR is accepted on the basis of a consistently positive relationship both 
descriptively when employing various methods, as well as statistically significant 
when performing different tests. The relationship, however, appears weak. 
Hypothesis 4 regarding the existence of a positive relationship between excess TC 
and abnormal TSR is rejected due to inconsistent findings. Descriptively there 
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appears to be a positive relationship, but statistical tests reveal that this 
relationship is only significant for a few quarters, and changes when employing a 
different statistical method. 
Table 37: Results of Chapter 6: Analysis of the relationship between pay and 
future performance 
No. Hypothesis Result 
H4 A positive relationship between excess total compensation (TC) and 
abnormal future total shareholder return (TSR) exists. 
Reject 
H5 A positive relationship between excess short-term cash compensation (SCC) 
and abnormal future total shareholder return (TSR) exists. 
Accept 
H6 A positive relationship between excess long-term incentive compensation 
(LIC) and abnormal future total shareholder return (TSR) exists. 
Reject 
H7 The companies with CEOs in the top decile of the relative proportion of LIC 
to TC, earn higher equally weighted future abnormal TSR than the 
companies of the CEOs in the bottom decile, when forming portfolios at the 
start of the calendar year. 
Reject 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1.Research conclusions 
This study had two research objectives: 
1. to analyse and describe compensation levels and pay structures for the 
largest 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
for 2011 to 2013; and 
2. to investigate and analyse the relationship between the level and structure 
of CEO compensation and the future total shareholder return (TSR) in 
South Africa (SA). 
In meeting these research objectives the study presented the following key 
findings related to CEO compensation in SA. Firstly, this study highlights the 
skewed distribution of CEO compensation in the top 100 JSE listed companies in 
South Africa towards the lower end of the spectrum with nearly two thirds of 
CEOs earning total compensation less than the mean of R20.5 million. Long-term 
incentive compensation (LIC) is not paid by 27% of the largest 100 listed 
companies in South Africa. Secondly, a statistically significant relationship 
between CEO total compensation (TC) and company size (as measured by 
revenue) was found, but not industry grouping. This may be evidence that the 
sales maximisation hypothesis put forward by Baumol in the 1920’s (McGuire et 
al., 1962) is applicable in the SA context, that the practice of benchmarking of 
CEO compensation on company size may exist in SA, and it corroborates the 
international literature that CEO pay and company size are related. Thirdly, this 
study corrects the view expressed in prior South African pay-performance 
sensitivity studies that LIC is an insignificant component of total compensation 
(TC) and so can be ignored as a component of TC. This study found that LIC 
comprises 38% of total compensation at the overall level (28% at the median). 
Finally, a weak positive relationship between excess short-term cash 
compensation (SCC) and future abnormal TSR was found in this study. No 
relationship was found to exist between either excess TC or excess LIC and future 
abnormal TSR. 
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The study contributes towards filling several gaps in the South African (SA) 
literature: Firstly, no prior SA study followed the international norm of adequately 
including long-term incentive compensation (LIC) as a component of CEO 
compensation or measuring company performance in terms of total shareholder 
return (TSR). Secondly, previous SA pay-performance sensitivity studies did not 
consider future company performance. Thirdly, prior studies are generally limited 
to specific industries or company size groups. Finally, no previous SA study 
adequately controlled for company size, with implications for the interpretation of 
the results thereof. The contribution of this study in addressing these gaps is set 
out below. 
 
7.2.Contributions of this study 
Unexpectedly this study finds a positive relationship between abnormal future 
TSR and SCC, but not LIC. The non-existent relationship between excess LIC 
and abnormal TSR is of concern and qualitative studies that have the potential to 
investigate and explain this phenomenon are needed. Even though only a three 
year compensation period is considered, thus including only short-term abnormal 
returns, this study does provide a first glimpse into the relationship between LIC 
and future company performance. If a significant relationship does exist, it would 
have been expected that some evidence of that relationship would start appearing, 
even in a limited time period, similar to that between SCC and abnormal TSR. 
This study generally corroborates the international literature that reports no linear 
relationship for a large part of the sample; however, the finding in the 
international literature that the highest paying companies report a negative 
association between excess LIC and future abnormal TSR does not apply to SA. 
This study is the first in South Africa that explicitly investigates the link between 
CEO compensation and company size, and found that it is statistically significant. 
Consequently, a problem in prior SA studies is identified: Existing studies that 
report a strong positive relationship between SCC and size-related accounting 
 
 
 
 
146 
 
measures of company performance are in fact reporting a relationship between 
CEO pay and the size of the company, and not the performance thereof. 
After controlling for company size in different ways, this study found a weak to 
moderate positive relationship between SCC and abnormal short-term future TSR. 
This study does not attempt to find explanatory reasons for this relationship, but 
raises the question of why this relationship exists. It is suggested that labour 
market theory (talent attraction) has the potential to answer this question; 
however, qualitative research would be helpful in exploring possible reasons for 
this relationship, by allowing reality to show itself freely, without conditioning it 
by the parameters set in place by quantitative empirical research. 
This study brings clarity to the SA literature by showing that there is a 
relationship between excess SCC and future company performance. This 
relationship is not clear from previous research because of the shortcomings of 
using accounting measures that are mostly related to the size of the company, 
instead of TSR to measure company performance. This study also highlights the 
importance of corroborating tests being embedded in the research design in order 
to consider the internal consistency of the findings, as well the risk of relying on 
empirical results that may change when a different methodology, time frame or 
sample size is used. 
In conclusion, this study brings clarity to the South African literature by reporting 
a positive, though weak, relationship between short-term cash compensation and 
abnormal future total shareholder return. No such relationship is found for long-
term incentive compensation, which raises the important question of considering 
how CEO compensation packages – and LIC specifically – are structured and 
used in South Africa to drive company performance. 
 
7.3.Areas for future research 
The positive relationship between SCC and lack of any relationship between LIC, 
and abnormal TSR found in this study prompts the need for qualitative research in 
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order to investigate possible reasons for the ineffectiveness of LIC to incentivise 
future company performance, as well as to explain why SCC is positively 
associated with future company performance. 
The apparent ineffectiveness of LIC to drive company performance could be 
further investigated by extending the time period of the study to include time-
series analyses and by calculating abnormal returns for a longer holding period 
since the effect of long-term incentive schemes may take a long time to manifest 
in terms of company performance. The expected value of share options and 
performance share grants could also be calculated more accurately by using 
company specific assumptions for the variables in order to investigate whether 
more accurate LIC values will have an effect on the relationship between LIC and 
company performance. 
The investigation of the relationship between excess CEO compensation and 
company performance could be refined by controlling for other variables (CEO 
age, CEO tenure, corporate governance structures, ownership structure, CEO 
shareholding) that may potentially have an effect on CEO compensation, as well 
as controlling for industry by breaking the sample up into smaller, more specific, 
industry groupings, although the small sample sizes in the SA context will present 
challenges to the statistical analysis thereof. The literature review did not reveal 
any work in SA on other theories underpinning executive compensation (labour 
market theory and managerial power theory). A study to investigate the effect of 
these theories as determinants of the relationship between CEO compensation and 
company performance would be of value. 
Finally, while this study covered a larger sample than most South African studies, 
small capitalisation companies and companies listed on the Alternative Exchange 
could be included in a future study to describe CEO compensation and to 
investigate whether the same relationship between SCC and abnormal TSR exists, 
as for medium and large capitalisation companies. In addition to calculating 
excess pay based on company size only, a larger sample may make it possible to 
break up peer size groups further into lagged return groups to eliminate the effect 
that mean reversion may have on future share performance. 
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Other areas of suggested future research that emanate from this study are: 
- A small proportion of CEOs earn a large proportion of their wealth in the 
form of LIC, while 91% of CEOs earned below average LIC. A study 
investigating whether a trend towards more or less LIC, relative to SCC, 
exists in SA would be of interest; 
- Possible reasons for some companies not awarding LIC or bonuses may 
include corporate culture, performance targets not being met or that 
incentives were awarded in one year, but cover several subsequent years. 
Further research is required to identify the reasons for LIC not being 
awarded, as this may provide insights into the lack of a relationship 
between LIC and abnormal future TSR reported in this study; 
- The apparent positive relationship between excess TC and abnormal TSR 
for the highest paying companies in SA is in contrast to a negative 
relationship reported in the U.S. Cooper et al. (2014) found evidence of 
CEO overconfidence in the U.S, which warrants a study investigating why 
the SA situation differs from the US experience, and why overconfidence 
is not evident locally; 
- The cumulative quarterly abnormal returns generally increased during the 
quarters where a statistically significant relationship between SCC and 
abnormal TSR was found, while decreasing where this relationship was 
insignificant. This requires further investigation in order to identify other 
factors that became relatively more influential during these periods; and 
lastly 
- The superior performance of the top two deciles in terms of excess LIC, as 
well as the high proportion of “mega”-sized companies in those deciles, 
stands out. A study aiming investigating whether this is explained by 
labour market theory and talent attraction is of interest.   
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APPENDIX A 
Table 38: Summary of findings  
No. Hypothesis Result 
H1 The distributions of the level of CEO total compensation of companies in four 
different size groups (based on revenue) are the same. 
 
Reject 
H2 The distributions of the level of CEO total compensation of companies in four 
industry sectors are the same. 
 
Accept 
H3 The correlation between LIC and TC is stronger than the correlation between 
SCC and TC. 
 
Accept 
H4 A positive relationship between excess total compensation (TC) and abnormal 
future total shareholder return (TSR) exists. 
Reject 
H5 A positive relationship between excess short-term cash compensation (SCC) and 
abnormal future total shareholder return (TSR) exists. 
Accept 
H6 A positive relationship between excess long-term incentive compensation (LIC) 
and abnormal future total shareholder return (TSR) exists. 
Reject 
H7 The companies with CEOs in the top decile of the relative proportion of LIC to 
TC, earn higher equally weighted future abnormal TSR than the companies of the 
CEOs in the bottom decile, when forming portfolios at the start of the calendar 
year. 
Reject 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table 39: Descriptive statistics on compensation components for companies 
of the “mega” size group (revenue > R100 billion) 
 
 Total 
guaranteed 
package 
(TGP) 
R’000 
Annual cash 
bonus (CB) 
R’000 
Short-term 
cash 
compensati
on (SCC) 
[TGP + CB] 
R’000 
Long-term 
incentives 
(LIC)  
R’000 
Total 
compensati
on (TC) 
[SCC + 
LIC]  
R’000 
Mean 16 019 11 866 27 885 29 815 57 700 
Median 15 574 12 748 27 561 31 092 55 785 
Std. dev. (P) 5 909 7 499 11 381 26 034 27 571 
Std. dev. (S) 6 017 7 637 11 590 26 512 28 077 
Maximum 26 088 27 230 52 842 130 454 136 713 
Minimum 5 300 - 5 300 -  5 586 
% of sum 28% 21% 48% 52% 100% 
  
 
Table 40: Descriptive statistics on compensation components for companies 
of the “large” size group (revenue: R40 billion to R100 billion) 
 
 Total 
guaranteed 
package 
(TGP) 
R’000 
Annual cash 
bonus (CB) 
R’000 
Short-term 
cash 
compensati
on (SCC) 
[TGP + CB] 
R’000 
Long-term 
incentives 
(LIC)  
R’000 
Total 
compensati
on (TC) 
[SCC + 
LIC]  
R’000 
Mean 11 331 4 794 16 124 9 003 25 127 
Median 7 931 4 824 14 524 7 351 22 503 
Std. dev. (P) 9 645 3 757 9 273 7 539 12 083 
Std. dev. (S) 9 727 3 789 9 351 7 603 12 185 
Maximum 50 001 14 908 50 001 30 925 55 099 
Minimum 3 501 - 5 013 - 5 614 
% of sum 45% 19% 64% 36% 100% 
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Table 41: Descriptive statistics on compensation components for companies 
of the “medium” size group (revenue: R10 billion to R40 billion) 
 
 Total 
guaranteed 
package 
(TGP) 
R’000 
Annual cash 
bonus (CB) 
R’000 
Short-term 
cash 
compensati
on (SCC) 
[TGP + CB] 
R’000 
Long-term 
incentives 
(LIC)  
R’000 
Total 
compensati
on (TC) 
[SCC + 
LIC]  
R’000 
Mean 5 782 4 236 10 019 4 450 14 468 
Median 5 576 3 612 9 213 2 304 13 146 
Std. dev. (P) 2 303 3 861 4 623 6 881 9 863 
Std. dev. (S) 2 314 3 879 4 646 6 914 9 911 
Maximum 15 251 16 234 25 877 48 964 70 547 
Minimum 1 658 - 2 184 - 2 184 
% of sum 40% 29% 69% 31% 100% 
 
 
Table 42: Descriptive statistics on compensation components for companies 
of the “small” size group (revenue < R10 billion) 
 
 Total 
guaranteed 
package 
(TGP) 
R’000 
Annual cash 
bonus (CB) 
R’000 
Short-term 
cash 
compensati
on (SCC) 
[TGP + CB] 
R’000 
Long-term 
incentives 
(LIC)  
R’000 
Total 
compensati
on (TC) 
[SCC + 
LIC]  
R’000 
Mean 4 621 3 260 7 881 2850 10 731 
Median 4 166 2 291 6 275 2133 9 396 
Std. dev. (P) 2 313 3 597 4 497 3688 6 521 
Std. dev. (S) 2 329 3 622 4 529 3715 6 567 
Maximum 10 905 16 575 21 500 17158 31 856 
Minimum 1 128 - 1 431 - 1 431 
% of sum 43% 30% 73% 27% 100% 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table 43: Descriptive statistics on compensation components for companies 
of the Basic Resources industry group 
 
 Total 
guaranteed 
package 
(TGP) 
R’000 
Annual cash 
bonus (CB) 
R’000 
Short-term 
cash 
compensati
on (SCC) 
[TGP + CB] 
R’000 
Long-term 
incentives 
(LIC)  
R’000 
Total 
compensati
on (TC) 
[SCC + 
LIC]  
R’000 
Mean 9 561 5 059 14 619 10 221 24 840 
Median 8 029 3 519 11 816 5 967 18 377 
Std. dev. (P) 5 440 4 898 8 365 12 943 19 757 
Std. dev. (S) 5 484 4 938 8 433 13 049 19 918 
Maximum 26 088 22 422 42 161 58 421 100 582 
Minimum 3 070 - 3 876 - 4 816 
% of sum 38% 20% 59% 41% 100% 
  
 
Table 44: Descriptive statistics on compensation components for companies 
of the Financial Services industry group 
 
 Total 
guaranteed 
package 
(TGP) 
R’000 
Annual cash 
bonus (CB) 
R’000 
Short-term 
cash 
compensati
on (SCC) 
[TGP + CB] 
R’000 
Long-term 
incentives 
(LIC)  
R’000 
Total 
compensati
on (TC) 
[SCC + 
LIC]  
R’000 
Mean 5 475 4 486 9 961 9 214 19 175 
Median 5 118 3 851 9 291 3 668 13 773 
Std. dev. (P) 3 349 4 378 6 050 17 528 20 194 
Std. dev. (S) 3 373 4 410 6 093 17 655 20 340 
Maximum 19 122 16 575 27 603 130 454 136 713 
Minimum 1 190 - 1 431 - 1 431 
% of sum 29% 23% 52% 48% 100% 
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Table 45: Descriptive statistics on compensation components for companies 
of the Industrial industry group 
 
 
  
Total 
guaranteed 
package 
(TGP) 
R’000 
Annual cash 
bonus (CB) 
R’000 
Short-term 
cash 
compensati
on (SCC) 
[TGP + CB] 
R’000 
Long-term 
incentives 
(LIC)  
R’000 
Total 
compensati
on (TC) 
[SCC + 
LIC]  
R’000 
Mean 6 257 4 952 11 208 3 970 15 178 
Median 5 610 4 828 10 593 3 335 12 806 
Std. dev. (P) 3 147 4 082 6 029 4 081 8 768 
Std. dev. (S) 3 192 4 140 6 114 4 139 8 893 
Maximum 13 659 16 229 29 532 17 045 42 795 
Minimum 1 658 - 3 751 - 3 751 
% of sum 41% 33% 74% 26% 100% 
 
 
Table 46: Descriptive statistics on compensation components for companies 
of the Services industry group 
 
 Total 
guaranteed 
package 
(TGP) 
R’000 
Annual cash 
bonus (CB) 
R’000 
Short-term 
cash 
compensati
on (SCC) 
[TGP + CB] 
R’000 
Long-term 
incentives 
(LIC)  
R’000 
Total 
compensati
on (TC) 
[SCC + 
LIC]  
R’000 
Mean 9 016 5 116 14 132 6 511 20 643 
Median 5 867 3 862 10 130 2 365 13 877 
Std. dev. (P) 8 884 5 656 11 592 10 838 19 452 
Std. dev. (S) 8 931 5 686 11 653 10 896 19 555 
Maximum 50 001 27 230 52 842 50 220 86 916 
Minimum
1
 1 128 - 1 751 - 3 150 
% of sum 44% 25% 68% 32% 100% 
 
 
                                                 
1
 This excludes one CEO who did not earn any compensation during the period 2011 to 2013 
 
 
 
 
